Posted on 12/15/2002 7:49:18 PM PST by new cruelty
For a quarter-century, this magazine has stood by one of its authors, a fine former officer from the United States Air Force. Dana Drenkowski was a participant in one of the most controversial air operations during the Vietnam War. Now, thanks to a new book just published, both Drenkowski and SOF are not only vindicated after these years, but it is now shown that SAC general officers lied to cover up tactical problems that were costing American pilot’s lives, destroyed a fine young officer’s military career, and then later destroyed his civilian writing career, by personally discrediting him. That book is The Eleven Days of Christmas, by Marshall Michel, a noted commentator on aviation strategy and tactics from the Vietnam War. During Linebacker II, the final and decisive bombing of North Vietnam in late 1972 using B-52 bombers as the primary strike force in raids against targets in and around the Hanoi-Red River Valley region of North Vietnam, tactics were badly conceived and poorly executed, the fault of senior officers in the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Numerous Air Force fighter plane units based in the northern areas of Thailand escorted the bombers to their targets and participated in bombing operations with smart bombs, their aircrews being witness to, and suffering losses from, those SAC tactics. Captain Drenkowski, a 1968 Air Force Academy graduate, flew B-52s during an earlier tour in the Southeast Asia war, and during Linebacker II was a flight leader flying the legendary F-4 Phantom fighter plane in support of the same B-52s he had flown earlier. He also worked concurrently as a staff officer for one of the most crucial fighter wings in Southeat Asia, where he helped in the planning and coordination of fighter support for the B-52 operations. He was decorated a number of times for his bravery and extraordinary achievement in war. He was uniquely placed to observe and comment upon the tactics used, both in the planning and in the actual operations phases of the intense 11-day battle known as Linebacker II. B-52s were ordered to fly in a long, straight line through the heaviest anti-aircraft gun and Surface-to-Air (SAM) missile defenses the world had ever seen, all provided by the Soviet Union. They attacked from the same direction, at the same altitudes, airspeeds and angles, ignoring the suggestions and complaints of the aircrews who had flown into those same air defenses for six months. Losses were unexpectedly heavy, while bombs went way off target (giving plenty of adverse publicity to an anti-American press, more than willing to believe that the United States would deliberately target civilians to terrorize them, while believing Communist and left-wing propaganda about Vietnam’s “humanitarian principles” in that war). The two general officers primarily responsible for the costly, inefficient tactics used during the first days of Operation Linebacker II were General John C. Meyer, the Commander of Strategic Air Command, and General Pete Sianis, in charge of planning missions at SAC. Both were based at SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. Neither saw fit to communicate with the aircrews who were actually fighting on SAC’s behalf in the combat zone. They were sadly reminiscent of the World War I general officers who launched hundreds of thousands of young men into the teeth of modern machine guns, while comfortably ensconced miles from the action in luxurious French villas. The operations, though costly and ineffective in many ways, still helped force the North Vietnamese back to the peace table, and were believed to be instrumental in bringing about the end of American involvement in the war, with the return of U.S. POWs less than three months later.
The Sequestered Truth
Author Michel, in The Eleven Days of Christmas, notes that SAC’s own internal bombing accuracy study (in the form of an “after action” report) of the operation found appalling errors, which were presented in a briefing to 20 general officers from SAC. As Michel reports, “[s]hortly after that briefing was presented, all the copies were destroyed” [emphasis added]. When congressional staffers asked for the results of the study, an unnamed SAC staffer said, “we managed to muddle the issue so much that we never had to give an answer.” A tactics analysis was also completed by SAC, which again pointed out the mistakes alleged later by Drenkowski, and this analysis as well disappeared, never to be seen again. SAC-sponsored articles published in official Air Force magazines and later in the prestigious Armed Forces Journal extolled SAC’s planning and the execution of Linebacker II, while it covered its errors even from Congressional review, from 1972 through 1977. According to Michel’s book, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Linebacker II raids, proudly displayed to the Senate Armed Services Committee photos of Gia Lam airport which was blown out of operation during the raids, plus one badly damaged fabrication plant. Gia Lam was actually on the restricted list because it was allegedly an international civilian airport. What he did not tell the impressed senators and staffs was that neither the airport nor the fabrication plant was targeted — the airport had been hit by a rogue aircrew tired of bombing restrictions, and the other was hit by mistake. His briefing was, of course, prepared by SAC, and promoted the idea that SAC’s staff from Omaha had done a wonderful job in planning and executing the operation. Thus, SAC was successfully covering up one of the most incredibly poor tactical operations in its history ... until Dana Drenkowski and SOF blew the lid off in his articles published in the September and November 1977 issues of SOF, and in an article published in the July 1977 issue of Armed Forces Journal. Drenkowski and others dutifully flew those missions in spite of the poor tactics. The tactics were later changed during the latter stages of the operation, due to unacceptably high losses. But there was concern that SAC was still too hidebound to adjust rapidly to new circumstances. There was fear that a new operation was in the works a month or two later, when it seemed as if Hanoi was delaying the release of prisoners. Drenkowski was asked to raise the issue of tactics with SAC general officers on behalf of himself and several commanders in the Tactical Air Forces (the fighter forces in Vietnam were under Pacific Air Command, but all considered themselves to be Tactical Air Command fighter command officers), hoping to change those strategies and tactics for future air operations. His Air Force career was ruined as a result. His Officer Efficiency Rating report for the period of the Linebacker raids was recalled, then illegally altered and downgraded — the kiss of death to a career officer. A recommendation for the Silver Star for his heroism during the Linebacker raids was reduced to a lesser medal. A prestigious award for superior airmanship in saving a flight of three F-4s on takeoff was mysteriously lost. He was transferred from a prestigious flying assignment, which was initially given in recognition of his flying skills and long combat experience. However, his issues and suggestions for better tactics were later proven right. He was forced out of the Air Force by a permanent promotion passsover (one of the first times this method was used to get rid of a Regular Academy officer), and later he became familiar with SOF’s owner-editor, Robert K. Brown. Brown recommended that he write about his experiences and about the tactics used, with an eye towards correcting the errors that SAC created, for future improvement. Drenkowski wrote the article, which received national publicity, especially when SAC denied such tactics — and the attendant losses caused by those tactics. Drenkowski had begun a new career as a writer and strategist/tactician at the time his articles came out. He intended to offer new solutions and tactics in aerial warfare to the general public. He wanted to open debate in the Air Force on the same subjects, hoping to see a comprehensive strategy and tactical doctrine replace the faulty SAC model, which was based on pre-World War II writings. Instead, SAC began an intense campaign in the national press to denigrate Drenkowski’s character personally, evading the issues he placed into national debate.
Shooting The Messenger
As Michel reports, “The Air Force Staff, with help from the SAC staff, moved quickly to destroy [Drenkowski’s] credibility.” Michel found that “numerous senior officers, including Admiral [Thomas] Moorer [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Linebacker II in 1972], carried out ad hominem attacks on Drenkowski, and the former Eighth Air Force Commander, General Gerald Johnson, suggested he was mentally ill.” This last was interesting, in light of the fact that Drenkowski had earned a Master’s Degree in Counseling Psychology in his spare time while in the Air Force. Drenkowski never returned the personal attacks in kind, though he could have easily pointed out the pathology of certain SAC generals’ individual responses to questions about their abilities. The personal attacks against Drenkowski by SAC generals and the Air Force continued. The national press, at first interested in the questions about how the Air Force fought the nation’s battles, now displayed more interest in the personal attacks than in the tactics themselves. Adding to Drenkowski’s woes was the fact that the Air Force convinced the editor of Armed Forces Journal to print the equivalent of a retraction, apologizing in print for “not checking Drenkowski’s story out,” according to Michel. The Air Force was also allowed to print an anonymous, grossly misleading “official response” in the next issue of Armed Forces Journal, which denied such tactics were used or that aircrews and observers were ignored in continued operations. This was the hammer used to nail Drenkowski’s credibility coffin shut. Soldier Of Fortune Magazine knew Drenkowski, knew his evidence, and made its decision to stand by him — fully understanding that when it came to embarrassment, SAC general officers would go to any end to avoid the truth. Drenkowski not only had maps and documents confirming his contentions, but also had the recordings of all of the “Iron Hand” anti-SAM mission tape-recordings for each of the nightly Linebacker II raids, which were accidentally not classified. He was given the interviews, which he tape recorded, and the tapes of the missions and maps, under promises of confidentiality, to protect the lives and careers of the officers still in the Air Force. He also personally interviewed one of the men taking responsibility for some of the planning, and kept his promise not to reveal that general officer’s name. He never violated those confidences, although they would have supported his contentions to the utmost. Those officers that Drenkowski protected with his silence continued their Air Force careers and eventually retired, while Drenkowski’s reputation was destroyed and his new civilian career also ruined by SAC. The editor of Armed Forces Journal, after he published the misleading/ untrue SAC official response, was inundated with classified messages from other officers who were incensed by the SAC cover-up. He then “realized that he had been duped” by the Air Force and SAC, according to the Michel book. He said later to author Michel that the Air Force response was “at best disingenuous and probably dishonest.” That same Armed Forces Journal editor went to an unnamed Air Force general “at the highest level,” according to Michel, and demanded to know what was true. “The general admitted that the messages [confirming Drenkowski’s contentions] were correct and the Air Force response [just printed in AFJ] to the article was “inaccurate”! The Armed Forces Journal editor was convinced not to publish the truth [for reasons which are best left to him to explain] and according to Michel, called that decision the “biggest mistake he made as the editor of Armed Forces Journal.” SOF did not know of the two internal analyses/briefings, which were highly critical of SAC’s own tactics, as well as its claims of bombing accuracy. It is noted that when Drenkowski’s articles came out, as Michel reports now, at least 20 SAC general officers were fully aware of both the truth of Drenkowski’s contentions, through those briefings and bombing analyses, as well as the falsity of the attacks on him. It is to their eternal discredit that of those 20 generals, supposedly the very epitome of veracity, integrity and honesty in the United States Air Force, setting the example for all other airman, not one stepped forward to stop the attacks in 1977, and not one has said anything since that date. Their names were not listed in the Michel book, but one may assume that there were many SAC generals and star officers in other units/services who knew what SAC had done, that SAC’s planning from Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska caused disaster throughout the operation, and that Drenkowski’s articles were true in virtually every aspect, while the SAC official version was false and/or misleading. Certainly, those 20 who saw the bombing analysis, created a short time after the raids, knew beyond any doubt that what SAC was telling the press, public and even Congress was a lie when it came to discussions of accuracy and targets struck. Among those who refused to speak out when Drenkowski’s Air Force career was canned and when he was later attacked in his civilian career, and whose positions within SAC and the DoD would have made it virtually impossible for them not to have been familiar with the specifics of the situation, include: General Pete Sianis, General John C. Meyer, probably Admiral Thomas Moorer, General Gerald Johnson, General Glenn Martin (Vice Chief of SAC during the raids and follow-on reports), Brigadier General James R. McCarthy (who was commander of SAC bombers on Guam and who forwarded a report of his own unit’s analysis on SAC errors — which has also gone among the missing — and who later wrote what is now considered a flawed book acclaiming SAC staff success), among others. There is no evidence that each saw the two SAC reports or the report generated by Brigadier General MacCarthy, but it would be nearly impossible for those mentioned not to have seen the reports, given their positions within SAC and the Defense Department. We challenge any so named to contact us and explain why they did not provide true accounts when Drenkowski was systematically destroyed by the Air Force’s official account, now known to be untrue or deliberately misleading. SOF will be glad to provide them a forum for that explanation. This was an incredible injustice to a man with the courage to tell the truth, done deliberately to protect the reputations of certain general officers, who could have retired with their pensions intact regardless of their errors. Instead, those who told the truth were punished and the wrongdoers continued. Their actions and inactions regarding this subject kept tactics and strategies from being corrected for years, possibly at the cost of human lives and certainly at the risk to U.S. security interests around the world. SOF has no such problems with its conscience, having stood by what it knew to be the truth for the past 25 years.
A Sacrifice That Paid Off
But Drenkowski’s articles started the ball rolling. Within the Air Force, there were enough junior officers who had seen what really happened, and who knew something was very wrong with the way the Air Force went to war. Many read Drenkowski’s articles and wanted to improve the flawed tactics he had exposed. Within a decade, new theories of strategy were presented, debated and adopted. But the “official” versions of Linebacker II as provided by SAC remained the mantra for SAC throughout the changes in the ’70s and ’80s. The new up-and-coming officers realized that SAC was too hidebound to be changed. SAC therefore was eventually disbanded — formerly the largest portion of the Air Force and the “budget hog” for decades of that service’s existence — and its bombers incorporated into a new Air Combat Command, combined with the old Tactical Air Command. But all knew that SAC had lost the battle and the new command was composed of the “fighter mafia” of the Air Force, not the SAC generals. The aerial operations in the Gulf War, in Kosovo, and again in Afghanistan are evidence of those new and highly effective strategies. SOF has long recognized Drenkowski as a completely credible officer, keeping him as its Aviation Editor for these 25 years. Drenkowski and SOF have now been vindicated by this late release of the uncensored facts. SOF is always ready to stand by the truth, no matter how embarrassing to certain senior officials. It is sad that it has taken this long for the truth to be confirmed, that some 20 general officers lied about or refused to speak out in order to cover their asses, while a courageous junior officer was sent down the tubes for telling the truth. If we are fortunate, there will always be a Dana Drenkowski willing to accept personal sacrifice for the sake of the truth. If there is, the truth will always out. Traitorous politicians and self-serving brass-hats, take note.
For a quarter-century, this magazine has stood by one of its authors, a fine former officer from the United States Air Force. Dana Drenkowski was a participant in one of the most controversial air operations during the Vietnam War. Now, thanks to a new book just published, both Drenkowski and SOF are not only vindicated after these years, but it is now shown that SAC general officers lied to cover up tactical problems that were costing American pilot’s lives, destroyed a fine young officer’s military career, and then later destroyed his civilian writing career, by personally discrediting him.
That book is The Eleven Days of Christmas, by Marshall Michel, a noted commentator on aviation strategy and tactics from the Vietnam War.
During Linebacker II, the final and decisive bombing of North Vietnam in late 1972 using B-52 bombers as the primary strike force in raids against targets in and around the Hanoi-Red River Valley region of North Vietnam, tactics were badly conceived and poorly executed, the fault of senior officers in the Strategic Air Command (SAC). Numerous Air Force fighter plane units based in the northern areas of Thailand escorted the bombers to their targets and participated in bombing operations with smart bombs, their aircrews being witness to, and suffering losses from, those SAC tactics.
Captain Drenkowski, a 1968 Air Force Academy graduate, flew B-52s during an earlier tour in the Southeast Asia war, and during Linebacker II was a flight leader flying the legendary F-4 Phantom fighter plane in support of the same B-52s he had flown earlier. He also worked concurrently as a staff officer for one of the most crucial fighter wings in Southeat Asia, where he helped in the planning and coordination of fighter support for the B-52 operations. He was decorated a number of times for his bravery and extraordinary achievement in war. He was uniquely placed to observe and comment upon the tactics used, both in the planning and in the actual operations phases of the intense 11-day battle known as Linebacker II.
B-52s were ordered to fly in a long, straight line through the heaviest anti-aircraft gun and Surface-to-Air (SAM) missile defenses the world had ever seen, all provided by the Soviet Union. They attacked from the same direction, at the same altitudes, airspeeds and angles, ignoring the suggestions and complaints of the aircrews who had flown into those same air defenses for six months. Losses were unexpectedly heavy, while bombs went way off target (giving plenty of adverse publicity to an anti-American press, more than willing to believe that the United States would deliberately target civilians to terrorize them, while believing Communist and left-wing propaganda about Vietnam’s “humanitarian principles” in that war).
The two general officers primarily responsible for the costly, inefficient tactics used during the first days of Operation Linebacker II were General John C. Meyer, the Commander of Strategic Air Command, and General Pete Sianis, in charge of planning missions at SAC. Both were based at SAC Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska. Neither saw fit to communicate with the aircrews who were actually fighting on SAC’s behalf in the combat zone. They were sadly reminiscent of the World War I general officers who launched hundreds of thousands of young men into the teeth of modern machine guns, while comfortably ensconced miles from the action in luxurious French villas.
The operations, though costly and ineffective in many ways, still helped force the North Vietnamese back to the peace table, and were believed to be instrumental in bringing about the end of American involvement in the war, with the return of U.S. POWs less than three months later.
The Sequestered Truth
Author Michel, in The Eleven Days of Christmas, notes that SAC’s own internal bombing accuracy study (in the form of an “after action” report) of the operation found appalling errors, which were presented in a briefing to 20 general officers from SAC. As Michel reports, “[s]hortly after that briefing was presented, all the copies were destroyed” [emphasis added]. When congressional staffers asked for the results of the study, an unnamed SAC staffer said, “we managed to muddle the issue so much that we never had to give an answer.” A tactics analysis was also completed by SAC, which again pointed out the mistakes alleged later by Drenkowski, and this analysis as well disappeared, never to be seen again.
SAC-sponsored articles published in official Air Force magazines and later in the prestigious Armed Forces Journal extolled SAC’s planning and the execution of Linebacker II, while it covered its errors even from Congressional review, from 1972 through 1977. According to Michel’s book, Admiral Thomas Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs during the Linebacker II raids, proudly displayed to the Senate Armed Services Committee photos of Gia Lam airport which was blown out of operation during the raids, plus one badly damaged fabrication plant. Gia Lam was actually on the restricted list because it was allegedly an international civilian airport. What he did not tell the impressed senators and staffs was that neither the airport nor the fabrication plant was targeted — the airport had been hit by a rogue aircrew tired of bombing restrictions, and the other was hit by mistake. His briefing was, of course, prepared by SAC, and promoted the idea that SAC’s staff from Omaha had done a wonderful job in planning and executing the operation.
Thus, SAC was successfully covering up one of the most incredibly poor tactical operations in its history ... until Dana Drenkowski and SOF blew the lid off in his articles published in the September and November 1977 issues of SOF, and in an article published in the July 1977 issue of Armed Forces Journal.
Drenkowski and others dutifully flew those missions in spite of the poor tactics. The tactics were later changed during the latter stages of the operation, due to unacceptably high losses. But there was concern that SAC was still too hidebound to adjust rapidly to new circumstances. There was fear that a new operation was in the works a month or two later, when it seemed as if Hanoi was delaying the release of prisoners. Drenkowski was asked to raise the issue of tactics with SAC general officers on behalf of himself and several commanders in the Tactical Air Forces (the fighter forces in Vietnam were under Pacific Air Command, but all considered themselves to be Tactical Air Command fighter command officers), hoping to change those strategies and tactics for future air operations.
His Air Force career was ruined as a result. His Officer Efficiency Rating report for the period of the Linebacker raids was recalled, then illegally altered and downgraded — the kiss of death to a career officer. A recommendation for the Silver Star for his heroism during the Linebacker raids was reduced to a lesser medal. A prestigious award for superior airmanship in saving a flight of three F-4s on takeoff was mysteriously lost. He was transferred from a prestigious flying assignment, which was initially given in recognition of his flying skills and long combat experience. However, his issues and suggestions for better tactics were later proven right. He was forced out of the Air Force by a permanent promotion passsover (one of the first times this method was used to get rid of a Regular Academy officer), and later he became familiar with SOF’s owner-editor, Robert K. Brown. Brown recommended that he write about his experiences and about the tactics used, with an eye towards correcting the errors that SAC created, for future improvement.
Drenkowski wrote the article, which received national publicity, especially when SAC denied such tactics — and the attendant losses caused by those tactics. Drenkowski had begun a new career as a writer and strategist/tactician at the time his articles came out. He intended to offer new solutions and tactics in aerial warfare to the general public. He wanted to open debate in the Air Force on the same subjects, hoping to see a comprehensive strategy and tactical doctrine replace the faulty SAC model, which was based on pre-World War II writings.
Instead, SAC began an intense campaign in the national press to denigrate Drenkowski’s character personally, evading the issues he placed into national debate.
Shooting The Messenger
As Michel reports, “The Air Force Staff, with help from the SAC staff, moved quickly to destroy [Drenkowski’s] credibility.” Michel found that “numerous senior officers, including Admiral [Thomas] Moorer [Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during Linebacker II in 1972], carried out ad hominem attacks on Drenkowski, and the former Eighth Air Force Commander, General Gerald Johnson, suggested he was mentally ill.” This last was interesting, in light of the fact that Drenkowski had earned a Master’s Degree in Counseling Psychology in his spare time while in the Air Force. Drenkowski never returned the personal attacks in kind, though he could have easily pointed out the pathology of certain SAC generals’ individual responses to questions about their abilities.
The personal attacks against Drenkowski by SAC generals and the Air Force continued. The national press, at first interested in the questions about how the Air Force fought the nation’s battles, now displayed more interest in the personal attacks than in the tactics themselves. Adding to Drenkowski’s woes was the fact that the Air Force convinced the editor of Armed Forces Journal to print the equivalent of a retraction, apologizing in print for “not checking Drenkowski’s story out,” according to Michel.
The Air Force was also allowed to print an anonymous, grossly misleading “official response” in the next issue of Armed Forces Journal, which denied such tactics were used or that aircrews and observers were ignored in continued operations. This was the hammer used to nail Drenkowski’s credibility coffin shut.
Soldier Of Fortune Magazine knew Drenkowski, knew his evidence, and made its decision to stand by him — fully understanding that when it came to embarrassment, SAC general officers would go to any end to avoid the truth. Drenkowski not only had maps and documents confirming his contentions, but also had the recordings of all of the “Iron Hand” anti-SAM mission tape-recordings for each of the nightly Linebacker II raids, which were accidentally not classified. He was given the interviews, which he tape recorded, and the tapes of the missions and maps, under promises of confidentiality, to protect the lives and careers of the officers still in the Air Force. He also personally interviewed one of the men taking responsibility for some of the planning, and kept his promise not to reveal that general officer’s name. He never violated those confidences, although they would have supported his contentions to the utmost. Those officers that Drenkowski protected with his silence continued their Air Force careers and eventually retired, while Drenkowski’s reputation was destroyed and his new civilian career also ruined by SAC.
The editor of Armed Forces Journal, after he published the misleading/ untrue SAC official response, was inundated with classified messages from other officers who were incensed by the SAC cover-up. He then “realized that he had been duped” by the Air Force and SAC, according to the Michel book. He said later to author Michel that the Air Force response was “at best disingenuous and probably dishonest.”
That same Armed Forces Journal editor went to an unnamed Air Force general “at the highest level,” according to Michel, and demanded to know what was true. “The general admitted that the messages [confirming Drenkowski’s contentions] were correct and the Air Force response [just printed in AFJ] to the article was “inaccurate”!
The Armed Forces Journal editor was convinced not to publish the truth [for reasons which are best left to him to explain] and according to Michel, called that decision the “biggest mistake he made as the editor of Armed Forces Journal.”
SOF did not know of the two internal analyses/briefings, which were highly critical of SAC’s own tactics, as well as its claims of bombing accuracy. It is noted that when Drenkowski’s articles came out, as Michel reports now, at least 20 SAC general officers were fully aware of both the truth of Drenkowski’s contentions, through those briefings and bombing analyses, as well as the falsity of the attacks on him. It is to their eternal discredit that of those 20 generals, supposedly the very epitome of veracity, integrity and honesty in the United States Air Force, setting the example for all other airman, not one stepped forward to stop the attacks in 1977, and not one has said anything since that date. Their names were not listed in the Michel book, but one may assume that there were many SAC generals and star officers in other units/services who knew what SAC had done, that SAC’s planning from Headquarters in Omaha, Nebraska caused disaster throughout the operation, and that Drenkowski’s articles were true in virtually every aspect, while the SAC official version was false and/or misleading. Certainly, those 20 who saw the bombing analysis, created a short time after the raids, knew beyond any doubt that what SAC was telling the press, public and even Congress was a lie when it came to discussions of accuracy and targets struck.
Among those who refused to speak out when Drenkowski’s Air Force career was canned and when he was later attacked in his civilian career, and whose positions within SAC and the DoD would have made it virtually impossible for them not to have been familiar with the specifics of the situation, include: General Pete Sianis, General John C. Meyer, probably Admiral Thomas Moorer, General Gerald Johnson, General Glenn Martin (Vice Chief of SAC during the raids and follow-on reports), Brigadier General James R. McCarthy (who was commander of SAC bombers on Guam and who forwarded a report of his own unit’s analysis on SAC errors — which has also gone among the missing — and who later wrote what is now considered a flawed book acclaiming SAC staff success), among others. There is no evidence that each saw the two SAC reports or the report generated by Brigadier General MacCarthy, but it would be nearly impossible for those mentioned not to have seen the reports, given their positions within SAC and the Defense Department. We challenge any so named to contact us and explain why they did not provide true accounts when Drenkowski was systematically destroyed by the Air Force’s official account, now known to be untrue or deliberately misleading. SOF will be glad to provide them a forum for that explanation.
This was an incredible injustice to a man with the courage to tell the truth, done deliberately to protect the reputations of certain general officers, who could have retired with their pensions intact regardless of their errors. Instead, those who told the truth were punished and the wrongdoers continued. Their actions and inactions regarding this subject kept tactics and strategies from being corrected for years, possibly at the cost of human lives and certainly at the risk to U.S. security interests around the world.
SOF has no such problems with its conscience, having stood by what it knew to be the truth for the past 25 years.
A Sacrifice That Paid Off
But Drenkowski’s articles started the ball rolling. Within the Air Force, there were enough junior officers who had seen what really happened, and who knew something was very wrong with the way the Air Force went to war. Many read Drenkowski’s articles and wanted to improve the flawed tactics he had exposed. Within a decade, new theories of strategy were presented, debated and adopted. But the “official” versions of Linebacker II as provided by SAC remained the mantra for SAC throughout the changes in the ’70s and ’80s. The new up-and-coming officers realized that SAC was too hidebound to be changed. SAC therefore was eventually disbanded — formerly the largest portion of the Air Force and the “budget hog” for decades of that service’s existence — and its bombers incorporated into a new Air Combat Command, combined with the old Tactical Air Command. But all knew that SAC had lost the battle and the new command was composed of the “fighter mafia” of the Air Force, not the SAC generals.
The aerial operations in the Gulf War, in Kosovo, and again in Afghanistan are evidence of those new and highly effective strategies.
SOF has long recognized Drenkowski as a completely credible officer, keeping him as its Aviation Editor for these 25 years. Drenkowski and SOF have now been vindicated by this late release of the uncensored facts. SOF is always ready to stand by the truth, no matter how embarrassing to certain senior officials. It is sad that it has taken this long for the truth to be confirmed, that some 20 general officers lied about or refused to speak out in order to cover their asses, while a courageous junior officer was sent down the tubes for telling the truth.
If we are fortunate, there will always be a Dana Drenkowski willing to accept personal sacrifice for the sake of the truth. If there is, the truth will always out.
Traitorous politicians and self-serving brass-hats, take note.
Why the Senate Slept
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution and the Beginning of America's Vietnam War
By Ezra Y. Siff
Foreword by Lt. Col. Anthony B. Herbert, U. S. Army, Retired
Praeger Publishers. Westport, Conn. 1999. 176 pages
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