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Posted on 04/13/2026 7:19:41 AM PDT by Cronos
Péter Magyar, the Hungarian politician most likely to defeat Viktor Orbán, promises “regime change” but signals continuity on several core policies. The European Union should manage expectations and prepare for a more complex relationship than a simple post-Orbán reset.
With less than two months to go before Hungary’s 12 April elections, the Tisza party led by Péter Magyar is polling ahead of Orban’s Fidesz. For the first time since 2010, a change of government appears genuinely possible.
The stakes are high. A fifth consecutive term for Orbán would further entrench what the European Parliament has described as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy” at the heart of Europe, and reinforce Budapest’s capacity to obstruct common EU positions, including on security. But Orbán’s defeat would not automatically translate into smooth relations with Brussels.
This raises the question of what a Magyar-led government would look like in practice. A former Fidesz member and government official, and the former spouse of Orbán's ex-EU Affairs and Justice Minister, Magyar entered politics in early 2024. Running on an anti-corruption and anti-state-capture platform, his party won nearly 30% of the vote in the European elections, securing seven MEPs and joining the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP).
Regime change without full rupture Tisza’s manifesto, published in early February, outlines a broadly pro-European trajectory. The party says that it “chooses Europe”, pledges to rebuild trust with EU and NATO allies and commits to joining the eurozone by 2030. Restoring the rule of law is framed primarily as a means to unlock €18 billion in EU funds currently frozen over systemic violations.
Yet EU leaders should not assume that a Magyar government would mark a clean break with Orbán-era policies. On Ukraine, Tisza’s manifesto is notably thin, beyond opposing Ukraine’s accelerated accession. Magyar has repeatedly stated that he would not reverse Hungary's current policy of non-support. While he signals an intention to reduce dependence on Russia, his proposed timeline – by 2035 – falls well behind the EU’s 2027 target. Tisza further opposes the Commission’s proposal for the next EU multiannual financial framework (MFF), arguing that it disadvantages Hungary, and rejects the EU migration and asylum pact.
Tactical alignment with Fidesz This ambivalence is reflected in Tisza’s voting behaviour in the European Parliament. An analysis of Tisza’s voting record in the European Parliament done by Eulytix for the EPC shows that while Tisza MEPs are mostly aligned with pro-EU forces, they also engage in tactical alignment with Fidesz on politically sensitive issues such as Ukraine, agriculture and migration.
Since the start of the current parliamentary term, Tisza has aligned with the EPP in 84.3% of votes, with Renew Europe in 75%, and with the S&D in 64%. It voted like the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) in 62% of cases. Convergence with the far-right Patriots for Europe is lower, at 44%, and below Tisza’s alignment with the Greens (52%).
However, compared to other EPP delegations, Tisza ranks as the fifth most aligned with Fidesz (48.55%) – behind the French, Slovenian and Slovak delegations, and one Dutch party – above the group average of 39.9% and placing it to the right of the EPP mainstream. Vote-by-vote analysis suggests that this convergence is strongest on issues where Magyar is vulnerable to Orbán’s central campaign narrative portraying him as Brussels’ “puppet”.
The analysis finds that Tisza MEPs converged with Fidesz in resisting further institutional integration, favouring a security-first migration policy and opposing language on rights and equality. They joined Fidesz in voting against an amendment calling for stronger use of the Article 7 rule-of-law procedure. On Ukraine, they repeatedly voted against amendments that strengthened language on support for Kyiv and condemnation of Russia.
In more than half of cases where Tisza diverged from the EPP and aligned with Fidesz (52.5%), it did so through abstentions. This suggests caution rather than conviction: an attempt to balance pro-EU credibility with domestic Fidesz-aligned electoral positioning. Participation rates also point to limited engagement at EU level. Tisza MEPs took part in 53.5% of votes this term, compared with an 88% average across Parliament. Magyar himself participated in only 25%.
Tisza’s voting record and campaign rhetoric reveal a dual constraint. Magyar’s political instincts remain partly shaped by years inside the Fidesz system, while his position as a political alternative may be too fragile to permit a decisive rupture. A narrow electoral victory on 12 April, combined with Fidesz’s entrenched media dominance, economic networks and parts of the state apparatus, would further limit the room for manoeuvre.
Engage, but avoid misplaced assumptions For the EU, the implication is clear. Orbán’s defeat would be symbolically significant, but it would not automatically resolve Hungary’s tensions with Brussels. Expectations should be calibrated accordingly. Early and sustained engagement would be essential to test Magyar’s intentions, understand his domestic constraints and shape incentives for genuine change.
Magyar, for his part, would need to invest quickly in relations with EU leaders and assert political autonomy from Fidesz framing. His political family, the EPP, would also bear responsibility for striking the right balance: supporting democratic reintegration without lowering the bar on EU values and security interests.
Orbán’s system has become a reference point for illiberal actors across Europe. A transition back toward an EU-integrated liberal democracy remains possible – but it should not be taken for granted, nor squandered by misplaced assumptions
Eric Maurice is a Policy Analyst in the European Politics and Institutions Programme at the European Policy Centre.
Levente Kocsis serves as Chief Data Scientist at Eulytix.
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Brussels would likely face a pragmatic and assertive partner who prioritizes Hungarian sovereignty and specific domestic interests over unconditional alignment with EU-wide federalist goals.
He has the same or similar views as Orban without the corruption or antagonism
What are his views on Iran and Israel?
Many here think Magyar is a EU/Soros pretender, it is my fear as well. We will find out soon enough.
That explains how he ousted Orbon. People liked the policies but were tired of the person.
Magyar can preen and pretend all the conservative values he wants
Brussels wants Hungary to adopt the Euro - and that’s what he will do.
After that, Hungary’s sovereignty is over.
The test will be whether he starts letting “migrants” start flooding in to Hungary.
Two points, please.
1. The European Parliament has described Orbán’s government as a “hybrid regime of electoral autocracy”
Well, maybe. But quoting the European Parliament makes the whole article rather suspect. Those folks treat the EU as some sort of empire, with its power centralized in Brussels. The various EU nations are mere provinces of the empire.
2. “Magyar, for his part, would need to invest quickly in relations with EU leaders…”
That will mean compromise. What will Magyar compromise on? What will he give up that he’d rather not give up?
I know that Magyar is anti-immigration. My concern is that he will compromise even a little on that topic. Because once the floodgates are opened even a little..
For Israel no change from Orban.
For Iran he hasn’t said much
He’s not an EU or Soros pretender
Tisza has the same strict anti Muslims policy as Fidesz. Read their election manifesto
Magyar has stated that while meeting the criteria for the Euro is a long-term goal, he is not planning an immediate adoption. He currently supports maintaining the Hungarian Forint to preserve economic flexibility.
Magyar has explicitly avoided making a commitment to a specific Euro adoption date. His focus he says is on meeting the criteria (lowering inflation and debt) to strengthen the Hungarian economy first, rather than joining the Eurozone as a ‘weak’ partner.
The eurozone don’t want unsteady economies in the eurozone. Tiny ones like Bułgaria are okay but not Hungary.
Hungary isn’t tiny. But at 10 million people and landlocked, it isn’t a powerful state.
The article is by an EU insider.
If HE is telling the EU to not celebrate Tisza as it will pursue similar policies as Fidesz, that is note worthy
Péter Magyar and the Tisza Party have been explicit: they oppose the EU Migration and Asylum Pact.
Magyar has pledged to keep the southern border fence and has stated that illegal migration is a security issue, not just a humanitarian one.
He will get support from Poland and Italy for this stance.
his “bargaining chips” are institutional like the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) which is his biggest offer. He is willing to give Brussels oversight of how money is spent to prove he isn’t corrupt. For Magyar, “giving up” power to an anti-corruption body is a win because it helps him dismantle the old oligarch system.
He is expected to restore the power of independent courts and the press.
On Ukraine he most likely will not give military aid but he is likely to be less “obstructionist” than Orbán on humanitarian aid and EU sanctions packages, provided Hungary’s energy interests are protected.
He will be more of a speak softly but not budge. Why? Because that works with the EU bureaucrats. Say yes, yes and don’t do it and the Brussels apparatchiks forget
You and he both - spoken like true politicians. Let's check back in 18 months.
Yes, Hungary's economy is small. It's not about debt ratios, 'stability,' or inflation Its about strategic and political control from Brussels.
The same reason NATO was expanded to 32 members, even though its strategic nonsense and militarily / logistically stupid.
> He will get support from Poland and Italy for this stance. <
Happy to hear that. As I have noted on other posts, I am of Hungarian descent. And my Hungarian is passable (but my aunt says just barely).
I don’t know about Italy. But there is an old Hungarian saying:
“Poles and Hungarians drink from the same cup.”
> Say yes, yes and don’t do it and the Brussels apparatchiks forget <
Ha! I hope you’re right about that.
The EU may have its capital in Brussels but its power resides in Berlin. Funny how things turned out eighty years after WW II. Many graves are spinning.
That portrayal seems excessive to me. Hungary's population is only 50% larger than Bulgaria.
Hungarian-first without Orban’s authoritarianism.
Even got the endorsement from Soros. You can look him up on X, if you're curious. (Actually it was posted by his son)
Hungary’s economy is significantly larger than Bulgaria’s, with a 2024 nominal GDP of approximately $223 billion compared to Bulgaria’s $113 billion.
Hungary holds a higher GDP per capita too
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