Fears over missing nuclear material

BBC ^ | 03/07/03

[Andy from Beaverton]

Fears over missing nuclear material

A few kilos of plutonium is enough for a nuclear bomb

International researchers have warned that the world may be awash in unaccounted weapons-grade uranium and plutonium, after completing a latest database of lost and stolen nuclear material.

It truly is frightening. I think this is the tip of the iceberg

Lyudmila Zaitseva, Stanford research member

The new database by the Institute for International Studies (IIS) at Stanford University said the protection of nuclear and radioactive material was "woefully inadequate", pointing to huge gaps of information on the exact amount of missing material.

"It truly is frightening. I think this is the tip of the iceberg," one of the researchers, Lyudmila Zaitseva, said.

The Stanford Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO) was released as US senators warned that the so-called "dirty" bombs made of discarded radioactive material could have a significant psycho-social effect and cause mass panic among the population.

The database, which will only be available to carefully vetted researchers, is intended to help governments and international agencies track missing nuclear material worldwide amid concerns over the patchy nature of most of the available information.

Chilling estimates

According to the report, about 40 kilograms of weapons-usable uranium and plutonium have been stolen from poorly protected nuclear facilities in the former Soviet Union during the last decade.

It said that while most of that material had been later retrieved, two kilograms of highly enriched uranium from a reactor in Georgia was still missing.

DSTO incident list

643 nuclear smuggling incidents

107 sources of orphaned radiation

over 80 cases of fraud or malevolent acts

The database, which combines information from two existing unclassified databases and also adds independently obtained figures, registered 830 incidents of illicit trafficking of radioactive material.

But Ms Zaitseva said that the real amount of missing weapons-grade material could be 10 times higher than the official figures.

"We don't know what's missing. That's the most frightening thing".

Another member of the research team, nuclear physicist Friedrich Steinhausler, said the biggest hole in the database was that no one knew where the smuggled material has gone.

"There is no proof. There is suspicion but there is no proof," he said.

'Orphan' radiation

The Stanford database also lists "orphaned" radiation sources: scientific or medical material that may have been lost or misplaced.

Mr Steinhausler said that such materials also presented a real threat because victims may not know that they have been exposed.

"Many countries don't even have a central register of radioactive materials. If they don't know what they have, they don't know what they've lost," he said, quoting two cases of relatively recent mass accidental contamination in the USA and Brazil.

Ms Zaitseva added that with the collapse of the Soviet Union, a large amount of weapons-grade material was left without adequate protection.

She said the US-sponsored programme to secure nuclear components in the former Soviet Union has locked only one-third of the more than 600 tons of weapons-usable material.

"It's just not protected. This is hot stuff. If you steal 20 kilograms of that material, you can build a nuclear weapon".

[Mr. Mojo]

Geez, a helluva story to read right before retiring for the evening. I'll be sure not to tell my nuclear war dreaming girlfriend.

[Jhoffa_]

I just want to know how this crap happens.

Why the hell is it that I can rent a library book and they know man.. They KNOW I have it, they know the number on it and they know when it's due back. Further, if I don't return it, they know how to find me and make me pay..

When I DO return it, they know right where to find it and what condition it's in. Bingo, like magic..

And then I am supposed to believe that nuclear material just vanishes like fog on the windsheild sometimes? "We don't know man, it was like there before and now it's not.. "

This is as insulting as the Los Alamos safe debacle.

[EGPWS]

It said that while most of that material had been later retrieved, two kilograms of highly enriched uranium from a reactor in Georgia was still missing.

I wouldn't be too concerned. It most likely isn't in the hands of terrorist who wouldn't know how to handle it anyway, it's most likely being used by a country of good standing just to supply power to the public, like say...North Korea! /sarcasm

[AFPhys]

Seriously, I'm rather surprised at how little of this is unaccounted for. If I read this corrrectly, only 2kg "but may be ten times as much". This is only sufficient for one or so low-tech bombs. I would have expected far more to be unaccounted for, simply due to lost records, etc.

[fporretto]

This is only sufficient for one or so low-tech bombs.

I must disagree. The minimum critical mass for Plutonium is 1.1 kilograms. So 20 kg would go a pretty long way, provided the right implosion mechanics were used.

A-weapons, without fusion stages, are fairly easy to build. The only technically exacting part is building the implosion shell and the timing network associated with touching it off in one coordinated burst. Most of the really sophisticated things about nuclear weapons design involve the special engineering required to produce a fusion reaction.

Of course, an H-bomb makes a much bigger blast. I don't doubt that rogue states and terrorists would like to have one, but, Tom Clancy's works notwithstanding, it's not nearly as straightforward a challenge as building a fission-only device.

Freedom, Wealth, and Peace,
Francis W. Porretto
Visit the Palace Of Reason:
http://palaceofreason.com

[Mackey]

As I recall, the Little Boy bomb used at Hiroshima used the simplest possible method of achieving critical mass, that of shooting one enriched uranium hemisphere into another. I'm sure there is much more to the total process than that, but basically that's how the reaction was initiated. The hardest requirement to meet is amassing sufficient U-235.