Understanding the Breakdown of Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations (long article)

[Editor's note: The author is an IDF intelligence officer. This is an abbreviated version of the article that first appeared in Ma'arakhot, the IDF magazine for military affairs (in Hebrew). It received the IDF Chief of Staff's prize for military affairs writing. A longer version, including the author's footnotes, is available from the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs website, www.jcpa.org]

The second Camp David summit (July 2000) was the culmination of nearly ten years of political dialogue between Israel and the representatives of the Palestinian people, and of almost six years of interim agreements since the mutual recognition of Israel and the PLO. Yet Camp David II did not result in the conclusion of an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement to end the protracted conflict between the Palestinian national movement and the Jewish national (Zionist) movement. The negotiations between Israel's Prime Minister Ehud Barak and Palestinian Authority (PA) Chairman Yasser Arafat (who also heads the PLO and the Fatah movement), under the auspices of U.S. President Bill Clinton, rather highlighted the wide differences between the two sides on the fundamental issues of the conflict.

In spite of many ideas and suggestions which went a long way toward the Palestinian position (even by their own testimony), the Palestinian stance on basic issues remained uncompromising, namely: compliance with all UN decisions as the source of legitimacy for a solution to the "Palestine problem"; a full Israeli withdrawal from the territories occupied in 1967, including Jerusalem; the establishment of a fully sovereign Palestinian state; and the settlement of the Palestinian problem on the basis of UN Resolution 194, which, in the PLO interpretation, requires Israel to assume responsibility for the refugee problem, to allow the refugees and their descendants to return to Israel and repossess their homes and property within its territory, and to compensate them.

Even the Taba summit (January 2001) and the political initiative of President Clinton that took place under the shadow of and concurrently with the Palestinian "War of Independence and Return," and which represented a last effort by Israel's government and the U.S. administration to reach a solution on the eve of elections in both countries, did not lead to the moderation of the PA's fundamental political positions.

The politically unbridgeable gap between the PA and Israel, which was exposed in the negotiations on a permanent solution, is first and foremost the result of the fundamental contrast between the protagonists' perceptions of the essence of the conflict and the ultimate goal of the negotiations. From Israel's point of view, the issue was in essence a conflict between two political entities that were now prepared to reach a historic compromise that would in turn lead to a true coexistence between two independent states. The historic compromise was based, in Israel's perception, on the abandonment of dreams of "the whole land," namely, that of "the whole of Eretz Israel," on one side, and that of "the whole of Palestine," on the other.

According to this approach, the goal of the negotiation was to reach a formula that would equitably bridge the differences between the two sides (for example, Israeli recognition of a Palestinian state and a compromise in Jerusalem in return for a Palestinian concession on the refugee issue). In Israel's view, the ultimate goal of the entire process was the conclusion of a final agreement that meant the end of the conflict and the cessation of further Palestinian demands -- particularly such demands as might alter the entire premise of the agreement (such as the return of refugees to Israel, or the return of private and public Palestinian property in Israel).

The Palestinian approach differed fundamentally from that of Israel, both in its basic perception of the essence of the conflict and in the objectives of the negotiations. In the view of the PA (and in the view of Fatah and the PLO as well), the issue at hand is not a political confrontation between Palestinian and Israeli entities over a specific parcel of territory, but a struggle between two civilizations which oppose each other in their basic worldviews and national aspirations. The 100-year-long struggle between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement (Arafat designates the first Zionist Congress in Basle as the historical turning point) inflicted a "disaster" (nakba) upon the Palestinian people. That disaster, which entailed the "forced expulsion of the Palestinian people from its land" in 1948 and 1967, and its subjection since then to "the yoke of occupation," is "a historic wrong." According to this tenet, Israelis are "invaders" into a land that does not belong to them, where they have established an entity which is an alien implant within Arab and Muslim living space, and which serves as a bridgehead for "imperialism" and for Western civilization. The struggle, then, is an existential one between the Zionist enterprise and the Palestinian national enterprise.

of the "revolutionary" ideological platform of the Fatah movement, headed by Arafat, which has not been revised since the last general council meeting in 1989. Sakher Habash, a member of the central committee of Fatah, one of its founders and its recognized chief of ideology, referred to the essence of the Israeli-Palestinian "cultural confrontation" in a speech made in Arafat's name on January 30, 2001: "Experience teaches us that without establishing a Palestinian state on the entire land, peace cannot be achieved. We are undergoing a struggle through which we can compel the Zionist society to get rid of Zionism, because there can be no coexistence between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement."

Regarding the settlement of the Palestinian problem, the PA, Fatah, and the PLO clearly distinguish between a "political solution" and a "historic solution." This distinction draws its inspiration and legitimacy from the decisions of the 12th meeting of the Palestinian National Council (PNC) of 1974, collectively known as the "Doctrine of Stages." At the time, that doctrine expressed a fundamental change in the strategy of the PLO, from a rigid doctrine of uncompromising armed struggle for the liberation of the whole of Palestine, to the acceptance of a gradual liberation process as allowed by the prevailing political and military conditions. Following are some of the decisions of the 12th meeting of the PNC, which paved the way for Arafat's speech to the UN General Assembly and launched the PLO's political engagement:

We are undergoing a struggle through which we can compel the Zionist society to get rid of Zionism, because there can be no coexistence between Zionism and the Palestinian national movement.

Item 2: The PLO will struggle by all means, first and foremost by the armed struggle, to liberate the land of Palestine and to establish the independent rule of the fighting nation on every part of Palestine which will be liberated...this will bring a great change in the balance of power in favor of our nation and its struggle.

Item 3: The PLO will struggle against the establishment of any Palestinian entity (that will) concede Palestinian national rights for a return and self-determination on its national territory.

Item 4: Each step that leads to liberation must be taken in the framework of the PLO's (grand) strategy for establishing the democratic Palestinian state, as defined by previous PNC decisions.

Item 10: The leadership of the revolution will define the tactics for achieving our goals within the framework of this plan (i.e., this strategy).

The political solution is thus a tactic that serves a strategy. It stems from recognition of the temporary weakness of the Palestinian side, and is aimed at achiev-ing a gradual improvement in its relative position through political arrangements that will ultimately lead to the historic (and, in the Palestinian view, inevitable) shift of the balance of power in favor of the Palestinians.

There is a broad consensus on the Palestinian side that no Palestinian is authorized to concede one single iota of the basic principles governing the solution of the Palestinian problem. The draft Palestinian constitution, submitted for Arafat's approval in mid-2000, states that "Palestine is the heritage of the Palestinian nation throughout the generations, and its national rights in Palestine are the joint legacy of all Palestinians. It is their duty to safeguard them and to pass them on from one generation to the next." This means that "the gates of confrontation" remain open to the Palestinians, until such time as the "historic solution" is realized.

In Palestinian thought, the "historic solution" will be manifested by the achievement of "justice" for the Palestinians, namely, the correction of the "historic wrong" inflicted upon the Palestinian people by the eruption of Zionism in Palestine. The often-repeated term in Arafat's speeches (used even during the height of the political negotiations) -- "a just and lasting peace" -- is a coded reference to his strategic view.

The Interim Agreements within the framework of the Oslo "Declaration of Principles" are perceived by the Palestinians as part of the "political solution," that is, essentially a tactical move. In his 1994 book The Historic Danger and the Borders of National Completeness, Sakher Habash explains that the Palestinians' agreement to Oslo was made in the context of a long-term, visionary strategy. In Habash's analysis:

1. The source of legitimacy for the Oslo process was, and still is, the decisions of the 12th meeting of the PNC (i.e., the "Doctrine of Stages").

2. The departure point for the Palestinian embarkation on a political track is the general political situation and the trend of decline in the Zionist enterprise, which is expressed in the Israeli readiness to give up the dream of the "entire Land of Israel" and to evacuate the territories occupied in 1967.

3. The Oslo process did not modify the Palestinians' vision or strategy. A just and permanent solution to the Palestinian problem can be achieved only by the realization of the right of return of the 1948 refugees and their descendants, and by establishing the democratic Palestinian state over the entire land of Palestine.

4. National goals are to be implemented in stages: First, an interim arrangement, through which the PA will establish its rule over the West Bank and Gaza. Only later will the "Final Solution" (sic) be achievedthe uprooting of the occupation, national independence side by side with the armed struggle and the intifada, in order to move into "the future struggle that will make the demo- cratic unification of the entire territory of Palestine an achievable goal." 5. There is a distinction between tactical and strategic goals: The full retreat of the occupation forces from all the Palestinian lands including Jerusalem is but the first stage of the struggle that will continue through other means to implement the national goals.

In the winter of 2000, Dr. Kemal el Astal (a senior official in the Palestinian Office of Planning and Cooperation -- a de facto Ministry of Foreign Affairs) analyzed the political process between Israel and the PA on the eve of Camp David. In an article published in the magazine el Siasa el Falestinia, he wrote:

"The political solution is an expression of a temporary cease fire...the Arab-Zionist conflict is a cultural conflict that will continue even if a peace agreement is achieved....The region will continue to live under the shadow of this equation -- an incomplete peace and an endless war....The reconciliation is not historic....The struggle will go on in every ditch....We are in the process of a political arrangement, not a historic reconciliation."

The PA, Fatah, and the PLO are translating their perception of the "historic struggle" into usable tools in the overall confrontation against Zionism. The Palestinian "tool kit" includes a variety of means whose common denominator is the effort to destabilize the foundations of Israel as a Zionist state and to make the Palestinian side, in time, the stronger side in the equation of power.

The first goal, already achieved, was the exploitation of the Oslo process to liberate the first, albeit small, area of Palestine, which in turn allowed the struggle to be transferred into the depth of the Palestinian hinterland. The (expected) establishment of an independent and fully sovereign Palestinian state in the 1967 territories is perceived essentially as the construction of a bridgehead aimed at connecting the Palestinian diaspora to Palestine and deepening the political, social, and economic ties with the "Palestinian hinterland" within Israel (and within the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan), and threatening regional stability in a manner that serves Palestinian goals. The major tool consistently used by the PA to achieve these goals is the application of violence and terror against Israel. The outbreaks of violence that accompanied the period of the interim agreements with Israel (the Temple Mount tunnel, the Har Homa violence, the "Nakba Days," the "Days of Rage") were far from spontaneous popular outbreaks, as the Palestinians claimed. They were meticulously staged events ordered by the PA which used mainly Fatah (in conjunction with other organizations) to produce them, as a means of leverage on Israel to modify its positions on substantive issues.

By early 2000, the Palestinian decision to launch a "War of Independence and Return" was already maturing. The first indications were evident in the aggressive tone used by Arafat in speeches to his own entourage -- in his meetings with the Shabiba, the youth movement of Fatah, in Ramallah and Nablus. In those meetings (April 2000), Arafat dubbed the Fatah youth "the new generals" and threatened to "launch a new intifada" to force upon Israel the "establishment of an independent Palestinian state." Two weeks before Camp David, on June 25, 2000, and once again during a Fatah meeting in Nablus, Arafat openly spoke about the return to armed struggle: "We shall sacrifice our souls for Palestine....We are fighting for our land....He who has forgotten, let him remember Karame [an IDF action against Palestinian terrorists within Jordan's territory, that is celebrated in Palestinian historiography as the first Arab victory against the IDF], the Beirut campaign, and seven years of intifada. We are ready to write off everything and start all over again."

The final decision was taken immediately upon the conclusion of the Camp David summit, and what remained was to decide on the timing and the justification. Sakher Habash, in a detailed report on Camp David published in Al-Hayat Al-Jadida on September 20, 2000, nine days before the outbreak of the intifada, wrote that "Brother Abu Ammar [Arafat] spoke in the language of a true believer, as a man who foresees what he and the sublime Palestinian people are facing -- the option of confrontation." After the summit, this message was translated into a sort of Order of the Day and distributed to the Palestinian national security forces in Gaza, after which they began preparing for the approaching outbreak of a violent campaign against Israel. In this document, entitled "The Campaign Has Started," it is written: "A call, a call, a call

from the negotiation team headed by the Commander, the Emblem Abu Ammar, to our heroic Palestinian nation: Be ready, the campaign for Jerusalem has started, this is the meaning of the return to the motherland of (our) mission from Camp David without conceding any of the declared and fundamental Palestinian positions." About three weeks before the outbreak of the intifada,the writing on the wall became apparent. In an article in Al Sabah, the official newspaper of the PA, Yasser Khalil Salah referred to the approaching event and to its theme -- Jerusalem -- as well as to the launching of the "jihad and intifada campaign" against Israel. "The time of intifada has come, has come, has come, the time of Jerusalem has come, Jerusalem is calling."

In order to keep the sword of violence ready at any time, the PA established the Political Direction Organization, which reports directly to Arafat, and which is responsible for national mobilization and the shaping of Palestinian public opinion on every level, from kindergarten through youth movements to military officers and civil servants. The organization has its representatives planted in every government office and each military unit, and is widely active in the fields of propaganda and "the preparation of hearts." Its activities include the publication of numerous information pamphlets, lectures to military units, organization of summer camps for tens of thousands of students (where emphasis is put on Palestinian rights to "Palestine 1948" and where students are trained in the use of firearms as a legitimate means in the struggle), and the explication of PA policy in the form of Orders of the Day.

The goal of these activities is to educate the present and emerging generations in the fundamental and uncompromising values of the Palestinians (independence, Jerusalem, the return), to contest the right of Israel to exist, to deny the right of the Jews to any share of Palestine, openly to promote anti-Semitism, and to encourage Istishhad (martyrdom) and the immediate readiness for self-sacrifice, according to the Fatah slogan "revolution until victory." The lyrics of the 2001 PA summer camp anthem read: "We the youth...will sacrifice ourselves for Yasser (Arafat)....We train in the use of weapons, we are the youth of vengeance.... Revolution, revolution until victory."

The PA sees the decisive historic action toward the eradication of Zionism as requiring the following elements:

Unite the National and Islamic Forces Cement national unity in the Palestinian camp based on the consensus over fundamental Palestinian principles. One of the most important achievements of the "War of Independence and Return" has been (and still is) the setting up of an organization for the overall coordination of the political movements within the Palestinian arena, dubbed "the National and Islamic Forces." This body has assumed the role (and was authorized to do so by the PA) of managing the intifada. It determines policy on the use of terror and is emerging as a center of power, overshadowing even the PLO (which does not represent Islamist bodies) in charting the political objectives of the intifada and that of the "negotiation campaign."

The Demographic Time Bomb Overturn the demographic equation in Palestine through the return of refugees, with the goal of preparing the conditions for the bi-national state.

Alliance with Israeli Palestinians Encourage the alliance (politically, socially, and economically) between the two constituents of the Palestinian people in Palestine, and encourage separatist tendencies among Israeli Palestinians. This is why the PA views with favor initiatives by the Israeli Palestinian leadership that strive to obliterate the Jewish character of Israel. A reflection of the PA's agenda regarding Israeli Palestinians can be seen in the speech made by Knesset Member Azmi Bashara before a forum of Arab politicians and intellectuals in early 1999. "[The option is] a bi-national entity, whose only feasible expression today is the strengthening of the ties between the Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line, and support for the demand of the Arabs in Israel to transform the state into a state of all its citizens."

On the other side of the (Israeli-Palestinian) political camp, one of the leaders of the Islamic movement in Israel, Raed Salah, is engaged in building an "independent Palestinian society" which is gradually distancing itself from Israeli society and relies on its own economic and social institutions. This entails strengthening ties with the "brethren" in the West Bank. Arafat himself, in a phone speech to a meeting of supporters in the Galilee (December 7, 2001), turned to the Palestinians in the "Galilee, the Triangle, and the Negev," and called them part of the heroic Palestinian people, a part that does not surrender and adheres to the "Ard-a-Ribat," a Muslim concept denoting a territory where Muslim armies congregate before battle.

Support from the Arab World Obtain active Arab support for the Palestinian struggle. This is part of the doctrine that perceives the armed struggle as legitimate even during negotiations, and as essential during the stage of confrontation over the right of return. The head of the political indoctrination apparatus, Othman abu Rarbiya, explained the relevant Palestinian doctrine in an article in A-Rai, an official Palestinian paper (December 2001). He wrote: "The [Arab] nation and the Palestinian nation will continue to prosecute the struggle for the rights of the Palestinians and the rights of the [Arab] nation....[The options of force and struggle exist] for the realization of the historic strategic front to a sufficient degree and to the degree of neces-sity. It relies on three foundations: Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. To those one must add a fourth foundation -- the depth of Hijaz (i.e., the Gulf States). Those were the foundations that historically achieved the repelling of invasions of Palestine." A sharper note was sounded by a member of the Fatah central committee, Abbas Zaki, in speeches made in Arafat's name (April 2001), when he invoked the Palestinian expectation of support by the Arab military front, mainly by Iraq, to finish the historic move toward the liberation of Palestine. He said: "We swear to you, Abu Udai [Saddam Hussein], to adhere to the path of struggle, until the Iraqi Army liberates this land from the uncleanliness of the oppression."

The head of the political indoctrination apparatus, Othman abu Rarbiya, explained the relevant Palestinian doctrine in an article in A-Rai, an official Palestinian paper (December 2001). He wrote: "The [Arab] nation and the Palestinian nation will continue to prosecute the struggle for the rights of the Palestinians and the rights of the [Arab] nation....[

That is, Pan-Arab Islamic fascism.

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