Posted on 07/05/2002 2:39:01 PM PDT by Asmodeus
On 24 January 2002, the Reduced Vertical Separation Minimum (RVSM) in the EUR RVSM Airspace provided six additional flight levels between 29,000 feet (FL290) and 41,000 feet (FL410) inclusive. This has been achieved by reducing the separation minima between aircraft from 2,000ft to 1,000ft. The RVSM Programme has been implemented simultaneously in the airspace of 41 European and North African countries.
Based on all currently available information, the tragic accident between a B-757 of DHL and a TU-154 of Bashkirian Airlines does not seem to be related to the introduction of RVSM in European Airspace.
EUROCONTROL had been notified by the respective Authorities of the States concerned that both aircraft were RVSM approved, both technically and operationally.
Baskhkirian Airlines Tu 154 notified its RVSM approval status for this specific flight by inserting "W" in the flight plan. The RVSM programme had been notified of its RVSM approval status on 24 Jan 2002 by the Federal Aviation Authority of Russia.
During the flight the aircraft flew over the Height Monitoring Unit of Linz (Austria) between 2105 and 2130, a few minutes before the incident. The Total Vertical Error recorded on this flight over Linz was 44.2ft, well within the performance limits established.
The DHL International B757 notified its RVSM approval status by "W" in flight plan. The RVSM Programme has confirmation from the Bahrain Civil Aviation Authorities that the aircraft was RVSM approved..
The B757 was monitored repeatedly in the last 2 months; its the last flight had a measured total vertical error of –35.7ft.
Thus the height keeping performance of both aircraft was verified recently and was shown to be well within limits and conformant with RVSM requirements.
The RVSM Programme continues to gather information on the causes of the accident. The information provided so far indicates that both aircraft were flight planned and established in cruise at FL360. If vertical separation would have been applied between both aircraft on the routes flown, they had been vertically separated by 2,000 feet, in accordance with ICAO RVSM cruising levels.
The thoughts of the RVSM Programme Team are with the families and friends of the victims of this terrible tragedy.
This is what is known as pilot error.
ML/NJ
No.
The pilot is the one in charge. He can tell the controller to pound salt if he wants to. (He might have some 'splanin to do afterwards, but avoiding a midair is likely to be considered reasonable grounds for deviating from ones clearance.)
ML/NJ
Sorry. I don't.
It may have been something I heard while listening to a radio news broadcast. I fly (or maybe flew is more accurate) myself and it was something that struck me as rather odd.
ML/NJ
Not being a pilot, I have to ask: Wouldn't the fact that both planes were flying at FL360 indicate that there just might be a potential problem here?
Not to me.
If the report I heard is true, then he requested permission to deviate. He wasn't ordered to alter his course, probably because the Swiss ATC was asleep at the switch. But ATC isn't in charge of airplanes, pilots are. This pilot apparently could see the other plane, with what seems plenty of time to deviate, and he didn't. Maybe the DHL guys were asleep too, and sure they shouldn't have been, but if the Russian saw the other plane with more than a minute of separation and didn't avoid it, it's his fault.
ML/NJ
Where did you hear that from? How did he see the conflict situation?
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