Serfs: About Your Privilige, Driving

1. The issue is whether this Sovereign is required to obey the provisions in North Carolina General Statutes. It is the contention of this Sovereign that because he is a Free and Natural Person who has given up none of his "RIGHTS." That the North Carolina General Statutes does not apply to him. It is also the contention of this Sovereign that travels upon the streets or highways in North Carolina by this Sovereign is an unalienable "RIGHT." Being this, is not subject to regulation or legislation by the State of North Carolina General Assembly.

2. Let us first consider the contention of this Sovereign that travels upon the streets or highways in North Carolina is a "RIGHT." Various courts have ruled on this issue. The U.S. Supreme Court ruled:

5. "Regulated" here means traffic safety enforcement, stop lights, sign, etc., NOT a privilege that requires permission, i.e.; licensing, mandatory insurance, vehicle registration, etc..

7. It could not be stated more conclusively that Sovereigns of the states have a "RIGHT" to travel, without approval or restriction, (license), and that this "RIGHT" is protected under the U.S. Constitution. After all, who do the roadways belong to anyway? The People-At-Large. Here are other court decisions that expound the same facts:

12. The Supreme Court of the State of Colorado discussed the issue in the following way in 1961.

14. The words of the Idaho Constitution are to all intents and purposes identical with those of the North Carolina Constitution. The Constitution of the State of North Carolina, Article I, §1, states as follows:

15. Since courts tend to be consistent in their rulings, it would be expected the Idaho Supreme Court would rule in the same manner as the North Carolina Supreme Court.

18. I demand all of my other rights, including the right to travel upon the public highways and byways in the United States of America.

20. As member of the Sovereignty of the people, I not only am entitled to use the highways and byways in the United States of America, I have an inalienable right to use the highways and byways.

21. I have emphasized the word "RIGHT" because it is a common point among the authorities listed. The Idaho Code even joins in this common point:

23. Thus, there can be little doubt that, when this Sovereign travels upon the streets or highways in North Carolina, he does so as a matter of "RIGHT" and not privilege. The authority for such travel is described variously as a "RIGHT," a "COMMON RIGHT," an "ABSOLUTE RIGHT," an "UNALIENABLE RIGHT," and a "RIGHT" protected by the Constitution of the United States. Let us then examine the importance of these terms to this Sovereign by defining their meaning.

24. It shows from these definitions that the State has an obligation to acknowledge the "RIGHTS" of this Sovereign to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. Further, the State has the duty to refrain from interfering with this "RIGHT" and to protect this "RIGHT" and to enforce the claim of this Sovereign to it.

25. Now if this Sovereign has the absolute "RIGHT" to move about on the streets or highways, does that "RIGHT" include the "RIGHT" to travel in a vehicle upon the streets or highways? The Supreme Court of the State of Texas has made comments that are an appropriate response to this question.

26. These words of the Supreme Court of Texas are of particular importance in Idaho because the Idaho Supreme Court quoted the Supreme Court of Texas and used these exact words in rendering its decision in the case of O'Conner v. City of Moscow, 69 Idaho 37. The Supreme Court of Texas went on to say further;

29. These authorities point out that the "RIGHT" to own property includes the "RIGHT" to use it. The reasonable use of an automobile is to travel upon the streets or highways on which this Sovereign has an absolute "RIGHT" to use for the purposes of travel. The definitions in Title 49 Chapter 3 of the Idaho Code positively declare the "RIGHT" of this Sovereign to travel in a vehicle upon the streets or highways in Idaho.

31. Now if this Sovereign has the "RIGHT" to use a vehicle on the streets or highways in North Carolina, to what extent can the State of North Carolina regulate or diminish that "RIGHT?" There are some who maintain that specific performance is required of every Sovereign who uses a vehicle upon the streets or highways in North Carolina. Let us examine this contention in detail.

32. Specific performance is a term used to designate an action in equity in which a party to a contract asks the court to order the other party to carry out the contract which he has failed or refused to perform. Thus, if specific performance is expected, a contract must exist. The question then becomes: What are the terms of the contract and when was it executed and by whom? Since specific performance seems expected of every user of a vehicle on the streets or highways in North Carolina, the user of a vehicle seems one of the parties to the supposed contract. And since the State seems the party demanding specific performance, the State is the other party to the contract. So the supposed contract exists between the user of a vehicle and the State of North Carolina. When was this contract executed and what are its' terms? Some contend that when a user of a vehicle avails himself of the "privilege" of driving on public thoroughfares that he enters a contract with the State that requires him to abide with all the laws in the North Carolina General Statutes. Others contend that the contract is executed when a driver's license is obtained. We need now to figure out what is a contract.

33. A contract may be defined as an agreement enforceable in court between two or more parties, for a sufficient consideration to do or not to do some specified thing or things. Thus, a contract has four essential features:

34. Several types of contracts exist, but all must contain the essential features listed. Contracts can be classified under three principal categories:

35. Quasi contracts, while being called contracts are not really contracts, will not be considered in this discussion of contracts but will be considered in a separation section later.

36. There can also be unilateral and bilateral contracts that is presumed can exist under some or all the above headings. Let us examine each above types of contracts to see if the license obtained by this Sovereign falls under any of the categories of contract.

38. An Iowa Statute that requires that every foreign corporation named in it shall, as a condition for obtaining a permit to transact business in Iowa, stipulate that it will not remove into the federal court certain suits that it would by the laws of the United States have a "RIGHT" to a permit dependant upon the surrender by the foreign corporation of a privilege secured to it by the Constitution and laws of the United States. Bouvier's Law Dictionary quoting Barron v. Burnside, 121 U.S. 186:

39. It would be foolish for this Sovereign to exchange a "RIGHT" for a privilege since it would mean giving up valuable property in exchange for something having less value. Is it possible for this Sovereign to do such a thing?

40. Thus, even if this Sovereign wanted to do so, he could not give up his "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina or exchange it for the privilege of having a driver's license. Thus, in exchange for the supposed obligation of this Sovereign, the State has given nothing. Thus, there is no consideration.

41. It may be contended that the seal on the driver's license is sufficient consideration by the State. It is true that under the common law, the question of consideration could not be raised concerning a contract under seal. The seal provided conclusive presumption of a consideration. Still, North Carolina has abolished by statute the common law presumption of consideration and this statute is binding upon all officers and employees of the State. So, though a seal may be present, it is not evidence of consideration in North Carolina. Of course, the document in question is a contrived and copied document and lacks validity in any case as a contract.

42. As to an obligation, since the license contains no statement of agreement, since there are no parties to any agreement, and since there is no consideration, there can be no obligation. The driver's license thus is not a contract since it fails to contain any of the four essential features of a contract.

43. Can the driver's license be an implied contract? The same elements must exist in an implied contract as exist in an express contract. The only difference is that an implied contract is not written or spoken and the elements of the contract are shown by the acts and conduct of the parties involved. With respect to this Sovereign, there was certainly no meeting of the minds else this brief would not result. It was never the intention of this Sovereign to give up constitutional "RIGHTS" to accept a privilege from the State. Such an action would be ridiculous. This could only be done in a socialistic state. There has been no implied agreement in a free society. It is possible that there were two parties to the supposed contract, the State and this Sovereign. There was no consideration in the implied contract for the same reasons that there was no consideration in the express contract.

44. An obligation is the thing to be done. It may be to pay money, to do work, or to deliver goods; or it may be to refrain from doing something that the person contracting had a "RIGHT" to do. Some may say that the State was obligated to allow this Sovereign to drive on the streets or highways in North Carolina and that this Sovereign was obligated to obey all the Statutes contained in the North Carolina General Statutes. It would be just as easy to say that the State could not be obligated to allow this Sovereign to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina because they did not have the "RIGHT" or the power to prevent him from doing so.

45. If the State cannot prevent this Sovereign from his travels on the streets or highways in North Carolina, they do not have any discretion in the matter and do not have the choice of whether to obligate themselves or not. Thus, the obligation of the State cannot be to grant this Sovereign the privilege of travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. The obligation of the State cannot be to refrain from prohibiting this Sovereign from his travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina since the State did not have the "RIGHT" to do this at first.

46. It is the contention of this Sovereign that the only obligation that this Sovereign incurs when using a vehicle upon the streets or highways in North Carolina is the Common Law obligation to refrain from any act that causes another person to lose life, liberty, or property. In complying with this obligation, this Sovereign does comply with many Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes since they are, for the most part, only common sense rules by which this Sovereign avoids doing damage to others.

47. Still, this acquiescence to some Statutes of The North Carolina General Statutes should not be construed as evidence of a contractual obligation by this Sovereign. Neither should it be construed as acquiescence to all the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes or to any of them always. Instead, it is merely evidence of a want of this Sovereign to travel safely and to do harm to no one.

48. Thus, the actions of this Sovereign do not supply unambiguous evidence of a contract with the State. Instead, the actions can, with equal weight, be said to be evidence of the fact that this Sovereign was complying with Common Law requirement that he does harm to no one. The driver's license is not an implied contract because there is no consideration, there may be possibly be two parties, but there is no consideration, and there is not clear evidence of an obligation. Three of the four elements necessary for a contract are missing.

49. The question now becomes whether the driver's license application is a contract. In completing this document, the applicant makes several statements and signs the paper upon which these statements are written under oath. The statements concern the identity, physical description, address, ability and experience in operating a vehicle, and one statement on the physical condition of the applicant. None of the statements are as an agreement.

50. The application form contains the signature of the applicant and the signature of the person taking the oath of the applicant. The reverse side of the Application contains the results of a vision test and rudimentary physical examination with the results of a driving test. These results are signed by the examiner and not by the applicant.

51. Thus the application takes the form of an Affidavit instead of a contract. But let us see if the elements of a contract are present in the application.

52. Since none of the necessary elements of a contract are present, the application does not constitute a contract.

53. The only other document involved in obtaining a driver's license is the document, part of which is copied to make the actual driver's license. It contains, besides the information that is used in making the driver's license, the results of a vision test conducted by the driver's license examiner.

54. The applicant places his signature upon this form that is then copied by some photographic process. Other material is added including a photograph, signature of the Director of the Department of Law Enforcement and the driver's license is made of this composite.

55. Thus the license itself cannot be a contract because it is a contrived document. The form from which the driver's license is made cannot be a contract because, again, none of the elements of a contract are present. So if none of the documents executed by the driver when obtaining a license is a contract, then no contract can exist between the driver and the State as a result of obtaining a driver's license.

56. But the idea that the driver's license is a contract with the State is pervasive. It is a belief that is strongly held even by people in high places. So let us examine the driver's license as if it were a contract and see if it can withstand scrutiny. Not every offer made by one party and accepted by the other creates a valid contract. The outward form of a contract, either oral or written may exist, and yet the circumstances may be such that no contract was in reality created. Some circumstances that will cause an apparently valid contract to be void are:

57. This Sovereign obtained a driver's license upon the representation by the State that one's travel upon the streets or highways of the United States of America was a privilege. This Sovereign accepted this representation as true and did obtain a driver's license.

58. But the General Assembly of the State who passed the Statutes contained in the North Carolina General Statutes are knowledgeable persons, many of whom are lawyers, and they undoubtedly knew at the time the law was passed that an individual's travel was a "RIGHT" and not a privilege. If this were the case, then the mistake would be unilateral. A unilateral mistake known to the other party is sufficient grounds to void a contract.

60. If the driver's license is a contract, a case can be made for the contention that it was an agreement obtained by the State by fraud.

62. In view of the many decisions by high courts, including the Supreme Court of the United States, that one's travel is a "RIGHT" and not a privilege, it would be hard to defend the proposition that the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina was unaware of these decisions, particularly since many legislators are and were lawyers knowledgeable in such matters. In fact, when one considers the definition of streets or highways in Sections of the North Carolina General Statutes, the Evidence is conclusive that the legislature knew and knows that ones travels is a "RIGHT."

63. Therefore, the statements in the North Carolina General Statutes that a travel is a privilege and that a driver's license is necessary before one can travel constitutes a material misrepresentation of fact to this possessor of a driver's license. And since the legislature is and was aware of the fact that an individual's travels was not a privilege, but a "RIGHT," the statement that one's travels is a privilege, when applied to this Sovereign, constitutes a willful intention to deceive, and therefore, to defraud.

64. This Sovereign did rely upon the representations of the legislature that an individual's travels was a privilege when he obtained his driver's license, else he would not have obtained one.

65. This Sovereign did suffer damage as a result of his acting upon the representation of the legislature at least to the extent of the license fee.

66. In as much as all the necessary elements of fraud are present if the driver's license is considered a contract, the "contract" is void.

67. With respect to duress, Bergh, supra., supplies the following definition:

68. Since it was essential to this Sovereign in pursuing his occupation of common "RIGHT" to use a vehicle upon the streets or highways in North Carolina, and since the State of North Carolina threatens to and does prosecute persons in criminal actions for not possessing a driver's license, regardless of their status, this Sovereign did obtain a driver's license under duress. If then the driver's license is a contract, the contract is unenforceable and invalid because of this duress.

69. With respect to alterations, Bergh, supra., has the following comments:

70. If the driver's license is a contract, it is a written contract, at least to the extent that the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes are written. Each time that the General Assembly amends or modifies or adds to any of the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes, the terms of the contract are changed. Since this Sovereign then has the option of considering the contract as discharged, he then chooses to do so as of the first change in the North Carolina General Statutes following his application for a driver's license.

71. If it is contended that the driver's license is an implied contract, the "Statute of Frauds" comes into play. North Carolina has enacted a "Statute of Frauds."

72. In the following cases the agreement is invalid, unless the same or some note or memorandum of it, be in writing and subscribed by the party charged, or by his agent. Evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without the writing or secondary evidence of its contents:

73. Since the term of the driver's license contract is so many years and the contract is not written, the "Statute of Frauds" does apply and the contract is unenforceable.

74. The discussion up to this point has been concerned with bilateral contracts in which each party promises something to the other party. Is it possible that the driver's license is a unilateral contract? A unilateral contract is described as:

75. Since the act expected by the State is obedience to the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes, what promise has the State offered in exchange for this act? The only promise that the State could make this Sovereign is the promise to allow him to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. Since this Sovereign already can do that as a matter of "RIGHT," the State can promise him nothing. Thus there is no consideration and a unilateral contract cannot exist.

76. Having shown that no contract exists between this Sovereign and the State, let us examine the proposition that a quasi-contract exists between this Sovereign and the State.

78. In order to establish the existence of a quasi-contractual obligation it must be shown:

79. Thus, if it is contended that this Sovereign must obey the Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes because of a quasi-contract, it must be shown that this Sovereign has received a benefit from the State. But one's travels on the streets or highways of the State is not a benefit received from the State. It was a "RIGHT" that attached to this Sovereign at the moment of his birth and cannot be removed by the State. In this respect, no benefit has been received from the State, and thus a quasi-contractual obligation cannot exist with respect to this Sovereign.

80. It may be claimed that the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes are made pursuant to the police powers of the State and that every person in the State is obligated to obey them.

81. The police power is a grant of authority from the people to their governmental agents for the protection of the health, the safety, the comfort and the welfare of the public. In its nature, it is broad and comprehensive. It is a necessary and salutary power, since without it, society would be at the mercy of individual interest and there would exist neither public order or security. While this is true, it is only a power. It is not a "RIGHT?"

82. The powers of government, under our system, are nowhere absolute. They are but grants of authority from the people, and are limited to their true purposes. The fundamental "RIGHTS" of the people are inherent and have not yielded to governmental control. They are not the subjects of governmental authority. They are subjects of individual authority. Constitutional powers can never transcend constitutional "RIGHTS." The police power is subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution upon every power of government; and it will not be suffered to invade or impair the fundamental liberties of the Sovereign, those natural "RIGHTS" that are the chief concern of the Constitution and for whose protection it was ordained by the people.

83. Where inherent, unalienable, absolute "RIGHTS" are concerned, the police powers can have no effect. The "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways and the "RIGHT" to own and use property have been described as inherent, unalienable, and absolute. Thus the police power cannot regulate this Sovereign's "RIGHT" to use a vehicle on the streets or highways in North Carolina.

84. If the police power of the State is permitted to regulate the travels of this Sovereign on the streets or highways in North Carolina, and if, through the action of these regulations or Statutes, this Sovereign is denied access to the streets or highways in North Carolina; a fundamental "RIGHT" of this Sovereign has been abrogated.

85. The abrogation of unalienable "RIGHTS" by legislation or rule making is unconstitutional.

86. If further proof is needed to show that this Sovereign need not be licensed to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina, it is provided in the following decisions:

87. Since a fee is charged for a driver's license and since one's travels on the streets or highways in North Carolina is a "RIGHT" guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, and by the LAW OF NATURE, it is not constitutional for the State to require this Sovereign to be licensed to travel.

88. Even the application for North Carolina Driver's License Form recognizes the "RIGHT" of some persons to travel without a license. North Carolina General Statutes recognizes categories of persons who are not required to be licensed in this State. Why is it then that the first demand made by the law enforcement personnel when making a traffic stop is:

89. Can it be that there is a conspiracy afoot within the State to reduce all Sovereigns to a status of contract? Why else would a law enforcement person take a Sovereign to jail without even trying to discover if that Sovereign is exempt from the requirement of having a driver's license?

90. The question now becomes whether this Sovereign is required to obey any of the Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes? It has been shown that this Sovereign has a "RIGHT" to travel on the streets or highways in North Carolina. So, any Statute that describes driving on the streets or highways as a privilege cannot apply to this Sovereign. Since the "RIGHT" of this Sovereign to travel cannot be abrogated, any Statute the operation of which would have the effect of denying access to the streets or highways to this Sovereign cannot be applied to this Sovereign.

91. Since violation of any Statue in the North Carolina General Statutes is classified as a "misdemeanor" that is punishable by a fine and six months in jail, and since putting this Sovereign in jail because of his use of the streets or highways that harms nobody would be an abrogation of his "RIGHT" to travel, none of the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes apply to this Sovereign. These contentions are supported by the Supreme Court of United States.

92. This decision is consistent with that in Miranda, supra, in which it was stated that where "RIGHTS" are concerned, there can be no rule making or legislation that would abrogate them. It is also consistent with the discussion in the following case. This case is a tax case, but the discussion on "RIGHTS" that it contains is appropriate.

94. The Emphasized statement is also consistent with North Carolina Statute. In the Statute reads:

95. Since the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes cannot apply to this Sovereign, he becomes subject to the Common Law that maintains that he owes nothing to the public while he does not trespass upon their "RIGHTS."

96. Is it the contention of this Sovereign that because the Statutes contained in the North Carolina General Statutes do not apply to him that the Statutes are unconstitutional? Absolutely not. There is a class of persons in North Carolina to whom these Statutes apply without reservation. Members of this class include corporations and those who do the corporation business on the streets or highways in North Carolina. A corporation is the creation of the State.

97. It is a person in the eyes of the law but it lacks character, no morals, no conscience. It's every activity must be directed and supervised by the State. Under the definition of "Due Process of Law", Bouvier's Law Dictionary states in part:

98. The Statutes in the North Carolina General Statutes are designed to direct the activities of the class of persons of which a corporation is a member. Corporations are absolutely bound by these Statutes. It is imperative that a conscienceless entity not be allowed to roam the streets or highways in North Carolina and jeopardize the Sovereigns. It is for this purpose that the Statutes of the North Carolina General Statutes were enacted and not for the control of a Free and Natural Sovereign.

99. There is no Court in this Land that could lawfully execute an Order that would or could cause, or work to compel, One to become a servant or slave of any city, county or state without a conviction and with full Due Process of Law, and for any city, county, or state to pretend otherwise is an absurdity.

Losing Cases

Driver's License / Right to Travel

Here's some case law on the subject from "Idiot Legal Arguments." This is why I'm going to keep my driver's license current. I really don't want to pay any fines.

But hey, why don't you drive? You're encouraging others to do so.

relating to traffic laws: state govt can restrict driving on the public roads to drivers with valid current licenses, and restrict drivers to vehicles registered as having passed inspection, notwithstanding argument about a "right to travel". Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 US 610 (a state may restrict the use of its highways to drivers who have complied with the license, insurance and vehicle registration laws of this state or, if the driver is a non-resident, of his home state); Bell v. Burson (1971) 402 US 535 (state statute which denies or suspends drivers license for failure to carry insurance or comparable financial responsibility does not violate constitution); (this authority to prescribe reasonable requisites for the "privilege" of driving on the public highways is inherent in state and local govts) State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953 ("the appellant asserts that the state ... has unduly infringed upon his 'right to travel' by requiring licensing and registarion .... However, contrary to his assertions, at no time did the State of Tennessee place constraints upon the appellant's exercise of this right. His right to travel ... remains unimpeded.... Rather, based upon the context of his argument, the appellant asserts an infringement upon his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways of this state. This notion is wholly separate from the right to travel. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public highway is not a fundamental 'right'. Instead, it is a revocable 'privilege' that is granted upon compliance with statutory licensing procedures."); Quackenbush v. Superior Court (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 454, 70 Cal.Rptr.2d 271 (state can require insurance for drivers licenses); ditto (state has legitimate interest in requiring financial responsibility of drivers) Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 87 RI 226, 139 A2d 869 (this crank, a lawyer who was evidently his own favorite client and eventually got himself disbarred for threatening to bomb the courthouse, Carter v. Berberian (RI 1981) 442 A2d 1263, later got his 13 year old son to sue over the age requirement for learners permits, see below); see generally essay, Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Act, 35 ALR2d 1011 & suppl.; Guerrero v. Ryan (1995) 272 IL.App.3d 945, 209 IL.Dec 408, 651 NE2d 586 app.denied 163 IL.2d 556, 657 NE2d 621 cert.den 516 US 1180 (state can suspend license already issued if lack of insurance is discovered, drivers license not a basic constitutional right); similarly State v. Turk (1982) 197 Mont 311, 643 P2d 224; ditto Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 87 RI 226, 139 A2d 869; (cannot evade insurance requirement by religious objections) State v. Cosgrove (So.Dak. 1989) 439 NW2d 119 cert.den 493 US 846; similarly State v. Skurdal (1988) 235 Mont 291, 767 P2d 304 ("This is obviously a growing school of thought which had been misguided.... The notion of right to travel remains wholly separate from the right or privilege to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways." The court made a point of discussing many of the crank arguments against requiring drivers licenses; evidently the crank notion is not only are the licensing requirements inapplicable to them but also speed limits); similarly City of Bismarck v. Stuart (No.Dak 1996) 546 NW2d 366 ("No court has ever held that it is an impermissible infringement upon a citizen's constitutional Right to Travel for the legislature to decree that ... every person who operates a motor vehicle on public roads must have a valid operator's license.... The legislature has the constitutional police power to ensure safe drivers and safe roads."); similarly City of Salina v. Wisden (Utah 1987) 737 P2d 981 ("Mr. Wisden's assertion that the right to travel encompasses 'the unrestrained use of the highway' is wrong. The right to travel granted by the state and federal constitutions does not include the ability to ignore laws governing the use of public roadways. The motor vehicle code was promulgated to increase the safety and efficiency of our public roads. It enhances rather than infringes on the right to travel. The ability to drive a motor vehicle on a public roadway is not a fundamental right; it is a privilege that is granted upon the compliance with the statutory licensing procedures."); similarly ("The right to operate a motor vehicle is wholly a creation of state law; it certainly is not explicitly guaranteed by the Constitution, and nothing in that document or in our state constitution has even the slightest appearance or an implicit guarantee of that right. The plaintiff's argument that the right to operate a motor vehicle is fundamental because of its relation to the fundamental right of interstate travel ... is utterly frivolous. The plaintiff is not being prevented from traveling interstate by public transportation, by common carrier, or in a motor vehicle driven by someone with a license to drive it. What is at issue here is not his right to travel interstate, but his right to operate a motor vehicle on the public highways, and we have no hesitation in holding that this is not a fundamental right.") Berberian v. Petit (RI 1977) 374 A2d 791, 86 ALR3d 468 (this case was a 13-year-old boy challenging the age requirement for learners permits, the court quoted from a 1958 decision involving his father's challenge to the requirement for motorists insurance); similarly Jones v. City of Newport (1989) 29 Ark.App 42, 780 SW2d 338; similarly Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1st Cir unpub 9/3/96) cert.den 520 US 1157; ditto (state can require drivers license, vehicle registration, display of license plate, etc., notwithstanding argument about "right to travel") State v. Weisman (Minn.App unpub 11/1/88) cert.den 489 US 1080; ditto Maxfield v. Corwin (WD Mich unpub 3/17/87); ditto ("While there exists a fundamental right to travel, neither this court, nor our [state] supreme court, nor the US Supreme Court has ever held that there exists a fundamental right to drive a moter vehicle." State can require display of official registration tag, and that driver present police with valid license and car registration, even against purported religious objections, and can punish for use of homemade license plate) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; ditto City of Spokane v. Port (1986) 43 Wash.App 273, 716 P2d 945 revw.den 106 Wash.2d 1010; State v. Patterson (Kan.App unpub 2/14/92) review den (Kan. Supm 1992) 250 Kan 807; ditto US ex rel Verdone v. Circuit Court for Taylor County (7th Cir 1995) 73 F3d 669; similarly Commonwealth v. Levy (1961) 194 Penn.Super 390, 169 A2d 596; see especially essay, Validity of statute making it a criminal offense for operator of motor vehicle not to carry or display his license or registration, 6 ALR3d 506 & suppl.); similarly (right to "property" does not enable perp to drive his car despite its lack of registration, safety inspection, license plate, drivers license, etc., nor to prevent it from being impounded until he complies with the licensing laws) Wisden v. City of Salina (Utah 1985) 709 P2d 371; similarly (perp already had an SSN but refused, supposedly on religious grounds, to provide it to apply for drivers license and thereby refused to renew or carry drivers license on religious grounds; "The appellant advised [the policewoman] that he could not be arrested because her God was not as big as his God. He referred to her as 'an agent of the socialist govt ...", court held the state had sufficient reasons to require SSNs for drivers licenses and that, since driving without a license is a crime, religious fastidiousness could not excuse a criminal act) State v. Loudon (Tenn.Crim.App 1993) 857 SW2d 878; similarly (when cranks already have SSNs but refuse to reveal them for drivers licenses applications, supposedly on religious grounds) Penner v. King (Mo.Supm 1985) 695 SW2d 887; similarly (refused to reveal SSNs for drivers license on privacy grounds, citing various laws on non-disclosure of SSNs, court held that state could require disclosure of SSN on license application) Nowlin v DMV (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1529, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 409; if state law requires the SSN on the license application then the use of the SSN is not optional and an applicant who fails to provide his SSN will thereby be refused a license. Schmidt v. Powell (IL App 1972) 4 IL.App.3d 34, 280 NE2d 236; Ostric v. Board of Appeals on Motor Vehicle Policies (Mass 1972) 361 Mass 459, 280 NE2d 692; similarly (crank claimed to have unilaterally revoked his SSN and tried to invoke state law that would permit an individual without an SSN to obtain a drivers license upon submission of a federal govt document attesting to the lack of a Soc.Sec. number or account for that person, at least the individual's own assertion without the federal documentation was insufficient; the court noted that driving on the public roads is a privilege, not a right nor a contract, and the state may impose reasonable conditions upon that privilege and someone too fastidious to meet those conditions would not obtain the privilege) Hershey v. Commonwealth Dept of Transportation (Penn.Commonw.Ct 1995) 669 A2d 517 app.den 544 Penn 664, 676 A2d 1202; ditto Kocher v. Bickley (Penn.Commonw.Ct 1999) 722 A2d 756; similarly (state can insist on SSN to obtain a drivers license and apparently not required to offer alternatives to someone with religious objections to having an SSN) McDonald v. Alabama Dept of Public Safety (Alab.Civ.App unpub 4/9/99); ditto Miller v. Reed (9th Cir 1999) 176 F3d 1202 (and quoting from Bowen v. Roy, 1986, 476 US 693, which upheld an AFDC requirement that welfare payments would not be paid for children whose parents did not provide the child's SSN, notwithstanding the parents' religious objections to SSNs, and without offering an alternative); requirement of SSN to obtain a drivers license did not infringe on religious rights, because the "plaintiffs may preserve their religious scruples intact by foregoing this privilege [of driving on the public roads]. It is for them to balance the resulting inconvenience." Penner v. King (Mo. 1985) 695 SW2d 887; similarly, "The state of Missouri, by making the licensing requirements in question, is not prohibiting Davis from expressing or practicing his religious beliefs or from traveling throughout this land. If he wishes, he may walk, ride a bicycle or horse, or travel as a passenger in an automobile, bus, airplane or helicopter. He cannot, however, operate a moto vehicle on the public highways without ... a valid operator's license." State v. Davis (Mo.App 1988) 745 SW2d 249; (on the other hand, some states have made provision for issuing drivers licenses in special circumstances in which an SSN is unavailable, such as lawfully admitted aliens, with their green cards, who are ineligible for Soc.Sec.) Lauderbach v. Zolin (Cal.App 1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 578, 41 Cal.Rptr.2d 434; similarly (accepting the IRS's Taxpayer Identification Number [TIN] as a substitute for the SSN) Devon Inc. v. State Bureau (Ohio App 1986) 31 Ohio App.3d 130, 508 NE2d 984; ditto (state would accept TIN as a substitute for the SSN and not obliged to create any more alternatives) Kocher v. Bickley (Penn.Commonw.Ct 1999) 722 A2d 756; [the state may also give applicants the option of not having their SSNs appear on their drivers license and the public registry but may stil require the SSN on the applications. Doe v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (Mass.Super unpub 6/8/93) 1 Mass.L.Rptr 156, 21 Media L.Rptr 2041; and if the drivers license does not display the SSN, a policeman stopping the driver may insist on seeing the driver's Soc.Sec. card when the SSN is required on traffic citations. State v. T.N. Hill (Ohio App. unpub 2/6/92)]; neither right to migrate nor right to a job implies a right to unlicensed driving. Maher v. State (Ind.App 1993) 612 NE2d 1063; (ditto, when crank sent the state letters "rescinding his signature" to all drivers license papers assenting to the state's statutory consent to breathalyzer test this had the effect of cancelling his drivers license, and he was charged with unlicensed driving; moreover, the state's refusal to return his car until he presented a valid license and registration was not a taking without due process) Maxfield v. Corwin (WD Mich unpub 3/17/87); {Note: There are reasons, other than dangerous driving, that a court may use to suspend or revoke drivers licenses; e.g. non-payment of taxes; Wells v. Malloy (D Vt 1975) 402 F.Supp 856 aff'd 538 F2d 317; failure to pay court fines; City of Milwaukee v. Kilgore (Wis.App 1994) 185 Wis.2d 499, 517 NW2d 689; failure to pay child support; Richey v. Richey (La.App 1997) 704 So.2d 343; generally essay, Revocation or Suspension of Drivers License for Reason Unrelated to Motor Vehicle, 18 ALR5th 542 & suppl. Another essay deals with putting conditions upon the reinstatement of a suspended license, such as requiring proof of financial responsibility. 2 ALR5th 725.} ("The right to travel on public highways is not absolute. It is subject to reasonable regulation by the state, pursuant to the police power granted by the Constitution. We have previously held that the motor vehicle codes are a valid use of police power. We have also previously held that requiring automobile insurance coverage and the registration of vehicles is a valid use of the police power and does not violate the due process requirements of the US Constitution.") State v. R.E. Wilson (Mont.Supm unpub 12/3/98); {The references to the "right to travel" in this propaganda turn out to refer to court cases that dealt with restrictions on passports, or on restrictions on out-of-state visitors or newcomers to a state obtaining employment or benefits such as food stamps; cf. G.B. Hartch, Wrong Turns: A critique of the Supreme Court's right to travel cases, 21 Wm. Mitchell Law Rev. 457 (1995). The exercise of state and municipal police powers to regulate and restrict traffic on public roads predates the automobile by at least a half-century, when bicycle riding was restricted to avoid frightening horses; cf. R.D. Perry, The Impact of the Sport of Bicycle Riding on Safety Law, 35 Amer. Business Law Jrnl 185 (1998). In France, the registration of automobiles goes back to 1893, before the first US automobile factory, and in the US, registration of cars dates back to 1901 and the licensing of drivers to 1916, and by the mid-1920s there were, in almost every state, age requirements and other limitations on who could be licensed to operate an automobile, even for personal use; for example, see J. Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile accidents, insurance, and the challenge to social order in the inter-war years, 1919 to 1941, 4 Conn. Insur. Law Jrnl 521 (1998). As the US Supreme Court noted in 1915, "The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally destructive to the [high]ways themselves. ... [A] state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its highways of all motor vehicles - those moving in interstate commerce as well as others. ... This is but an exercise of the police power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their citizens." Hendrick v. Maryland (1915) 235 US 610; and in 1927, "Motor vehicles are dangerous machines, and even when skillfully and carefully operated, their use is attended by serious dangers to persons and property. In the public interest the state may make and enforce regulations reasonably calculated to promote care on the part of all, residents and non-residents alike, who use its highways. ... The state's power to regulate the use of its highways extends to their use by non-residents as well as by residents." Hess v. Pawloski (1927) 274 US 352. There is nothing in the cranks' reliance on a "right to travel" to try to exempt themselves from driver license and traffic laws that limits their theory to wheeled vehicles and they might eventually claim an unregulated right to pilot aircraft over cities! Courts have already held that driving without a license or registration is, by itself, indicative of reckless driving; see essay, 29 ALR2d 963 & suppl.} ; (enforcement of traffic laws is not governed by the UCC; speed limits and their enforcement is not a violation of the "right to travel") Barcroft v. State (Tex.App 1994) 881 SW2d 838; ditto (UCC inapplicable to case involving driving unregistered vehicle) Gipson v. Callahan (WD Tex 1997) 18 F.Supp.2d 662; (state can require that vehicle be maintained with current inspection and registration stickers and tags) State v. Kuball (Minn.App unpub 8/15/89); state can require that drivers carry a drivers license, vehicle registration and proof of insurance. City of Billings v. Skurdal (1986) 224 Mont 84, 730 P2d 371 cert.den 481 US 1020; Nowlin v. Dept of Motor Vehicles (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 1529, 62 Cal.Rptr.2d 409 (state can require applicants for new or renewed license to provide their Soc.Sec numbers and refuse licenses until applicant obtains a Soc.Sec number); ditto Miller v. Reed (9th Cir 1999) 176 F3d 1202; ditto McDonald v. Alabama Dept of Public Safety (Alab.Civ.App unpub 4/9/99); ditto Hersshey v. Commonwealth (Commonw.Ct of Penn 1996) 669 A2d 517 app.denied (Penn Supm unpub 6/4/96) 544 Pa 664, 676 A2d 1202; ditto (and also pretending that accepting a benefit from the state, in the form of a license, is against his religion) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; ditto State v. Clifford (1990) 57 Wash.App 127, 787 P2d 571 review denied 114 Wash.2d 1025, 792 P2d 535; ditto State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953; ditto (claiming that his religious beliefs were against registering for a drivers lic) Schmidt v. Powell (IL App 1972) 4 IL.App.3d 34, 280 NE2d 236; ditto (and also pretending that violation of license and registration laws is a victimless crime) State v. Yoder (Ohio App unpub 6/7/95); (police request that driver show them his license and registration and proof of insurance is not a "search" under the Fourth Amendment, the law requires a driver to keep these documents, and driver cannot insist on search warrant) State v. Reed (1984) 107 Ida 162, 686 P2d 842; (ditto, does not violate Fifth Amendment) Sherman v. Babbitt (9th Cir 1985) 772 F2d 1476; (ditto, does not violate First Amendment religious rights) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; (as part of a justifiable traffic stop, the police can instruct the driver to step out of his car) Pennsylvania v. Mimms (1977) 434 US 106; (thought that posting No Trespassing notices on his truck was a sufficient substitute for having license plates - and was surprised when the police had his truck towed away) Fenili v. Calif. Dept of Motor Vehicles (ND Cal unpub 6/16/98); (homemade license plate, saying "Freeman", not acceptable, and state may impound car until perp presents current and valid license, registration, etc.) Maxfield v. Corwin (WD Mich unpub 3/17/87); (mere use of homemade license plates is indicative that car is not properly registered and is sufficient to justify police stop) Granse v. State (Minn.App unpub 7/1/97); State v. French (1994) 77 Haw 222, 883 P2d 644 (required to comply with license and traffic laws event though perp believes that Hawaii is still an independent kingdom, there is no federal legislation that overrides the state’s authority to regulate driving); driving is a privilege not an inherent right and may be regulated by the state for public safety reasons: Jones v. City of Newport (1989) 29 Ark.App 42, 780 SW2d 338; (driving not synonymous with "right to travel") Azubuko v. Registrar of Motor Vehicles (1st Cir unpub 9/3/96) cert.den 520 US 1157; ditto City of Spokane v. Port (1986) 43 Wash.App 273, 716 P2d 945 revw.den 106 Wash.2d 1010; similarly (including driver license laws and requirement for vehicle registration and insurance) Goode v. Foster (D. Kan unpub 10/21/96); ditto Gordon v. State (1985) 108 Ida 178, 697 P2d 1192; ditto State v. Von Schmidt (1985) 109 Ida 736, 710 P2d 646; ditto Endsley v. State (1987) 184 Ga.App 797, 363 SE2d 1; similarly Lebrun v. State (1986) 255 Ga 406, 339 SE2d 227; ditto Humphreys v. State (Okla. Crim. App 1987) 738 P2d 188; ditto State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953 (privilege of operation a motor vehicle on the public streets is "wholly separate from the right to travel"; perp refused to identify himself to police, tried to present policeman with his own version of "Miranda warning"; claims to be immune to license & registration requirement as an "unenfranchised citizen of Tennessee", etc.; held "No person in the State of Tennessee may exempt himself or herself from any law simply by declaring that he or she does not consent to its applying to them"); ditto State v. D.R. Gibson (1985) 108 Ida. 202, 697 P2d 1216 (perp claimed that as a "free man" who had not "accepted" a drivers license, he is exempt from all traffic laws); similarly Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; similarly State v. Stuart (No.Dak 1996) 544 NW2d 158; similarly (including argument that his driving is not "commercial" or not connected to govt activity and therefore not susceptible to any state controls) State v. Skurdal (1988) 235 Mont 291, 767 P2d 304 ("That claim is baseless in Montana and we find no law in any other jurisdiction to support it either."); ditto (tried to argue that registration and licensing laws only apply if the vehicle is "for extraordinary use"; "We see no reason why we should place any limitations on the application of the registration statute when the legislature decided not to.") Slye-Nelson v. State (Tex.App 1993) 862 SW2d 628; ditto ("completely frivolous and meritless") J.M. Anderson v. State of Michigan (WD Mich unpub 3/18/93); ditto City of Spokane v. Port (1986) 43 Wash.App 273, 716 P2d 945 revw.den 106 Wash.2d 1010; ditto City of Belton v Horton (Mo.App 1997) 947 SW2d 104; ditto Humphreys v. State (Okla. Crim. App 1987) 738 P2d 188; ditto (claimed "it is a legal impossibility for the state or anyone to collect a civil penalty for non-registration of a private vehicle" and wanted $2.5M in damages; "completely frivolous and meritless") J.M. Anderson v. State of Michigan (WD Mich unpub 3/18/93); ditto (also that this was a "victimless crime") City of South Euclid v. Carroll (Ohio App unpub 10/6/88) app.dism 42 Oh.St.3d 706, 537 NE2d 225; similarly (tried to argue that limiting driving to those able to afford car insurance was discriminatory) Maher v. State (Ind.App 1993) 612 NE2d 1063; ditto State v. J.S. Smith (Minn.App unpub 6/11/96); (tried to argue that he could not be required to pay a fine nor pay for a license nor for registration in the absence of gold and silver coiage) Lowry v. State (Alask.App 1982) 655 P2d 780; (tried to argue that a traffic ticket required the same tedious red tape, such as notarization or accompanying papers, as a formal indictment or a complaint in a lawsuit) State v. Gibson (Ohio App unpub 6/19/95); (seemed to think that by denying US citizenship could immunize himself from drunk driving laws and from traffic court) T.J. Johnson v. State (Ark.App unpub 10/7/92); ditto (as "a ‘free’ man who is no longer a 14th Amendment citizen, he is not required to register his vehicle, wear a seatbelt or maintain liability insurance, ... also asserts that he is not required to abide by any state or federal laws.") State v. Folda (Mont 1994) 267 Mont 523, 51 Mont St.Rep 1149, 885 P2d 426; ditto State v. Skurdal (1988) 235 Mont 291, 767 P2d 304; ditto (argued that his unregistered truck was not a vehicle but a "religious conveyance" and as a "natural citizen" rather than an enfranchised citizen he was exempt from licensing law) Terpstra v. State (Ind.App 1988) 529 NE2d 839; ditto (also tried to argue that his unregistered automobile was not a "motor vehicle" unless and until it was registered) State v. Booher (Tenn.Crim.App 1997) 978 SW2d 953; similarly (altho alone in his truck, tried to deny that he was "driving a motor vehicle" but rather "traveling in a conveyance". "His reasoning for this premise ... is not based on any relevant statute or case precedent, and has no merit. [State law] defines an operator as a person ... 'who is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle upon a highway.' ... Since Davis was in actual physical control of the pickup truck, he was operating a motor vehicle.") State v. Davis (Mo.App 1988) 745 SW2d 249; similarly (argued that traffic laws, even against driving the wrong way down a one-way street, violated the 10th Amendment ... and sent the traffic judge letters on the letterhead of "The Committee to Save the Judges from Hanging Even Though They Deserve It" with the printed marginalia that "oppressed people have never once regained their freedom until they had hung the judges and stoned the tax collectors to death." ) Freeman v. Town of Lusk (Wyo.Supm 1986) 717 P2d 331; similarly (awarded himself, as "a first class judicial citizen", a permanent lifetime "travelers authorization" ... "it also means that never again will he have to wait in line at the Dept of Motor Vehicles for a renewal") Estes-El v. Town of Indian Lake (ND NY unpub 5/11/98); (an international driving permit is not, alone, a sufficient substitute for a drivers license, and requires additionally a drivers license from that person's country or state of residence) Schofield v. Hertz Corp. (1991) 201 Ga.App 830, 412 SE2d 853; Dwyer v. Margono (1997) 128 N.C.App 122, 493 SE2d 763 review den (1998) 347 NC 670, 500 SE2d 85; Eskew v. Young (SD IL 1998) 992 F.Supp 1049; someone whose drivers license had been deliberately suspended or revoked here cannot resume driving by obtaining an international drivers permit. People v. Platts (1995) 274 Ill.App.3d 753, 655 NE2d 300; where an arrestee has an international drivers permit in a false name that is a strong indication of an inclination and ability to flee and adopt false identities for which a high bail may be demanded. US v. Himler (3d Cir 1986) 797 F2d 156; having organized a small mob to resist law enforcement efforts to arrest him, having denied his citizenship and denied being susceptible to the laws or courts, and having threatened the judge, all justify the court refusing to allow him bail or pre-trial release. US v. Kanahele (D Haw 1995) 951 F.Supp 921; {The international driving permit is issued under the authority of the UN Convention on International Road Traffic, and it serves as an authoritative multi-lingual translation and verification of the person's home drivers license, which means that it has no legal weight without that home drivers license (and, also, a driver's international permit has no weight inside the driver's home country). It is good for not more than 12 months (less in some countries) and the driver is still subject to all the traffic laws. In the US, they are available from AAA for $10. Apparently there is a lively Internet scam of selling unauthorized or fake permits and at prices up to $300; cf. USA Today, 5 March 1999; Business Wire, 20 Jan 1999; Toronto Star, 5 Sept 1998}. Bernard J. Sussman, JD, MLS, CP (as of: August, 11, 1999)

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Losing Cases

Driver's License / Right to Travel

Perhaps we dont have the "right" to surf the net! Hmmmmmmmm???!!!