Posted on 09/03/2022 10:43:45 AM PDT by FarCenter
PREFACE
This study was prepared (for the Historical Division, EUCOM, by a group of former German genernals and general staff officers. The names of the contributors are not announced at this time. The principal author, who by the end of the war had attained the rank of general (Generaloberst), served on the Eastern Front throughout the Russian campaign and the subsequent retreat into the plains of northern Germany. He was successively commander of an infantry brigade, a panzer division (November 1941 to February 1943), and two different corps in the battles for Kharkov and Belgorod. Appointed commander of a panzer army on 1 December 1943, he participated in the withdrawal across southern Russia until the Germans reached the Carpathians. In August 1944 he Was transferred to Army Group Center, and his last assignment was with Army Group Weichsel. During this final phase of his military career, he played an important part in the retreat from Lithuania, East Prussia, and Pomerania.
The reader is reminded that all publications in the GERMAN REPORT SERlES were written by Germans from the German point of view and that the procedures of the German Army differed considerably from those of the United States Army. Throughout this pamphlet the point of departure for tactical innovations was official German combat doctrine and authorized German tables of organization and equipment. Moreover, it must not be overlooked that a fundamental condition of German operations in Russia was the almost consistent German inferiority in both manpower and materiel. Various other factres colored the authors' thinking in ways unfamiliar to Americans. Every effort has been made to retain the point of view, the expression and even the prejudices of the authors.
(Excerpt) Read more at history.army.mil ...
The tactics described in Chapter 4 "Defensive Pincers" now appears to be a favorite Russian tactic, and may be applicable to the Ukrainian attack across the Inhulets River.
You fall back all the way to Berlin.
You wait for Steiner’s attack.
Spoiling attacks into a developing attack was also a favorite German tactic.
Ok, LOL
Thanks for posting this interesting document.
The Russian’s destruction of the three Ukrainian pontoon bridges is what has enabled this effective Russian defensive pincer attack. I’m not sure what the Ukrainians can do now to relieve their enveloped troops that are on the “Russian side” of the river. Perhaps a major attack elsewhere to divert the Russian forces which are destroying the trapped Ukrainians in detail.
The principal authors biography reads like Gotthard Heinrici’s career. Or Hermann Balck.
I suspect that the more successful Nazis fell back to Washington DC, they just put a paperclip on their German ID card.
Huntsville, Alabama for a few STEM types...
Well we can’t keep ‘em in DC permanently with those German accents...
In fact, neither side seems really capable of exercising combined arms maneuver warfare by coordinating air, artillery and armored forces. There has been some improvement by both sides in the use of artillery.
The Ukrainians are much better on defense than anyone expected because they have large numbers of dispersed troops with ATGMs and MANPADs and their informal logistics network makes it hard to destroy supplies since those are also widely dispersed. The same logistics factor and lack of organized armor also make it hard for them to concentrate organized forces to go on the offense.
One of the most surprising things is how the Russians seem to be incapable of even local air superiority. The Russian air force seems completely devoid of stand-off precision bombs and Ukrainian SAMs and MANPADs make it impossible for them to operate at lower altitudes to provide close-in support or to conduct high-altitude strategic bombing.
It appears that more and better Ukrainian artillery is stripping the Russian army of offensive capability, but it remains to be seen how that can translate to increased offensive capability.
A very good book is “The Devils General” about General Graff Hyazinth Von Strackwitz. He gave the Russians fits, using slender resources to flank and destroy a lot of Russian armor and personnel.
good stuff
Finally, a suggestion to shift all German forces from the West to the East in order to slow the Red Army’s invasion of Germany and prevent the territorial expansion of communism was turned down by Hitler.
While he believed his principal enemies to be in the West, the German military leaders for all their antagonism toward the western powers, considered Russia their irreconcilable enemy...
ping
It may not have made much of a difference. The units in France were not the best.
An acquaintance was captured in France when he was 16. He had been in the Hitler Youth, conscripted at 14, fought partisans in Yugosalvia and then sent to France.
The grandfather of another acquaintance was conscripted in his 40s, sent to France, and he died there. He was a peasant farmer with a wife and three children.
The principal authors biography reads like Gotthard Heinrici’s career. Or Hermann Balck.
Erhard Raus is my guess.
Only two commanders of Army Group Weichsel: Himmler and Heinrici. So it must be Heinrici.
Only two commanders of Army Group Weichsel: Himmler and Heinrici. So it must be Heinrici.
Missed that. Heinrici it is. Ryan’s “The Last Battle” talks about Heinrici’s defensive tactics too.
You wait for Steiner’s attack.
Ok, LOL
That’s about right. Get your forces trapped in a hopeless pocket and wait for the relief force that never comes. The biggest and worst was Stalingrad. Many others after but smaller.
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