How about some analysis on the fire?
James G. Quintiere earned a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering in 1970.And some of his work on a relevant topic:He has more than 25 years experience in fire research and its applications, is a professor in the Department of Fire Protection Engineering at the University of Maryland.
Professor Quintiere has conducted research in the study of fire growth in structures and on materials, has developed test methods for ignition and flames spread, studied smoke movement in full-scale and scale model systems, and has developed theoretical solutions and simulation models for fire behavior and material response to fire. He has more than 100 publications in the field, and is currently Chairman of the International Association for Fire Safety Science (the world organization for fire research and its applications).
In addition to his research, he has helped to analyze a number of fire disasters including the Dupont Plaza fire and the more recent Branch Davidian Fire near Waco, Texas.
Books by James G. Quintiere:
Principles of Fire Behavior
Fire Research Applied to the 1993 Fire in Waco, TexasFrom: http://www.iafss.org/newsletters/1996.htm#FireresearchappliedOn April 19, Waco, Texas was the site of one of the deadliest USA fires of 1993, a fire that ended a long siege by agents of the US government at the complex occupied by the Branch Davidian religious group. IAFSS Chair James Quintiere notes that "In the two years since, many theories about the fire have been proposed, some quite bizarre." Professor Quintiere was asked to be part of an investigation of the cause and origin of the fire, and his statement to the US Congress, summarizing his findings, was also published in the November/December issue of the National Fire Protection Association's NFPA Journal.
One of his recommendations was that when catastrophic fires of national interest occur, a national inquiry be conducted to determine the facts. "This should be conducted by a national objective body... To protect and preserve society better, we must learn from these disasters. Moreover, the findings must be based on technically sound principles. I recommend that there be a national investment in the development of fire science in order to ensure technically sound investigations and to advance the technology of fire safety."
While the Waco fire was highly unusual in its circumstances, the occurrence of a fire with potential implications for national policy and a great deal of attendant controversy is not unique to the Waco fire or even to the USA. For this reason, Professor Quintiere suggested that the IAFSS membership might be interested in his statement. For reasons of space, the statement has been compressed to focus on the logic of the analysis and the resulting findings. "The fire had completely leveled the compound, so that no significant remains were available to establish the development of this fire. However, this fire was probably one of the most extensively recorded fires in history ... [including] a forward-looking infrared (FLIR) video. ...
"The principal source of data to establish the inception of the fires and their locations is the FLIR video. [Later parts of the statement explain the use of FLIR video data to identify fire plumes and other hot gas areas, as well as rates of growth to flashover and energy release rates at flashover, which have implications for the fuels involved.] Based on the calibrated clock of the FLIR, the other video and photographic records could be correlated, and a comprehensive visual record of this fire could be established. >From this visual data, I was able to determine the point of origin of the fires, their growth rates, and estimates of the fire energy output rates at critical transition points in their development. ...
"It is concluded that these three fires, occurring nearly at one-minute intervals, were intentionally set from within the compound. Even if the tank battering had caused the spillage of fuel from lamps, a match would be needed to initiate the fire. An electrical spark is ruled out because the electric power was shut off in the compound. It is obvious that these three fires needed an ignition source deliberately placed in each of the three locations. Also, none of these three fires could have caused any of the others because their growth rates would not provide sufficient heating to cause such remote ignitions. Any external heat source that might have been used to start the fires would have clearly been visible on the infrared video. This was not seen. Although normal furnishings and interior construction characteristics would provide a means for fire propagation, the more-than-usually rapid spread of these fires, especially in the dining room and chapel areas, indicates that some form of accelerant was very likely used.
"Methylene chloride, used as a dispersal agent for CS tear gas, is flammable as a vapor at a concentration of 12 percent in air; however, it is not easily ignited as a liquid. In fact, it will put out a match on attempting to ignite the liquid. Although fire spread was relatively rapid in the compound, these rates are not indicative of the much more rapid propagation that would be associated with a flammable mixture in the air. Those rates would be in excess of two feet per second, and would be seen as a fireball moving through the atmosphere of the interior of the compound. No such characteristics were observed in this early fire growth.
"Recently, I conducted additional experiments to assess the role of methylene chloride as a wetting agent to available fuel types in the compound, such as wood and paper. Since methylene chloride is a liquid at normal temperatures, it could have been absorbed into the furnishings of the compound. From my experiments, I can conclude that the methylene chloride had no enhancement effect on the fire spread over room furnishings. Also, I can conclude from the flashpoint data (197°C or 387°F) of CS itself, that its deposition on furnishings should not have had a significant effect on fire propagation either. Hence, the tear gas had no bearing on the propagation of this fire. ...
"It is estimated that the occupants would have had sufficient warning of the fire to escape, for at least up to five minutes from its inception, and up to nearly 20 minutes in some more protected locations. This is dramatically indicated by one occupant, who jumped from the second floor 12 minutes after the start of the fire. Although smoke would have impaired visibility, exits were within 30 feet of most occupants, with additional openings made by the battering tanks.
"Carbon monoxide in the smoke would have been the primary threat to the occupants. However, preliminary autopsy reports made available to me indicated that only five of 31 victims with recorded carbon monoxide (CO) levels had lethal levels of CO. The remaining 26 victims with recorded CO data stopped breathing before lethal CO levels were attained. Hence, if these data are correct, at least 26 victims did not die due to the fire. The autopsy report goes on to indicate that, in at least 17 of the victims, death was attributed to gunshot wound."