I used “Monty” as a middle name moniker in reference to Biden because of his greatest debacle - LARGER than D-Day, BTW - not because of his earlier campaigns. But clearly, in deference to your replies, I agree concede Biden is so far completely beyond that of even Monty’s last legacy it isn’t even funny.
That bit about the ‘intel’ about the panzer divisions? It was ignored because the planning for MG was already too far advanced. Monty was in charge....
“...the ‘intel’ about the panzer divisions? It was ignored because the planning for MG was already too far advanced. Monty was in charge...” [Gaffer, post 18]
Bernard Law Montgomery was simply the least bad alternative when it came to selecting commanders at senior flag-officer levels for most of the British Army. Few were exceptional in terms of pugnacity and in motivating troops, though many were competent in planning. Such dilemmas plagued the British for most of Winston Churchill’s early tenure; he sacked several after reversals in North Africa. In his book _Winston’s War_, Max Hastings addressed these troubles as perennial problems dating back generations. Long before World War Two.
Market Garden was afflicted by bad luck and Western-Alliance politics from start to finish.
Six of seven major ops had been cancelled before MG began. Most were British-planned and -directed. “Must-get-on-with-it” disease affected British & American attitudes.
Due to lack of air-drop support elements, planners had to use two days to insert all airborne elements. A death knell for operations depending so heavily on strategic surprise.
As late as mid 1944, aerial reconnaissance wasn’t fully trusted, especially when it came to tactical indicators. The fact that elements of crack panzer divisions had retired for rest & refit into MG’s planned advance areas wasn’t taken as seriously as it should have been. Obvious only after the fact.
Many of the ground-forces’ planned-advance phase lines, and many of the objectives assigned to the airborne elements, were too optimistic, given the risks of operating in the flat, soggy terrain of the area. Flaccid German resistance was assumed. Risks for the Western Allies weren’t really assessed nor acknowledged. Again, not truly obvious beforehand.
Wider political considerations could not be ignored. Many launch sites for Germany’s V-2 missiles were in the planned engagement areas; morale of the British public was deemed to be put at severe at risk by these revolutionary hi-tech weapons - far worse than what did occur during the Blitz mounted via Luftwaffe air strikes earlier in the war.