Posted on 08/24/2024 3:43:09 PM PDT by delta7
Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of maneuver warfare until Russia reaches the next heavily defended localities further afield.
Ukrainian officials have urged locals in and around the town of Pokrovsk to evacuate within the next two weeks as Russian forces rapidly approach this pivotal military logistics hub. The head of neighboring Mirnograd’s military administration bluntly said “Don’t wait. It will not get better, it will only get worse. Leave”, and then admitted that “The enemy is advancing faster than expected.” The Associated Press cited local commanders who blamed Russia’s swift gains on their side’s poorly trained conscripts.
One of them claimed that “Some people don’t want to shoot. They see the enemy in the firing position in trenches but don’t open fire. ... That is why our men are dying…They don’t receive even the lowest standard of training required for our (combat) actions.” An unnamed soldier also lamented that “The main problem is the survival instinct of newcomers. Before, people could stand until the last moment to hold the position. Now, even when there is light shelling of firing positions, they are retreating.”
The poor quality of Ukraine’s recruits casts doubt on whether the whopping 120,000 troops that Belarusian President Lukashenko claimed had been deployed along his border could make much of a difference if some of them are sent to Donbass out of desperation to halt Russia’s advance. They’d more than likely participate in “meat waves” like those before them did in Artyomovsk/Bakhmut and Avdeevka, and just like their predecessors, they’re also destined to sacrifice themselves in vain.
Russia’s capture of Pokrovsk, however long it might take, could reshape the conflict’s dynamics due to this town’s strategic significance for Ukraine’s military logistics. Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of maneuver warfare. Ukraine’s US-backed invasion of Kursk reminded observers that maneuver warfare isn’t dead like some had earlier claimed, and it might soon make a major comeback in the fields past Pokrovsk.
Ukraine’s successes in Kharkov, Kherson, and most recently Kursk over the past two and a half years were the result of missteps on Russia’s part, not examples of Ukrainian “military genius” like its supporters in the media misportrayed them as. It either exploited overstretched and undermanned supply chains in the first two cases or took advantage of a poorly defended border in the second. None of these three precedents suggests that Ukraine is capable of beating Russia head-to-head at maneuver warfare.
It’s therefore possible that Russia could quickly capture broad swaths of Donbass once maneuver warfare begins to be fought along that front upon its capture of Pokrovsk, which could then improve its position for assaulting the heavily defended Kramatorsk-Slavyansk agglomeration in northern Donbass. In that event, Russia might also take advantage of its post-Pokrovsk maneuver warfare successes (assuming that they’re achieved as expected) to branch out in other directions.
Capturing Pokrovsk would enable Russia to move north into southern Kharkov, west into eastern Dnipro (neither of which it has any territorial claims to), and southwest into Zaporozhye (all of which it claims). Opening up a third front in Kharkov to complement the northern and eastern ones from Belgorod and Lugansk could be seen as revenge for Kursk as could opening one in Dnipro. The Kharkov vector could also help cut off supply lines to Kramatorsk-Slavyansk and thus facilitate the full capture of Donbass.
Moving into southeastern Dnipro could be a shortcut for launching operations in northern Zaporozhye so it also can’t be discounted due to the possibility that this could lead to a siege of the latter’s namesake administrative center. Observers can only speculate which vector(s) Russia would move into after Pokrovsk and when that might be, but the point is that maneuver warfare might play a large role in its forthcoming operations after that tow is captured.
Ukraine’s poorly trained conscripts and its lightly defended towns beyond Pokrovsk increase the odds of a partial Russian military breakthrough up to the next heavily defended localities further afield, and this could result in serious changes to the way in which Ukraine fights this conflict. It could either stay the course by doubling down on Kursk (and potentially opening new fronts in Belarus and/or Russia’s other border regions) at the expense of Donbass or decisively shift back to the latter at the former’s expense.
Either way, it’ll be forced into a dilemma, especially if Russia opens up new fronts in Kharkov and/or Dnipro in parallel with putting maximum pressure upon Donbass’ Kramatorsk-Slovyansk. Ukraine thus stands to lose more ground, or it could explore whether Russia would be willing to swap whatever Kiev controls in Kursk for whatever Moscow controls in Kharkov (and possibly also Dnipro by then). The possibility also exists that Ukraine could become hellbent on crossing Russia’s non-negotiable red lines.
About that, this could take the form of a nuclear provocation (such as that which could be caused by a crippling attack against its nuclear power plants or spent nuclear fuel storage sites there), a high-level assassination, or a terrorist attack even worse than the recent Crocus one. The purpose would be to provoke Russia into using nuclear weapons just like Lukashenko warned last week that Kiev wants to do, which could then serve as the tripwire for a conventional NATO intervention in Ukraine’s support.
All told, Russia’s capture of Pokrovsk might still take a while since Kiev could decide to turn this town into the next Artyomovsk, but the conflict’s dynamics will likely be reshaped once that happens if Russia can employ maneuver warfare against the lightly defended towns in the fields beyond. Any subsequent breakthrough would force Ukraine into the dilemma of prioritizing some fronts and the expense of others, but it might try to cut the Gordian knot through a series of swaps or escalations instead.
It's anyone’s guess what it would do in that scenario, but those are the three most likely options: sacrifice one front to save another; swap land with Russia; or try crossing Russia’s non-negotiable red lines as part of a dangerous gamble to “escalate to de-escalate” up to the brink of provoking World War III. In any case, all eyes will be on Pokrovsk as Russia inches towards this pivotal military logistics hub and inevitably begins battling for control of it, so everyone will eventually see what Kiev ultimately does.
I can’t keep up. One day one side is “winning”, the next day the other.
“ Beyond it are just a few lightly defended towns and then vast expanses of grassland that could become the scene of maneuver warfare until Russia reaches the next heavily defended localities further afield.”
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Well, maybe. But I believe the autumn muddy season is coming up.
Isn’t this Andrew Korybko the same Moscow-based Russian stooge who on 16 February 2022 claimed that Western concerns about a Russian invasion was merely propaganda and therefore not going to happen? And then Russia invaded the following week and has been stuck ever since?
Yeah, he’s a real frickin’ expert. 🙄
The the crack Ukie troops in the Kursk firebag can'r do no defendin' down in Pokrovsk...
The crack Ukie troops in the Kursk firebag can’t do no defendin’ down in Pokrovsk...
My goodness you are a retard. English much?
Apparat-chick weighs in with her gay punctuation-less pearl-clutching.
There's a fainting couch over there, A-chickie. Avail yourself of it.
I've heard this from Western pundits since before Russia took Bakhmut.
Ukrainians just dig new trenches in the next down down the road. Of course, the Russians bomb the hell out of them, and most of the defenders die, but its a game that Ukraine continues to play.
You are clearly not a native English speaker. Как дела в России?
99.8th percentile got me a free ride to college.
French in high school, book German and conversational Russian in college. I excel at languages.
BTW - congratulations at evading the net of Don't Ask, Don't Tell during your years in the military.
Trannies like yourself have a hard time hiding their "flamboyance", A-chickie...
Ooh, more baseless attacks on veterans! You strike me as a POS know-it-all with zero experience in real life, least of all in the military. Impressive.
Not.
I respect the service of our closeted military (such as yourself), so your ad-hominem falls flat.
You strike me as a POS know-it-all with zero experience in real life, least of all in the military. Impressive.
Weird that my family is a military family.
My brother is an Air Force and Army veteran [proud heterosexual, so I'm sure that grinds your DADT grits].
I'm mostly a expert/professional in anything I do [people pay me munney], so there goes your little "zero experience" theory.
There is a striking absence from the names on those lists, A-chickie.
Bite the pillow, as is your wont. Have you always been a "catcher"?
I've been an FR donor. Many people around here would consider that "doing jack".
Matter of fact, I'm gearing up to cut another check for this quarter.
You? Or is your budget consumed by exotic sex toys?
Why yes, it is. Did the West just psyche itself out over Ukraine? Andrew Korybko, 16 Feb 2022.
Looking at his Substack, he parrots the Russian talking points of the week as if his life depends on it. Maybe it does. Korybko was born in the US, has dual US-Polish citizenship, and works in Moscow. Academics in dictatorships making the public appearance of loyalty to the regime is a good way to survive. Especially if their loyalties could get called into question.
I've also noticed that the pro-Russian types on Substack tend to publish impressive quantities of material from a single person. Today, August 24, is the 234th day of the year. Korybko has 540 articles on his Substack this year (I checked the long way by paging down through his Substack's archive page), averaging 2.3 posts per day. 2.3 posts per day on one platform is impressive from a single person who has time for x.com and other publications.
Also interesting, is Korybko Linkedin page says his most recent experience/job is:
"Independent Moscow-Based American Political AnalystFreelance does not mean "free" as in "unpaid". Someone is paying him to put an American born, academic face on the pro-Russian talking points of the week.
Freelance
Apr 2019 - Present · 5 yrs 5 mos"
I think you have the experience to make a more educated guess than I can on who is paying him.
Before adding negative speculation, some Freepers opt for anonymous donations.
>>>>Before adding negative speculation, some Freepers opt for anonymous donations.<<<<
Thank you, “REVEREND” Obvious, for telling everyone something they already knew.
You’re good at that.
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