Posted on 07/02/2002 7:43:48 AM PDT by JohnHuang2
The 10th Mountain Division sure isn't the same tough outfit I saw in Northern Italy at the end of World War II, nor the squared-away unit I spent time with during the bad days in Somalia in '91 or the liberation of Haiti in '94.
The 10th troopers still wear the Mountain tab – indicating they're mountain-trained – which the men of the division sported so proudly in Italy when they were a superbly conditioned outfit fighting on one of the hardest U.S. battlefields of World War II.
"We don't do mountains anymore," a division sergeant told me – which the out-of-shape battalions that fought during Op Anaconda proved in spades.
"We saved their butts during Anaconda with close air support while they stumbled around with 100-pound rucks, wheezing from the altitude, sucking up guerrilla mortar fire like magnets," says a Special Forces warrior. "No wonder the Brit Marines were sent in. And then the 10th returns home, gets a parade and 170 medals for coming under mortar attack?"
"Give me one [Special Forces] 'A' Team, and I could destroy a whole damned infantry battalion in this sorry division with one arm tied behind my back," says a division captain who served serious enlisted time in Army Special Forces. "The 10th Mountain was a great unit back when, but it's been slowly destroyed over the years by leaders who are more concerned about haircuts than hard training."
"This is my first experience with a light-infantry division," says a division captain. "I'm in awe at how poorly trained these troops are. In my two years here, we haven't done any mountain training even though there are world-class training areas right nearby in Vermont. We don't go out in the winter except to do PT, and in the summer the National Guard uses most of our training areas. Our big deal is to go out twice a year for two weeks and train up for the Joint Readiness Training Center at Fort Polk (Louisiana). All our training is geared toward passing the test there. No deviations, no special situations, just the same old canned stuff we always do. It's like having a copy of the exam and just memorizing that."
"After a recent battalion 5-mile run," according to a 10th soldier, "75 soldiers fell out – including my 1st Sergeant." He added that his unit has a history of substance abuse and AWOL problems and that "morale's in the toilet" because heavy doses of political correctness and peacekeeping have dulled the division's combat readiness. "We've done peacekeeping missions in Bosnia, Kosovo and the Sinai until we're blue in the face. This combined with operations in Afghanistan has left only 30 percent of the division at Fort Drum (New York)."
Another problem is that junior leaders are promoted too fast. "The Army says they're short junior NCOs," reports an old vet. "They're promoting when eligible, not when ready, and now we have the unqualified leading the untrained."
"After 9-11 the top brass were going nuts trying to figure a way to get us into Afghanistan," says a division major. "We finally sent one reinforced infantry battalion. A brigade commander told me, 'This is all about getting our boys in the game.' Meaning this was a way to get that critical combat efficiency report and as many glory medals and goodies as the careerists could grab."
Before their boots hit the ground in Central Asia, this lead battalion was joined by the "entire division staff and one entire brigade staff," a senior sergeant says. "Never before have so few been so supervised by so many. The ratio of shooters to staffers was amazing, and when they came back most were wearing combat patches and badges."
When candidate Bush was running for the presidency, he publicly stated that the 10th was not combat-ready. The kinder and gentler folks who were then running and ruining our armed forces ate him alive.
"There's a series of issues that have caused this division to hit the skids," says a division leader. "Many of these problems are infecting the entire Army, not just the 10th. There are great guys here in the trenches that are doing the right thing. All they need is some old-fashioned senior leadership."
The obvious result of two terms of Klinton, the man who loathed the military.
It's past time for this process to start operating for this war.
Currently less than 7% of the combined armed forces are combat proven veterans. Yes we have GO's with no CIBs. Yes, we have O's and NCO's with limited combat experience. Yes, the last ten years has had a real drain on the US Military. Something Mr. Hackworth needs to remember before he starts writing. But more importantly, we still have the best Armed Forces on this planet. As a former Jumping JAG, who also has limited combat experience, I am still very proud of these troops. I see this as a cycle effect. We have had this happen at early stages of almost every war we have really ever fought, with maybe the exception of Korea and the early entrance to Vietnam. Can we do better? Indeed. Do we have the time? Not anymore. However, this is how boy's are made into men. This is how hero's are made. This is how Armies are made. Is it the best way, No! Did we have a choice? No! So I guess these unit commanders have their jobs cutout for them. So, get the job done and stop complaining, especially to the press. You are not the first to have green troops in combat, if that is what you really call Afghanistan.
Does Mr. Hackworth ever write anything positive? Or does Mr. Hackworth think he is the only soldier who knows anything?
One of the most distressing things I ever did in the Army was to spend 6 months as the Training Sergent for an Infantry unit (I was injured and moved into that role to assist in my recovery). One of the duties was to document all required training for all 120 members of my company. When I took over the job, I found that many training records were out of date or incomplete as we had been without a Training Sergent for about 1 year.
I decided that my first task was to comb through the regs to find out all of the required classes. So after about three weeks of heads down research, I developed a full list of all the training required. It totaled 2,030 hours. That is a little over 40 hours per week, 50 weeks per year.
OVER 50% OF THE TRAINING WAS NOT COMBAT RELATED!!!!
Typical training topics included: Sex Ed, Equal Opportunity Classes, Respect for local culture (this was Germany), Uniform Code of Military Justice (basicly law), etc. etc. etc. etc. etc.
Of the 50% training that remained, much of the time was given to safety and general health education. Of the acutal combat training (Shoot move and communicate) we only got about 6 weeks of training -- PER YEAR! During some years, not even that.
What I have not pointed out is that our job was to guard the East / West German boarder. Many times the required training could not be completed due to our mission requirements. Also, other duties would rotate to our unit including support for REFORGER or guarding ammo depots. In fact, our mission requirements added up to between 1,000 hrs to 3,000 hrs per year. If you add the required training, the total time required was in excess of 5,000 hrs. If you work 365 days per year, that equates to 13 1/2 hour days. Obviously something has to give. Missions cant be refused so it had to be training.
The sad thing is that the IG would come down on you HARD if you did not complete all of the non-combat training. That was a fast way for a Captain to get a poor evaluation and thus end his chances for promotion. At one time, I actually had a Major during our IG inspection state that rifle marksmanship was non-essential training.
The leadership in the Army needs to get it's priorities staight. The officers are there to lead troops into battle - not punch their tickets for the next rank. Troops need to be able to shoot (rifle marksmanship), move (physical training and vehicle training), and communicate (training on radio operations - things like battle reports and calling for mortar or artillery support) FIRST . Then train for safety, survival, maintanance. Then lastly, all of the non-combat feel good stuff. Just my .02
Good Luck, there's a lot to go through and it's just the tip of the iceberg. A commander's nightmare to plug it all in, I can tell you, from first hand experience.
Mr. Hackworth makes money on his military experience by writing columns about military affairs. Nobody -- especially those who read the publications in which Hackworth is usually published -- wants to read cheery stuff about the military. They want dirt. (And, to be honest, there's plenty of that.)
Mr. Hackworth and others needs to remember that before they start thinking about their bank accounts. Yes report on the problems, but as a military affairs writer Mr. Hackworth needs to present a solid resolution to the issue he reports on. It's also about moral, Mr. Hackworth.
I must admit I was supprised at the time to find out that TRADOC could not or rather did not have the list and publish it for unit commanders. I thought it would have been a natural extension of their job. I also asked the IG folks and they could not supply more than a basic list.
I can only hope that someone will repeat the exercise and bring it to the attention of the brass.
However, our armed services must be purged of the social engineering and political correctness that is hindering unit cohesion, readiness and moral.
Dubya has done a few things in that regard.
We spent 20 to 30 hours in the air each week, training for what we were being paid to do. The idiots back in some plush office kept coming up with such ridiculous programs, and the smart COs ignored them.
However, during my first month, I found out that our company (Mech Infantry) had only three valid military vehicle drivers license. That made us "non-mission ready". Even though many of our drivers had been doing so for a couple of years.
Since the regs required the signature of the training NCO and the Captain, I decided NOT to whip up those records - didn't want some new LT trying to make a name for himself, to come after my hide. The Captain quite agreed - esp after a driver in a different company got himself killed by flipping his jeep - no drivers license.
Most other records where created rather rapidly. One trick a fellow NCO used was to record on VCR several of the required classes or to use the tapes provided by the Post training center. For the bi-annual update, he would give a 1 hr summary to everyone, pass out the recommended hand outs, and play 7 or 8 VCR's at once. He got 8 training sessions in about 2 hours. :-)
Gotta disagree. That is the normal state of a leaderless unit.
If nothing else, there is always PT and EIB qualification training that costs next to nothing and keeps the troops focused and busy.
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