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Nixon's Policies

Vietnamization / Intimidation / Public Opinion /

Vietnamization Upon Nixon's presidency, he had many ideas of Johnson's that he wanted to ignore or discontinue. However, there were a few that he wanted to continue on; one of these was the "Vietnamization" policy. This policy, in a very basic and broad definition, stated that the South Vietnamese should form their own stable government without the aid, physically or economically, of the United States. Unfortunately, the South Vietnamese found this idea to be demeaning, and thus protested it (Herring, 253). They claimed that this "American" idea was absurd, because they had been at war years before Americans became involved. Though in 1970 Vietnamization seemed to have been working well, the true state of it's productiveness is still in question. "American officials claimed to have 'neutralized' as many as 20,000 members of the NLF infrastructure through the Phoenix Program, and the Communists later conceded that in some areas Phoenix was 'dangerously effective'" (Herring, 255). "The biggest question mark remained the government itself." Civilians and villagers were increasingly more reluctant to remain loyal to the South. "Desertion remained a chronic problem, and there was thus a huge gap between the authorized and actual strength of most units" (256). As talks of peace persisted, and repeatedly disappeared, the support for American support by the South Vietnamese began to lessen. During the Easter Offensive, the North Vietnamese "aimed the offensive directly at the ARVN's main force units, hoping to discredit the Vietnamization policy and tie down as many regular forces.." (271). The North Vietnamese knew that the policy was failing and the more persistent they were with it, the more likely the failure would continue.

Intimidation One of the most notable aspects of Nixon's on going ambition, is his belief in the historically known method of intimidation. He constantly made threats to the Vietnamese (northern) in order to make them fall his way. The *amusing* aspect, of course, is that this didn't work. The North Vietnamese were immune to the threats put forth. Yet, Nixon still persisted. "He seems to have reasoned that if he could mobilize American opinion behind him, peruade Hanoi that he would not abandon Thieu, and intensify the buildup of South Vietnamese military strenth, the North Vietnamese might conclude that it would be better to negotiate with the United States now than with South Vietnam later, and he could extract from them the concessions necessary to secure peace with honor" (251). This is just one example of the many instances when Nixon tried intimidation to maintain a superiority among the powers.

Public support within the United States showed a dramatic decrease when "it was clear that there would be no breakthrough in Paris" (249). Overall opinion of the war took a negative genre. Demonstrations and protests began to become increasingly more violent and frequent. March of Death and Kent State are two of the most publicized and known protests. The American citizens did not support the policies that repeatedly failed president after president. They also were tired of the lies that were being spoon-fed to them by these same presidents. "The documents [Pentagon Papers] confirmed what critics of war had long been arguing, among other things that Kennedy and Johnson had consistently misled the public about their intentions in Vietnam" (267).

"We will not make the same old mistakes. We will make our own." (Kissinger) (243)

"I'm not going to end up like LBJ holed up in the White House afraid to show my face to the street. I'm going to stop that war. Fast." (Nixon) (245)

"They'll believe any threat of force Nixon makes because it's Nixon. We'll just slip the word to them that, 'for God's sake, you know Nixon's obsessed about Communism...and he has his hand on the nuclear button'" (Nixon) (246)

"North Vietnam cannot humiliate the United States. Only Americans can do that." (Nixon) (251)