Posted on 03/25/2003 4:46:39 PM PST by Axion
The War and the Clock Summary
Mar 26, 2003 - 0025 GMT
The realization that the war in Iraq would not be over in a day or two sent the markets reeling and the media into a frenzy of negativity this week. When one considers that Desert Storm took six weeks and Kosovo took two months, it strikes us as odd that the criteria for a successful war has been set in days. In fact, both the Iraqi and U.S. war plans are playing out pretty much as expected -- a chess game with fairly predictable first moves. Both sides have done well, but ultimately, the Iraqis have been able to pose only localized problems for coalition forces, and the coalition has been able to accomplish its strategic missions. Things get harder now, of course, but the logic of the war remains set. The United States will win, unless it takes unnecessary risks in trying to win a prize for the world's shortest war.
Analysis
The American people discovered last weekend that the United States was at war. They discovered that in war, troops are wounded, taken prisoner and go missing in action. They discovered that the enemy can sometimes fight and sometimes win, and that they might well be brave and skilled. This seemed to come as a shock to many, judging from the behavior of the stock market on March 24 and the behavior of reporters at a March 25 briefing by U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Gen. Richard Myers. The events of the weekend seemed to convince both the markets and reporters that something might be seriously wrong with U.S. strategy.
Some had expected that the Iraqi army might not fight at all and would simply collapse at the first blow. This was always a possibility, but as Stratfor stated in its War Plans series, it wasn't the most likely scenario:
"It has been 12 years since the Gulf War. The general assumption on the U.S. side is that the Iraqi army has deteriorated over that time and that the defeat of 1991 in Kuwait can be replicated in 2003 in the whole of Iraq. This may well be true, but the answer will not be known until the battle has begun. This much we do know: The Iraqi government must believe that its forces have improved. Its leaders know how badly the Iraqi army was defeated in 1991. They know that a similar defeat in 2003 could mean their lives and certainly their freedom and fortunes. They have alternatives, such as complying with weapons inspections or accepting exile; they have not chosen these. Therefore, they clearly must believe -- rightly or wrongly -- that their forces have improved or were not fully tested in 1991." From War Plan: Iraq - March 12, 2003.
Since their lives were on the line, we tended to trust the Iraqis' judgment. They thought their army would fight, and it did.
Which means there is resistance. That fact has stunned some people, who have gone from the expectation that there would be no resistance to the view that any resistance represents not only a stunning setback, but in some way a betrayal -- a failure to deliver on a flawless war in which the Iraqis would cooperate by capitulating at the first shot. The lack of realism about war, both in the financial community and among portions of the media, has been interesting to say the least.
Let's begin by benchmarking wars. Desert Storm, which is as close to the perfect campaign as you can come, lasted six weeks. It included a massive air campaign that culminated in a lightning ground war. The lightning ground war was made possible by the fact that Iraqi forces left in Kuwait were generally among the weakest formations in the Iraqi army and had been brutalized by six weeks of incessant bombardment. But the perfect campaign still took six weeks.
Kosovo, which was far from a perfect campaign by any measure, took two months to complete. It did not end in the military defeat of the Yugoslav armed forces but in a complex diplomatic maneuver, in which the Russians convinced the Serb leadership that capitulation on the Kosovo question was better than resistance. It nevertheless took the United States and its coalition two months of intense bombardment to reach this point.
It is true that Haiti was defeated in a matter of days. But Iraq is not Haiti. Under the best of circumstances, you couldn't drive from Kuwait to Turkey in 48 hours in peacetime. The idea that a large military force could enter and occupy Iraq in a matter of days was preposterous on its face, even if the Iraqi army had served as guides. The time measure for this war ought to be Desert Storm and Kosovo, save that the territory being fought over is substantially larger than either Kuwait or Kosovo, and the defenders appear somewhat more motivated. This is a war of weeks or months, not of days.
Thus far, the war has been fought as Stratfor expected, by both sides. In our war plan for Iraq, we wrote:
"The Iraqi regime intends to try to impose a war of attrition on the United States, under the working assumption that time and casualties are what Washington can least afford." From War Plan: Iraq, March 12, 2003.
Iraq's plans included devolving command to the lowest possible levels, imposing delays and casualties on U.S. forces advancing from Kuwait, establishing defensive lines in populated/urbanized areas south of Baghdad, and digging in and waiting for U.S. forces to come to them. So far, they have held to their plan.
The United States is also operating generally according to plan:
"Two separate operations apparently are planned. One, involving the slightly heavier forces, seems committed to advancing northward, into the oil fields and against two Republican Guard Armored Divisions. The lighter, western force seems to be preparing a combined ground/airmobile thrust into the Western Desert, to the Euphrates bridges." From War Plan: United States, March 14, 2003.
The coalition drove north, encountering the 51st Mechanized Division and the 6th Armored Division -- both regular army units -- which splintered when attacked. However, certain elements did resist stubbornly, allied with special operations troops that linked with them and continued to resist in Umm Qasr and Basra. These pockets needed to be eliminated, but many of the units in this area were released and reassigned to the more strategic western drive.
The 3rd Infantry Division mounted the drive to the west and north to the Euphrates river bridges. There were limited airmobile operations, although elements of the 101st Airborne Division did participate in the drive. The drive was a textbook application of the principles of armored and mechanized warfare. It drove at maximum possible speed through the line of least resistance, on the relatively unpopulated and undefended western bank of the Euphrates. The spearhead bypassed all pockets of resistance, continuing the attack northward until it reached a major line of resistance south of Karbala, where Republican Guard forces were dug in, waiting for their first encounter with the U.S. forces.
The 11th Infantry Division, which was a regular army unit charged with holding the Euphrates line from An Nasiriyah to An Najaf, had an impossible mission: It could not possibly hold the entire line. Nevertheless, elements of the 11th remained in An Nasiriyah and formed other pockets of resistance that were attacked by U.S. forces following the spearhead. The Iraqi forces held in several places, inflicting casualties. Even a direct attack by U.S. Marines on the night of March 24-25, which led to the capture of the bridge at An Nasiriyah, did not completely dislodge the Iraqis.
What we have seen, therefore, is that the Iraqis were defeated on the strategic level. The main objectives of both operations were met. However, the Iraqis did not simply collapse. They held their positions and, on a tactical level, were able to inflict casualties, take prisoners and pose non-critical problems for U.S. forces. The bottom line is that some Iraqi troops -- but far from all -- held their positions. However, the speed of the U.S. advance was not affected. The resistance was strategically ineffective, causing very light casualties for an operation of this sort.
On the other side of the ledger, the United States demonstrated that it could deploy a division-sized force for an impressive thrust against light resistance. Since the night of March 20, the United States executed the easier part of the campaign. It advanced to the major line of Iraqi resistance and halted its advance as it should have done, which opened the door for the next part of the campaign -- intensive air attacks on the Republican Guards. Those attacks resulted in the downing of a single Apache helicopter, and the capture of its crew. Apache attacks were apparently abandoned in favor of attacks by tactical aircraft and, we suspect, ultimate bombardment by B-52s, which will seek to break the Republican Guard before a ground assault begins. In the meantime, U.S. forces, under the cover of a dust storm, appear to have crossed at multiple points to the more populated eastern bank of the Euphrates. This opens up a new axis of attack, with the potential of either flanking the Republican Guard around Karbala or moving forward to identify the major line of resistance between the Euphrates and Tigris and/or assault on Al Kut.
The Iraqi forces have performed more effectively than expected, and some of their soldiers have fought courageously. The United States has carried out its first maneuvers of the war as expected, and coalition troops also have fought courageously and effectively. On the Iraqi side, it must be said that many of their forces did not resist. On the U.S. side, it has to be said that forces have not yet confronted their greatest challenge. That is yet to come, as the battle south of Baghdad unfolds and U.S. troops fight Republican Guards -- who may be shattered by U.S. air attacks or may resist.
All of that is as yet unknown. However, what is known is this: Two countries went to war, and both sides fought. The Iraqis were unable to defeat the coalition either in Basra or along the Euphrates, except in peripheral, tactical situations. They did not mount successful counteroffensives. They could not isolate U.S. forces. They could and did resist direct U.S. attack as well as air and artillery bombardment. But the U.S. war plan has not been checked, at least not yet.
The United States has an overwhelming advantage: Its forces are more mobile than those of Iraq, and it has air power. This means that while the Iraqi forces can hold fixed positions, they can neither engage in maneuver warfare nor, if they hold positions, can they avoid overwhelming air attack. The United States then can choose to attack directly or envelop the Iraqis. Once the battle is joined, coalition forces have the options. Even in the possible battle of Baghdad, the United States has the option of attack or siege. The Iraqis have only one option -- to hold in the face of bombardment. The Iraqis can't win.
They can't win unless they achieve their strategic goal: to create a political crisis in the United States that compels the Bush administration to accept a cease-fire. Their means to this end would be to inflict as many casualties as possible and to make the war last as long as possible, in the expectation that political support for the war will dissolve internationally and in the United States and Britain. Saddam Hussein's assumption is and has always been that the United States and Britain have no stomach for a long (defined as months), costly (defined as hundreds of deaths) war. From what he has seen so far, he has no reason to doubt his strategy.
To claim that either U.S. or Iraqi war plans have failed to this point indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of warfare. The measure of a plan is not whether it is adhered to, but whether it leads to victory. In this particular case, it seems to us that the plan thus far has actually been followed. But if one simply thinks of the Normandy Invasion, we can see a case in which many things went wrong for the Allies, except for one: that they succeeded in invading France.
There are some real issues built into the war, of course. The decision not to isolate Baghdad by shattering its electric and telecommunications system strikes us as odd, although it has not interfered thus far in the war. There is a question in our mind as to whether there are enough forces in theater to deal with the Republican Guards should they fight effectively. But at this point, with the air campaign against them just beginning, it isn't clear that additional forces will be needed.
Stratfor has consistently warned that the assumption that Iraq's army would not resist invasion of their homeland was probably flawed and certainly unproven. We are, as an organization, skeptical and pessimistic. However, the manic-depressive mood swings of the markets and some in the media force us to into a different mode. The fact that the United States has taken light casualties does not translate into thinking that the U.S. plan has failed. It hasn't even been tested.
The greatest danger the United States faces in this war is if its politicians and generals come to feel that they are working against some deadline -- if they sense that they must not only win, but win fast. That is where unnecessary risks are taken and where wars can be lost. How many really remember how long Desert Storm or Kosovo took? What is remembered is the outcome. There is no prize for doing it fast. However, the core Iraqi assumption is that the United States will not be given enough time by the American public to defeat Iraq. That is the essence of the Iraqi war plan. Over the past few days, it did not seem a foolish assumption.
The plan has many branch points. These branch points are taken based on real things happening on the battlefield. Not the feelings, fears, hopes, or dreams of journalists or even retired Generals.
No matter which branches are taken, they all lead to the same result: WE WIN!
"However, the manic-depressive mood swings of...the media force us to into a different mode."
Saddam has many allies in the media. One White House press conference is sufficient to prove the point.
Amen to that!
There is nothing Iraq can do that would achieve this goal. The political crisis, if it comes, will be fabricated out of lies and propaganda by Saddam's faithful allies, the liberal media and the liberal Democratic party.
I hope President Bush is keeping a sharp eye on the enemy within the gates; they are by far the more dangerous pole of the Axis of Evil.
As has been said, over and over again, "Those who know the plan are not talking." Now, you are getting to see the plan as it unfolds. Please, rest assured that when you are told that we are on the plan, we are on the plan!
The plan has many branch points. These branch points are taken based on real things happening on the battlefield. Not the feelings, fears, hopes, or dreams of journalists or even retired Generals.
No matter which branches are taken, they all lead to the same result: WE WIN!
(Thanks, Dave.)
Hard pounding, this, gentlemen; try who can pound the longest
- the Duke of Wellington, at Waterloo.
I lost interest in this article soon after this line.
I believe that the Iraqis thought that the US would never come and so their strength was not really an issue.
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