129 posted on
01/15/2024 9:55:47 AM PST by
AdmSmith
(GCTGATATGTCTATGATTACTCAT)
To: AdmSmith
Russian mercenaries in Africa have been ineffective in counterinsurgency operations and would likely be more focused on advancing the Kremlin's strategic aims of regime security and resource plunder than degrading insurgent support zones in western Niger. Wagner Group forces spectacularly failed to slow the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Mozambique in 2019 and have failed to degrade the Salafi-jihadi insurgency in Mali.[27] The Wagner contingent's size is insufficient to address the insurgency in Mali, given its force composition is roughly 6 percent of the struggling French and UN troops it replaced.[28] Wagner's brutal tactics are also counterproductive, as they exacerbate human rights abuses against civilians that insurgent groups use to gain popular support.[29] However, a significant Wagner presence around Niamey would improve the Nigerien forces’ capacity and enable the junta to divert more troops away from the capital.
Regime protection and resource plunder advance the Kremlin's strategic goals of supporting pro-Russian dictators and acquiring natural resources that help mitigate Western sanctions for its invasion of Ukraine.[30] Wagner's most significant contributions in Mali have been to symbolic victories in northern Mali that have shored up regime security and positioned its Wagner fighters near northern Mali's artisanal gold mines.[31] The small mercenary force in Burkina Faso focuses on regime security and training of elite units and does not directly engage in counterinsurgency operations.[32]
https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/salafi-jihadi-movement-weekly-update-january-19-2024
130 posted on
01/20/2024 3:34:04 AM PST by
AdmSmith
(GCTGATATGTCTATGATTACTCAT)
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