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BTW, the pipeline section that ruptured was about 3 ft. in diameter and approximately 50 years old. The explosion obliterated the pipeline section and created a very large crater in the ground. Due to its configuration on an approach to a bridge over the Pecos River, it could not be pigged to determine condition. A lot of existing pipelines are similarly old, and new Congressional legislation was passed to require more inspections and testing. Due to liability issues, you can be sure EPNG and other companies are checking out their individual systems to make sure a similar accident doesn't happen again, especially near a large population area.

Due to liability issues, you can be sure EPNG and other companies are checking out their individual systems to make sure a similar accident doesn't happen again, especially near a large population area.

It's about time. El Paso is obliged to properly maintain its pipelines for safety and to provide the contracted capacity.

The U.S. Department of Transportation’s Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) today announced it is seeking the largest civil penalty ever proposed against a gas transmission pipeline operator in the history of the federal pipeline safety program.
The $2.52 million civil penalty, proposed today by RSPA’s Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS), is against El Paso Energy Pipeline Group for safety violations related to the August 2000 pipeline failure in Carlsbad, N.M.
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RSPA cited El Paso for the following safety violations:
• Failing to ensure that qualified personnel perform required internal corrosion control procedures.
• Transporting corrosive gas on numerous occasions without taking proper preventive and mitigative steps. This included failing to communicate to appropriate personnel when excessive water content was in the gas stream and when liquids and solids were found, and failing to perform necessary tests for corrosion.
• Failing to follow procedures for continuing surveillance of its facilities which would have led to action to control collection of liquid at low points, thereby mitigating conditions which led to the accident.
• Failing to take action to minimize the possibility of a failure recurrence following a similar incident in 1996.
• Not having an accurate elevation map for lines involved in the accident, which would have shown low points where liquid could accumulate and corrosion could occur.
http://ops.dot.gov/press/rsp1701.pdf