Naw, not me! As I told you
I've gone back to women.
Posted on 03/18/2003 11:04:32 PM PST by FairOpinion
A BUG linked to the virus that killed a Brisbane horse trainer in 1994 has emerged as a likely cause of the mysterious pneumonia-like illness that has claimed eleven lives around the world.
Specialists in Hong Kong and Germany claimed to have identified paramyxovirus in two patients suffering from severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) as the international death toll climbed to eleven.
Paramyxovirus belongs to a family of viruses that can infect animals and humans and cause a range of illnesses including measles, mumps and childhood croup, as well as distemper in dogs.
However, the World Health Organisation and local virologists and more information was needed before paramyxovirus was comforted as the source of the outbreak.
Health authorities in Australia said 20 people remained under investigation for SARS today but no cases were expected to be confirmed.
"In the absence of severe disease, most cases that are investigated in Australia are likely to be other unrelated respiratory infections," chief commonwealth medical officer Richard Smallwood said.
Paramyxovirus was linked to the equine morbillivirus, or Hendra virus, which killed Brisbane horse trainer Vic Rail in 1994, said Dr Dominic Dwyer of the Centre for Infectious Diseases and Microbiology at Westmead Hospital.
It was also related to the Nipah virus which broke out in 1999 among Malaysian pig workers, killing at least 65.
"Paramyxoviruses are a large group of viruses, there's a whole range of them some of them we know cause respiratory disease and some of them have been new ones," he said.
"An unknown paramyxovirus has been very high on the list of possible (causes)."
There was no specific treatment and no vaccine for paramyxovirus, Dr Dwyer said.
"Until we get some more information we don't know whether it's an animal one that's crossed over and spread around in humans or whether it's a human one that just happens to have become more virulent," he said.
"Once you have the organism you can then develop tests. In broad terms we wouldn't have tests at this stage but at least this gives us a direction to head."
The World Health Organisation said it was taking the paramyxovirus theory seriously, but added it was too early to draw conclusions.
"It's in two specimens and it's not been confirmed anywhere else," said Dr David Heymann, WHO's communicable diseases chief.
Dr Heymann said other labs around the world were now looking to see if they could find the same thing in their samples.
The breakthrough came as a French doctor who treated the first case of SARS died today after contracting the virus, while a second man died in Hong Kong.
Despite the climbing death toll, China said the outbreak, that has affected parts of the southern province of Guangdong since November, had been brought "under effective control".
AAP
Misuse of spellchecker alert!
In 1994-95 a new virus appeared in Queensland, killing two humans and fifteen horses in two separate outbreaks. In January 1999, another horse, near Cairns, died of the disease.
In the Brisbane outbreak in September 1994, a total of 13 horses died of hyperacute respiratory disease with clinical signs similar to African Horse Sickness. The trainer and a stablehand suffered from respiratory disease at the same time. The stablehand recovered slowly but the trainer died despite hospitalisation.
This first outbreak required a broadly targeted effort to discover the cause of the illness. Initially, the investigation included the Queensland Department of Primary Industries (QDPI) and the Queensland Health Department. QDPI sent samples to CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory (AAHL), the Fairfield Infectious Disease Hospital and the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in Atlanta, Georgia.
Diagnosis
The diagnostic team at AAHL isolated and identified the virus. Its structure was characteristic of viruses in the Paramyxoviridae family, none of which was known to cause serious disease in both horses and humans. Comparison with other viruses, through sequencing of some viral genes, soon showed that the mystery virus was most closely related to a group known as morbilliviruses, which contains viruses such as measles, rinderpest and canine distemper viruses. It had not been reported before anywhere in the world.
The virus was initially called equine morbillivirus, but genetic analysis of the entire virus later showed that its most appropriate classification is a new genus within the Paramyxoviridae family. The name Hendra virus is now currently used, after the Brisbane suburb in which the outbreak occurred.
With the cause of the disease outbreak known, AAHL researchers developed an ELISA, serum neutralisation and indirect fluorescent antibody tests. Queensland DPI, Queensland Department of Health, and CSIRO's Australian Animal Health Laboratory tested more than 2,500 horse samples and 150 human samples without finding any new cases.
Consequences of the outbreak
The occurrence of an unknown and serious disease in racing horses seriously disrupted the Queensland horse industries. The impact interstate was minimal. However, had the disease taken longer to diagnose, there could have been a substantial impact interstate, damaging the 1994 Melbourne Spring Carnival and the Melbourne Cup through restrictions on the movement of horses from region to region.
A second incident
In October 1995, Hendra virus was associated with a second death when a farmer from Mackay died in Brisbane. The farmer, who tested positive for Hendra virus, had close contact with two horses in August 1994 both during their clinical illness and while they were being autopsied. Subsequent tests at Geelong on tissue from the dead horses revealed the presence of Hendra virus.
Third case
In January 1999 a horse from a property near Cairns died from Hendra disease. The diagnosis was made by a team of AAHL scientists.
Research findings
Unlike other viruses in the family, which tend to be host-specific, Hendra virus can infect more than one species of animal. Scientists believe fruit bats (also known as flying foxes) are the natural 'host' of the virus. This means the virus is carried by fruit bats but has little effect on them. However, when it is transmitted to humans and horses, its effect is lethal.
Symptoms in horses include breathing difficulties, high fever and a blood-tinged foamy discharge from nose and mouth as the virus attacks blood vessels and causes pulmonary oedema - lungs filled with fluid. The Hendra virus produces both lung and brain disease, consistent with related viruses such as canine distemper and measles.
Queensland investigators have found antibodies to Hendra virus in four species of fruit bats. Approximately 25% of the bats they surveyed had antibodies to the virus. The presence of antibodies indicates that an animal has at some stage in the past been exposed to the virus, although the virus may not still be present. Of 13 wildlife species tested, only bats had antibodies to Hendra virus.
Analysis of the viral genes and research into the functions of viral proteins by AAHL researchers has yielded more information about how the virus affects animals.
Transmission of the virus
It has been shown experimentally that Hendra virus can cause severe clinical disease in cats and guinea pigs. There is infection, but no disease in fruit bats. No infection or disease occurs in dogs, chickens, rat and mice.
Scientists from AAHL have shown that Hendra virus is not highly contagious, but if an infection occurs it can cause death, except in fruit bats. The research demonstrates that horses can be infected by eating material contaminated with the virus, and that transmission from cat urine to horses can occur.
Experimentally, horses, cats and guinea pigs excreted the virus in their urine. Most importantly, the research also shows the virus is not carried on the breath of horses. This helps to explain why it is not highly contagious.
The research shows that if a further outbreak occurs in a stable, rigorous hygiene practices could greatly assist the eradication of the outbreak.
The means by which Hendra virus infected the horses at Hendra and Mackay is not known. Infected bat urine or an aborted bat foetus or reproductive fluids could have been involved, and other possibilities will be investigated.
Diagnostic tests
As a result of work at AAHL since the outbreak in 1994, regional veterinary laboratories and hospitals around Australia now have an ELISA diagnostic test. Other tests developed include an immunoperoxidase test for use on formalin-fixed tissue, virus isolation, and virus neutralisation tests to detect antibodies.
Current research
By better understanding the virus, we can develop improved diagnostics and establish the relationship of Hendra virus with other viruses. The recent emergence of viruses related to Hendra virus has meant that new diagnostic tests are required to discriminate Hendra virus infections from those caused by related viruses such as Nipah virus. Such tests may provide further clues on the disease that could assist in managing any further outbreaks. The approach involves genetic analysis and comparison of the gene sequence of Hendra virus with other closely related viruses.
CSIRO and the Commonwealth Government have supported the research into this new disease through their investment in AAHL.
Discovery of other bat viruses
During the first four years of the research program into the Hendra virus, two previously unknown diseases also associated with bats were identified in Australia.
The Australian bat lyssavirus was identified in 1996 after samples from a sick bat were sent to AAHL for testing for Hendra virus. Tests in fact showed that it was a close relative of rabies virus that caused the disease. Classical rabies does not occur in Australia. A human bat carer died from infection with the lyssavirus in 1996 and a second person died in December 1998.
A virus now known as the Menangle virus was first isolated in 1997 by NSW Agriculture after pig illness and miscarriage in a NSW piggery, and influenza like symptoms occurred in piggery workers. The Menangle virus is also a paramyxovirus, in the same family but unrelated to Hendra virus. It is also carried by fruit bats.
In 1999, another bat borne virus emerged, this time in Malaysia. The Nipah virus is related to but distinct from Hendra virus. Like Hendra virus, Nipah virus is a paramyxovirus.
Biocontainment
In 1996 the Hendra virus was classified as requiring Level-4 security, that is, the highest-level security procedures.
All people working with the virus, whether in the laboratory or with live animals, are required to wear a 'space suit' with its own air supply; or to work with the virus contained in an enclosed cabinet known as a flexible film isolator.
No! Sorry about that. I didn't realize you might take it that way, although in hindsight perhaps I should have.
My point was that all the words were "correctly spelled," in that dictionary entries exist with such spellings, but that didn't prevent a wrong word being used. Many people assume that if the spellchecker is happy, then there aren't any errors. Unfortunately, that's not the case. I suspect the author of the article put too much trust in his spellchecking software, which can't catch the type of error I pointed out. Proofreading is essential.
The reason I didn't give this verbose explanation originally is because I wasn't intending to give a serious admonition in favor of proofreading, but simply to gently laugh at the result of the author relying too heavily on the lack of any errors reported by spell checking software. Hence the brevity and tone of my post.
That does it for me! No more one night stands with nags.
Guess I'll go back to women-- but you gotta talk to them and cuddle!
*** THIS NEW REGULATION COULD AFFECT YOUR RESEARCH ***
July 12, 2002
If you conduct biomedical research, you need to know about this new regulation that addresses security of select infectious agents, toxins, and genetic elements (refer to attached list). The new law focuses on possession of materials that are not uncommon in biomedical research labs, and calls for DHHS to be more aggressive in tracking individuals who have them. This new law takes the Patriot Act to the next level.
The intensified concern over bioterrorism in the aftermath of September 11 and the subsequent anthrax incidents have caused Congress to increase its scrutiny of potential sources of biological agents that could pose a risk to the public’s health and safety, including the nation’s university laboratories. On May 22, the US House and Senate approved House Rule 3448 and President Bush signed it into law on June 12, 2002 (Public Law 107-188).
ACTION ITEM – Oversight of the Select Agents Program at the University of Michigan is accomplished through the Department of Occupational Safety and Environmental Health (OSEH). The contact is Michael Hanna at 7-2318. Please scour your memories, inventories, and Ultralow’s to determine if you are in possession of any of these regulated materials. Internal DEADLINE is August 30. If you suspect you’ve located a Select Agent, call OSEH and we’ll assist you in working through the required registration.
BACKGROUND – Since 1996 when Select Agents were first listed as more heavily regulated research materials by the CDC, OSEH has assisted the research community in dealing with these new regulations. In conjunction with the Office of the Vice President for Research (OVPR), the effort has been to alert and brief researchers on shipping restrictions for Select Agents. However, the new law dictates that you must register with the CDC if you merely possess these infectious agents, toxins, and genetic elements.
In the July 2nd Federal Register (FR), the CDC published a proposed data collection system for notification of Select Agents possession. Section 202(a) of the Act requires that all persons in possession of a Select Agent notify the Secretary of Health and Human Services by September 10, 2002.
Excerpt from the FR notice “In order to complete the application, the RFO will need to inventory its facility and consult with others (e.g., principal investigators) as necessary to obtain the information required for this application. The Responsible Facility Official (RFO) must review and sign the application and will be the point of contact if CDC has questions concerning the application or other matters related to the Public Law.
Appendix A
Select Agents List as of January 1, 2002
[42CFR 72, Appendix A – October 24, 1996]
Viruses
1. Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus
2. Eastern Equine Encephalitis virus
3. Ebola viruses
4. Equine Morbillivirus
5. Lassa fever virus
6. Marburg virus
7. Rift Valley fever virus
8. South American Haemorrhagic fever viruses (Junin, Machupo, Sabia, Flexal, Guanarito)
9. Tick-borne encephalitis complex viruses
10. Variola major virus (Smallpox virus)
11. Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis virus
12. Viruses causing hantavirus pulmonary syndrome
13. Yellow fever virus
Exemptions: Vaccine strains of viral agents (Junin Virus strain candid #1, Rift Valley fever virus strain MP-12, Venezuelan Equine encephalitis virus strain TC-83, Yellow fever virus strain 17-D) are exempt.
Bacteria
1. Bacillus anthracis
2. Brucella abortus, B. melitensis, B. suis
3. Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
4. Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
5. Clostridium botulinum
6. Francisella tularensis
7. Yersinia pestis
Exemptions: vaccine strains as described in Title 9 CFR, 78.1 are exempt.
Rickettsiae
1. Coxiella burnetii
2. Rickettsia prowazekii
3. Rickettsia rickettsii
Fungi
1. Coccidioides immitis
Toxins
1. Abrin
2. Aflatoxins
3. Botulinum toxins
4. Clostridium perfringens epsilon toxin
5. Conotoxins
6. Diacetoxyscirpenol
7. Ricin
8. Saxitoxin
9. Shigatoxin
10. Staphylococcal enterotoxins
11. Tetrodotoxin
12. T-2 toxin
FROM FEDERAL REGISTER - JULY 12, 2002
“Preliminary Guidance for Notification of Possession of Select Agents”
INSTRUCTION FROM UM-OSEH TO RESEARCHERS - CDC AND USDA HAVE ADDED NEW AGENTS TO THE LIST. IF YOU HAVE ALREADY DONE A REVIEW OF YOUR COLLECTION FOR SELECT AGENT POSSESSION, REVIEW THE FINAL BLOCK AND RE-CHECK YOUR COLLECTION. IF ANY ARE IDENTIFIED, CONTACT OSEH AT 7-2318.
HHS Select Agents
Crimean-Congo Haemorrhagic Fever Virus
Ebola Viruses
Lassa Fever Virus
Marburg Virus
Richettsia prowazeki
Rickettsia rickettsii
South American Haemorrhagic Fever Viruses
Tick-Borne Enciphalitis Complex Viruses
Variola Major Viruses (Smallpox Virus)
Viruses Causing Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome
Yellow Fever Virus
Yersinia pestis
Abrin
Conotixins
Diacetoxyscirpenol
Ricin
Saxitoxin
Tetrodotoxin
USDA-HHS Overlap Agents
Bacillus anthracis
Brucella abortus
Brucella melitensis
Brucella suis
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) mallei
Burkholderia (Pseudomonas) pseudomallei
Clostridium botulinum
Coccidioides immitis
Coxiella burnettii
Eastern Equine Encephalitis Virus
Equine Morbillivirus (Hendra Virus)/Nipah Virus
Francisella tularensis
Rift Valley Fever Virus
Venezuelan Equine Encephalitis Virus
Aflatoxins
Botulinum Toxins
Clostridium perfringens epsilon Toxin
Shigatoxin
Staphlococcal enterotoxin
T-2 Toxin
USDA High Consequence of Livestock Pathogens and Toxins
African Horse Sickness Virus
African Swine Fever
Akabane Virus
Avian Influenza Virus (Highly Pathogenic)
Blue Tongue Virus (Exotic)
Bovine Spongiform Encepalopathy Agent
Camel Pox Virus
Classical Swine Fever
Cowdria ruminantium (Heartwater)
Foot and Mouth Disease Virus
Goat Pox Virus
Japanese Encephalitis Virus
Lumpy Skin Disease Virus
Malignant Catarrhal Fever
Menangle Virus
Mycoplasma capricolum/M.F 38/M. mycoides capri (Contagious Caprine Pleuropneumonia Agent)
Mycoplasma mycoides mycoides (Contagious Bovine Pleuropneumonia Agent)
Newcastle Disease Virus (Exotic)
Peste Des Petits Ruminants
Rinderpest Virus
Sheep Pox
Swine Vesicular Disease Virus
Vesicular Stomatitis Virus
RELATED DOCUMENTS:
OSEH GUIDE – SELECT AGENTS
– http://www.umich.edu/~oseh/Select_Agents.pdf
OSEH GUIDE – PATRIOT ACT –
http://www.umich.edu/~oseh/patriot.pdf
Naw, not me! As I told you I've gone back to women.
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