[Svartalfiar]

Jamming GPS is not high tech. It’s simply putting out enough noise power to prevent a receiver from seeing the very low power GPS signal. If the US was fighting this battle, these jammers would quickly become targets themselves for HARM missiles or other anti-radiation weapons. But Ukraine is not equipped like the US to fight a combined arms battle. Both sides, Ukraine and Russia, are fighting century old trench warfare, with Russia simply having a larger force to throw into the melee, and having some jamming capability to reduce the effectiveness of some older western weapons.

Jamming isn't what they're talking about. Jamming GPS makes these rounds a hair less accurate, they have inertial guidance systems that don't need GPS, and are used if GPS isn't available. What they're actually doing that makes these miss is GPS spoofing, or faking the GPS coordinates well enough to where the missile/round/whatever thinks it's accurate, when it's not. Much more difficult, but effective, than just jamming the signals.

But yes, we are definitly much better equipped for anti-EW operations, and what limited such equipment we've given Ukraine is enough to where Russia doesn't just leave their S-400 and other radars on 24/7.

[Magnum44]

I hear ya. I don’t feel comfortable talking about spoofing from an op sec perspective. But true spoofing is far more complex to achieve. One easy cheap spoof solution that has been observed in the Middle East and reported in the open literature is simple gps repeaters (seen by a receiver on the international space station) If a receiver picks up a repeaters signal because locally it is a stronger signal, then the receiver thinks it is at the repeaters location. Without some smarts, this would certainly mess up your nav solution. But of course, if every receiver that gets spoofed by this technique is reporting to location of the repeater, the repeater is easily targeted.