Held: New York’s proper-cause requirement violates the Fourteenth
Amendment by preventing law-abiding citizens with ordinary self-defense needs from exercising their Second Amendment right to keep and
bear arms in public for self-defense. Pp. 8–63.
(a) In District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U. S. 570, and McDonald v.
Chicago, 561 U. S. 742, the Court held that the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments protect an individual right to keep and bear arms for
self-defense. Under Heller, when the Second Amendment’s plain text
covers an individual’s conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct, and to justify a firearm regulation the government
must demonstrate that the regulation is consistent with the Nation’s
historical tradition of firearm regulation. Pp. 8–22.
(1) Since Heller and McDonald, the Courts of Appeals have developed a “two-step” framework for analyzing Second Amendment challenges that combines history with means-end scrutiny. The Court rejects that two-part approach as having one step too many. Step one is
broadly consistent with Heller, which demands a test rooted in the Second Amendment’s text, as informed by history. But Heller and McDonald do not support a second step that applies means-end scrutiny in
the Second Amendment context. Heller’s methodology centered on
constitutional text and history. It did not invoke any means-end test
such as strict or intermediate scrutiny, and it expressly rejected any
interest-balancing inquiry akin to intermediate scrutiny. Pp. 9–15.
(2) Historical analysis can sometimes be difficult and nuanced,
but reliance on history to inform the meaning of constitutional text is
more legitimate, and more administrable, than asking judges to “make
difficult empirical judgments” about “the costs and benefits of firearms
restrictions,” especially given their “lack [of] expertise” in the field.
McDonald, 561 U. S., at 790–791 (plurality opinion). Federal courts
tasked with making difficult empirical judgments regarding firearm
regulations under the banner of “intermediate scrutiny” often defer to
the determinations of legislatures. While judicial deference to legislative interest balancing is understandable—and, elsewhere, appropriate—it is not deference that the Constitution demands here. The Second Amendment “is the very product of an interest balancing by the
people,” and it “surely elevates above all other interests the right of
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms” for self-defense. Heller,
554 U. S., at 635. Pp. 15–17.
(3) The test that the Court set forth in Heller and applies today
requires courts to assess whether modern firearms regulations are
consistent with the Second Amendment’s text and historical understanding. Of course, the regulatory challenges posed by firearms today
are not always the same as those that preoccupied the Founders in
1791 or the Reconstruction generation in 1868. But the Constitution can, and must, apply to circumstances beyond those the Founders specifically anticipated, even though its meaning is fixed according to the
understandings of those who ratified it. See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 565 U. S. 400, 404–405. Indeed, the Court recognized in Heller
at least one way in which the Second Amendment’s historically fixed
meaning applies to new circumstances: Its reference to “arms” does not
apply “only [to] those arms in existence in the 18th century.” 554 U. S.,
at 582.
To determine whether a firearm regulation is consistent with the
Second Amendment, Heller and McDonald point toward at least two
relevant metrics: first, whether modern and historical regulations impose a comparable burden on the right of armed self-defense, and second, whether that regulatory burden is comparably justified. Because
“individual self-defense is ‘the central component’ of the Second
Amendment right,” these two metrics are “ ‘central’ ” considerations
when engaging in an analogical inquiry. McDonald, 561 U. S., at 767
(quoting Heller, 554 U. S., at 599).
To be clear, even if a modern-day regulation is not a dead ringer for
historical precursors, it still may be analogous enough to pass constitutional muster. For example, courts can use analogies to “longstanding” “laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such
as schools and government buildings” to determine whether modern
regulations are constitutionally permissible. Id., at 626. That said,
respondents’ attempt to characterize New York’s proper-cause requirement as a “sensitive-place” law lacks merit because there is no historical basis for New York to effectively declare the island of Manhattan
a “sensitive place” simply because it is crowded and protected generally by the New York City Police Department. Pp. 17–22.
(b) Having made the constitutional standard endorsed in Heller
more explicit, the Court applies that standard to New York’s propercause requirement. Pp. 23–62.
(1) It is undisputed that petitioners Koch and Nash—two ordinary, law-abiding, adult citizens—are part of “the people” whom the
Second Amendment protects. See Heller, 554 U. S., at 580. And no
party disputes that handguns are weapons “in common use” today for
self-defense. See id., at 627. The Court has little difficulty concluding
also that the plain text of the Second Amendment protects Koch’s and
Nash’s proposed course of conduct—carrying handguns publicly for
self-defense. Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a
home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear
arms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry.
Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to
possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and
confrontation can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 23–24.
Very nice.
“Nothing in the Second Amendment’s text draws a
home/public distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear arms, and the definition of “bear” naturally encompasses public carry. Moreover, the Second Amendment guarantees an “individual right to possess and carry weapons in case of confrontation,” id., at 592, and confrontation can surely take place outside the home. Pp. 23–24.”
Hmmmm .. will this lead to more public/concealed carry denials by liberal states being overturned?
This "should" put to rest whether the government argument that "assault weapons" are banned because they only had muskets when the 2nd Amendment was adopted.
And thanks to TexasGurl24 for posting some of the text along with the news! Agreed on the doomers. This is a big win. :)
And also thanks to the NRA.
Thank you ... I was wondering.