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Posted on 02/15/2026 8:18:34 AM PST by Mariner
An elite British Army battalion is going all in on drones after working closely with Ukrainian soldiers and seeing how central these systems have become in modern warfare.
The 1st Battalion of the Irish Guards now has 78 of its 300 members qualified as drone operators, its commanding officer, Lt. Col. Ben Irwin-Clark, told Business Insider. The unit has big plans to increase its training and work with drones further.
"That just gives you an idea of how important this is," he said.
The battalion has built a training facility with drone warfare in mind, and its soldiers are heavily invested, he said, sharing that he's got soldiers asking if they can get in on the weekends and log some flying hours.
(Excerpt) Read more at yahoo.com ...
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Air supremacy trumps everything.
Who is this meant to be used against? I don’t think it’s the Russians...
“Air supremacy trumps everything.”
Not for Russia.
Conclusion
Brief by Alexander Palmer and Kendall Ward
Published October 10, 2025
Available Downloads
Download the Brief
729kb
The Issue
Russia has not achieved air superiority over Ukraine in more than three years of fighting, but Israel seized air superiority over Iran in less than four days. Despite the vastly different circumstances and strategic objectives facing each nation’s forces, this CSIS comparison of the two campaigns holds lessons for countries seeking to achieve air superiority in modern conflicts—or to deny it to their adversaries. Israel succeeded where Russia failed by building and equipping an organization that fit an offensive air superiority doctrine, preparing the battlefield with special operations forces, and taking full advantage of its intelligence edge. Ukraine succeeded where Iran failed in taking advantage of dispersion and mobility to prevent its suppressed air defenses from being destroyed.
Introduction
Before Russia invaded Ukraine, its Aerospace Forces (VKS) and missile forces were considered likely to play a major role in forcing Ukraine’s rapid collapse.1 But as Russia’s offensive unraveled in early 2022, commentators declared Russia’s air force to be “missing” and its performance to be “perplexing.”2 In contrast, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) achieved air superiority over Iran in less than four days, an achievement made more impressive by the fact that Tehran is nearly 1,000 miles from Israel’s nearest airbase.
To better understand air war in the twenty-first century, this analysis compares Israeli, Russian, Iranian, and Ukrainian performance across several dimensions. Few of the lessons are novel; Israel’s success and Russia’s failure reinforce old lessons about pursuing qualitative superiority in technology and training, operational flexibility, accurate and timely intelligence, and effective use of combined arms. The most important new development is the increasing ability to strike ground-based air defense (GBAD) systems from threats within their lethal envelopes, the three-dimensional space in which air defenses can kill incoming threats, along with the corresponding need to defend against such attacks. Israel’s use of Mossad special operations forces to conduct unmanned aerial system (UAS) and missile strikes against Iranian air defense systems from within Iran demonstrate the risk that small precision-strike assets can pose to a country’s air defenses. Unconventional attacks—such as those conducted by Mossad against Iran and by Ukraine against Russia in Operation Spider’s Web—are repeatable because these or other states could conduct similar attacks in the future. 3 Although this type of attack involves significant preparation and cannot be repeated without rebuilding the networks that enabled them, they represent an ongoing threat to air defenses and strategic assets that air defenders must respect.
Due to the differences between the Russian and Israeli air campaigns, this analysis compares Operation Rising Lion with only a narrow slice of the Russian campaign. At the beginning of its 2022 invasion, Russia prioritized attacks against Ukrainian air defenses, and its plan to rapidly seize Kyiv and decapitate the Ukrainian government required airborne insertion of forces near the capital—and therefore required suppression or destruction of Ukraine’s air defenses.4 This analysis therefore directly compares the 12-day Israeli campaign, throughout which the Israeli Air Force (IAF) was able to operate freely over Iran, with the first two weeks of the Russian operation. During this period, Russia sought and, in several locations, achieved air superiority. But by the ninth day of Russian operations, Ukraine had partially reconstituted its air defense network and Russian control of the skies was lost, although Ukraine took several more weeks to fully deny the VKS the ability to operate over its territory.
Success and Failure in the Skies
Israel’s strikes against Iran and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine differed in their goals, assumptions, and requirements. Operation Rising Lion incorporated special forces, cyber, and informational elements, but air and missile forces were always going to provide the decisive capabilities—the operation depended on seizing and maintaining air superiority long enough to degrade Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. In contrast, Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was primarily a ground operation. The Russian military did not assume that success depended on air superiority in the way the Israeli operation clearly did.
Nevertheless, the Russian and Israeli campaigns began in much the same way, with air and missile strikes against their adversaries’ militaries—especially their air defense infrastructure. Israel’s initial strikes, including the well-publicized Mossad operations of June 13, 2025, killed the leadership of Iran’s strategic air defense and long-range strike unit, the Iranian Republican Guard Corps (IRGC) Aerospace Forces.5 Over the next 24 hours, the IAF struck 100 targets with nearly 200 sorties of manned and unmanned aircraft, decimating Iran’s integrated air defense system.6 Russia also began its 2022 invasion with a strike campaign intended to degrade and destroy Ukrainian air defenses.7 During the first week of the conflict, Russia launched more than 200 short-ranged ballistic missiles into Ukraine.8 Russian combat aircraft also flew roughly 140 sorties per day, attacking more than 100 air defense targets in the first 72 hours of the invasion.9
Israel’s success was comprehensive—the IDF announced that it had air superiority on the fourth day of the conflict—and while Russia’s was not, the VKS did achieve air superiority in key locations.10 In the first three days of the conflict, Russia managed to both insert a 34-helicopter air assault into Hostomel airport and conduct sorties up to 300 kilometers into Ukraine.11 However, Russia did not expand or maintain its air superiority. Slow-moving Ukrainian Bayraktar TB2 UAS struck Russian ground forces when they should have been easily destroyed by Russian air or air defense forces. Russia was unable to defeat Ukraine’s air forces, which fought the VKS until about March 3, 2022, when Ukraine’s GBADs had recovered from Russia’s suppression.12 From that point onward, the VKS grew increasingly ineffective, and by early April 2022 it had effectively ceased attempts to penetrate Ukrainian airspace.13 In the end, Israel did not lose a single manned aircraft or pilot—one F-16I navigator claims that Iran did not fire a single surface-to-air missile—while independent researchers confirmed the destruction of multiple Russian manned-combat aircraft in the opening weeks of the campaign.14
Remote Visualization
History, Doctrine, and Organization
Israel has a long history of offensive air operations, but Russia does not. Due to Israel’s limited strategic depth and its proximity to hostile nations and actors, IDF doctrine emphasizes the rapid achievement of air superiority to enable preemption, rapid escalation, and freedom of action. 15 The IAF does not merely support operations; Israeli officials see it as a critical enabler of Israel’s national defense, designed to rapidly seize control of the air in support of ground forces and to impose strategic costs on adversaries. For more than 50 years, Israel has prioritized technological, operational, and doctrinal improvements to increase the IAF’s ability defeat adversary air defenses. 16 Unlike many of its adversaries, the IAF emphasizes suppression and destruction of enemy air defenses as operational imperatives in air force doctrine, training, equipping, and operational employment. 17
In contrast, Russia has no significant history of offensive air superiority operations. Russian air forces have been employed either in air defense or close air support missions for most of the country’s history, and they have never been pitched against a sophisticated enemy air defense system like that of Ukraine. 18 Despite the combat experience its pilots gained in Syria, that campaign did not involve disrupting or defeating an adversary’s air defense network. 19 Rather than attempting a U.S.- or IAF-style air superiority campaign in Ukraine, Russia appears to have sought only limited air superiority over corridors vital to its plan to quickly seize Kyiv and topple the Zelenskyy government. 20 This may be because, unlike Israel and the United States, Russia does not see air superiority as necessary to enable ground maneuver. Its ground forces rely much more on artillery than on airpower. 21
As a result, struggling Russian ground commanders were not prevented from redirecting assets from the air superiority mission before Ukraine’s GBADs had been destroyed and air superiority seized. 22 This was a critical limitation of the air superiority campaign; even in the absence of Russia’s many other failings, the ground forces’ redirection of air superiority assets alone would have made it difficult for the VKS to consolidate or expand its gains. Russia’s subordination of the VKS to the ground forces has even drawn criticism within Russia, despite restrictions on negative speech about the war.
https://www.csis.org/analysis/air-superiority-twenty-first-century-lessons-iran-and-ukraine
I would think that drones are a part of air superiority.
Soon every soldier will have drones , they’ll toss a hand full in the air and say , FETCH
Russia never had the tech for air supremacy.
Only US stealth can do it.
Of course, using their technology, they can LARP and then upload the data, which will always offer the same battle benefits that battle hardened soldiers learn the hard way.
No more weapons carrying troops? Just launch thousands of drones to seek out the enemy? NO more military in uniform. Just contractors with drones.
Anyone who hasn’t seen the game changer drones have become is a fool.
“Anyone who hasn’t seen the game changer drones have become is a fool.”
The only places they have been a game changer is the Ukrainian war. A war where nobody has air superiority, much less air supremacy.
Certainly they have not helped Iran. Or Venezuela.
So, uh... how many of thr 1st Battalion, Irish Guards have been working with the Ukrainians?
And where?
The article ignores the most important part: Ukraine started 2022 with an air defense system that was far superior to Iran’s.
“The article ignores the most important part: Ukraine started 2022 with an air defense system that was far superior to Iran’s.”
The most important part now is that Russia does not have the technology.
“The article ignores the most important part: Ukraine started 2022 with an air defense system that was far superior to Iran’”
Perhaps you didn’t read the whole article.
Since the invasion, units of Ukrainian troops have been brought to Britain in a continuous programme of intensive training. I've come across quite a few of them, as they've been using the ranges on Dartmoor, not far from me. Training is a large part of British aid. From this report, the training has clearly been mutual.
Back in the 80s we had the Air/Land battle strategy to take on the Soviets in Europe.
We used it in 1991 to take part the Iraqi military.
“the DJI Air 2S....uses low-noise propellers, which are crafted to reduce sound output significantly”
“sound level of approximately 64 decibels, which is roughly equivalent to the noise level of a normal conversation in a quiet room”
https://dronesgator.com/silent-drones/
“We used it in 1991 to take part the Iraqi military.”
So many think that because drones are the only option in Ukraine, that they will be somehow decisive elsewhere. Essential even.
It’s fantasy. Air supremacy makes every other weapon system irrelevant.
I think it's important to also consider the cost of anti-drone activities. It hurts when we must use a $500k missile to deal with a $2.5k drone.
Natives complaining about the ongoing colonization of the UK by the third world.
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