Posted on 11/27/2002 6:32:55 AM PST by Sparta
Last week was a milestone for our homeland security. No, not because of passing a bill -- but because of passing a test.
That is, the test for effective protection against the vilest leaders in the world launching the vilest weapons: Ballistic missiles topped with nuclear, biological or chemical weapons. Indeed a ballistic missile defense system for homeland security will protect us more than any Department of Homeland Security.
And that's what advanced last Thursday, when a bullet hit a bullet in space, over the oceans. That mind-bending event proves that BMD is more than Ronald Reagan's pipe dream. It's our future protection.
The Strategic Defense Initiative drove its critics batty over the past 19 years since Reagan sprang SDI on a "mutual assured destruction" (MAD) world.
Some critics griped that SDI was undesirable. But it proved tough to persuade many folks that we (and our allies) were better off remaining vulnerable to missiles launched from Iraq or North Korea, than seeking protection from missiles they launched against us.
So most critics used another argument: OK, SDI's desirable, but it's unfeasible.
Where were they on Thursday when a ballistic missile -- like one that could conceivably be launched by an "axis of evil" state -- was demolished early in its flight, way before it could demolish us?
Why no public notice of this big event? Partly because the test was conducted in plain sight. Leaked classified tests get real notice. Plus, war on Iraq has replaced SDI as Bush critics' preferred line of attack.
But this test is a really big deal for lots of reasons:
-- It's the third successful test in a row, showing a consistency of performance;
-- It's the first in that series to hit a launched ballistic missile while rising -- in its "boost phase" -- rather than when falling (called its "terminal phase");
-- Attacking in this boost phase precludes the enemy from using decoys, and makes BMD programs in other phases easier (since fewer missiles are still coming in);
-- The intercepting missile was fired from an Aegis cruiser at sea, which assures vast mobility;
-- This mobility enables us to deploy BMD to protect 1) our homeland itself, 2) our troops fighting in some theater (Iraq, Korea) or 3) our friends and allies under threat (Israel, Europe, Japan), depending upon the crisis at hand.
But don't just take my word for it. Take that of a real expert in this field, Dr. Robert Jastrow, SDI's early and prescient backer. Jastrow founded NASA's Goddard Institute for Space Studies and served as its director for 20 years. On Thursday, Dr. Jastrow said: "With this latest successful test, the Aegis missile defense system is appreciably closer to deployment." Past winner of NASA's Medal for Exceptional Scientific Achievement, this gifted scientist and policy wonk now chairs the Marshall Institute, which promotes unbiased, scientific findings critical to public policy.
Here, at long last, is a Pentagon BMD program that won't go on endlessly being tested. It'll actually get deployed, which is the only way to boost our homeland security.
Such a whopping accomplishment would have gotten noticed if the Navy had somehow made it into a video game. Imagine how kids would have been wowed by the Aegis weapon system detecting a "hostile" missile launch within seconds. Then, precisely tracking it for two minutes. And then firing. And then two minutes later -- bamo! -- having that bullet hit and obliterate the incoming bad-guy missile. Way cool!
Even if kids weren't so wowed last week, adults will be grateful with the system getting deployed -- as early as three or four years from now. For that will constitute real homeland security.
An intention to deploy within 3-4 years, combined with the occupation of the US in the middle east, creates a very dangerous environment in Eastern Asia.
China and NK's only real military strength is based on the ballistic missiles they have developed and deployed. Chinese intimidation of Taiwan is based on ballistic missles. China now has a window within it must act or see its dream of controlling the Western Pacific by controlling Taiwan go out the window.
If we commit too much in assets to the middle east, this window looks dangerous indeed.
If we commit too much in assets to the middle east, this window looks dangerous indeed.
The Chinese lack sufficient sea lift, and more importantly, the ability to defend that sealift. The U.S. still has dozens and dozens of SSN's, as well as a dozen carriers. Even if the PLA unleashed it's buildup of missiles and initiated a reverse Dunkirk into Taiwan they'd be unable to hold it against American pressure. Their Navy and their Air Force remain a joke.
-- The intercepting missile was fired from an Aegis cruiser at sea, which assures vast mobility;
It also suggests to the bad guys the essential first target in any planned attack. If you can neutralize the Aegis system and thus allow your booster to survive, your attack will be harder to stop.
Attacking in this boost phase precludes the enemy from using decoys, and makes BMD programs in other phases easier (since fewer missiles are still coming in);
Actually, this only precludes the enemy from using decoy warheads. However, if you're already betting the farm on attacking the U.S., cost is really no object: you're going to buy and launch a bunch of decoy boosters. If you put up 100 boosters, some substantial number will make it through boost phase.
Should be "let's not overlook..."
Still, it's not a good idea to get too complacent about it. The whole scene assumes that the US would get involved. If the Chinese managed to figure out a way to make it expensive for the US to get involved (say, quietly telling the Prez that certain unpleasant things would happen in the US, like smallpox, like widespread Islamic terrorism, etc, if the US interfered), then US military power becomes irrelevant
In WW2, France felt secure that Germany would not be able to penetrate the Siegfreid Line. The Germans just went AROUND it, via Belgium. Don't assume that the Chinese will be unable to figure out a novel way to transport massive numbers of troops across a narrow strait -- the Chinese have lots of good engineers.
High Frontier is a good site, in general, but they don't seem to update their web site very often. The web site of National Review does the best job in the media of keeping you up to date on NMD.
To the consternation of the Chinese the Bush administration has already affirmed they view as the Taiwan Relations Act as a pledge to defend Taiwan. You can read the Act here: Taiwan Relations Act Text
In WW2, France felt secure that Germany would not be able to penetrate the Siegfreid Line.
In the interest of accuracy, I'll mention that the French felt safe behind the Maginot Line. The Siegfreid Line was what the Germans hoped would slow down Patton...
The Germans just went AROUND it, via Belgium.
That's actually the Schlieffen Plan, that the Germans adopted in World War I, and it worked pretty well. In 1940 Manstein's Plan was enacted, which utilized a feint in force against the Low Countries which the Allies expected and rushed in to stop. The Germans, under the incredible initiative of Guderian, then pushed their spearhead into the Ardennes forest, which the French considered essentially impenetrable to large organized forces, and 'bagged' are large portion of the Allied forces against the coast.
Don't assume that the Chinese will be unable to figure out a novel way to transport massive numbers of troops across a narrow strait -- the Chinese have lots of good engineers.
They're very adept at reverse engineering, but unless they're on the verge of a teleportation breakthrough they're going to come by boat, or by plane. They can't afford the planes (and we have immense capability to shoot them down) and they don't yet have the sealift (which we also have immense capability to sink). We needn't be afraid, just resolute. So long as the President makes clear that war on our ally Taiwan in war on the United States the Chinese have more to lose than gain by invasion.
True but very highly unlikely that anyone can pull it off. Aegis can track from say 50 to several hundred targets simultaneously and can engage lots of them at the same time. So it would take a huge investment in anti-ship missiles to get one Aegis ship. (remember that each incoming missile has to pass through several layers of anti-missile defense and that each layer has proven to be quite effective) Then you have to face the fact that we have lots of Aegis ships and that they are hardly ever alone, each one defends all the others etc. Hitting an Aegis ship at sea is a much harder problem than hitting a carrier and it ain't so easy to hit a carrier.
God Save America (Please)
Yup. But that solution is rather like sending large amounts of infantry to storm a machine-gun covered trenchline.
Actually, this only precludes the enemy from using decoy warheads. However, if you're already betting the farm on attacking the U.S., cost is really no object: you're going to buy and launch a bunch of decoy boosters. If you put up 100 boosters, some substantial number will make it through boost phase.
The boosters would have to mimic the relevant signatures of the real thing. That means that they must weigh the same (a lighter booster will accelerate faster unless the rocket is less powerful; using a less powerful rocket means that the exhaust plume will look very different to the infrared sensors tracking the booster).
My point is, the boosters could be the real thing. If you're talking about a nuclear warhead, the hard part is not the rocket, it's getting the nuke to put on top of it. If you're talking chemicals or biologicals, all of the rockets could be live. Getting enough boosters to do it is the easy part -- well within the current capabilities of most of the countries we'd be worried about -- especially if you're not too concerned about quality control on the decoys.
And I think a cloud of plausible booster decoys also neutralizes the Aegis system. How many boosters can they shoot down?
This isn't an insurmountable problem, but it is still something that has to be countered. We're not quite there yet.
My point is, identifying the real deal from the decoys is going to be easier than you think. Either the damn thing weighs as much as the real thing (whereupon it costs just as much, whereupon you might as well plunk a warhead on it and make it the real thing), or it's a lot cheaper, thus a lot lighter, thus easily picked out from the real targets.
Like I said: most likely the decoys are the real deal. Remember: you're already betting the farm by launching a nuke at somebody. You'd put nukes on all of them, if you had enough nukes. And if you're popping off chemicals or bugs, then they're all live boosters.
The cost of some extra boosters isn't really all that much by comparison.
Finally, the ugly secret is that it's not really that expensive to make boosters unless you want to buy pinpoint accuracy and very high reliability. If your goal is to spoof the Aegis, all you need is guidance that "looks right" and engines that put out enough thrust.
Ah, I see.
Problem: it's still EXTREMELY expensive.
The cost of some extra boosters isn't really all that much by comparison.
For us, or for Bill Gates, a true statement. For North Korea, it's NOT true.
North Korea already has enough boosters in its arsenal to do it, and they've also got a thriving market selling them to places like Libya. They've been doing this for over 10 years.
FWIW, their apparently successful nuke program would have cost a lot more than the boosters.
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