Former FBI Agent Says 9-11 Hijackers had U.S.-based support

but BOY HOWDY did she make a lot of money!!!

Isn't that the sole reason for entering the government public service field?

YUP.

But this POS raised the bar by several magnitudes.

The debris from the neighboring towers caught WTC7 on fire.
The fireman did not have any water to suppress the fire in #7.

WTC7 burned for over seven hours. The fire in the core of the building reached temperatures exceeding the point the steel lost its compression bending ratings. The weight of the building compressed the beams and they collapsed. Gravity did the rest.

I have not studied statics, mechanics and structural engineering since 1985. However, that is why building structures out of wood has an advantage in fire situations over steel.

“probably” don’t cut it

Actually, the smaller & tighter the group, and the less electronic communications they make (especially the closer to the end-point), the more likely they will have the end-point plan escape detection.

Every individual expansion of a “network” makes detection of its existence and operations MORE likely.

Osama would have insisted on a very small tight well organized plan with only the essential principles knowing what that plane was, and communicating as little as they could once all them were in the U.S.

THAT’S HER! Good one.
SPJNK.

“Greg Ford is full of crap. The 19 came from various places, they didn’t all even go through Saudi Arabia, and did not travel as one group. The pilots weren’t even Saudis.”

_______________________________________________________

I believe we can read below and understand just who is full of crap, Piasa:

Monograph on 9/11 and Terrorist Travel - Chapter 2 - Chronology
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/staff_statements/911_TerrTrav_Ch2.pdf

1.) On April 3, Nawaf al Hazmi applied for a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, submitting a written visa application, his passport, and a photograph.
Hazmi was a Saudi citizen born August 9, 1976.3
Hazmi’s passport was new—issued on
March 21, 1999, and it contained an indicator of extremism that has been associated with
al Qaeda.

2.) April 7. Khalid al Mihdhar applied for a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia, submitting a written application, his new passport, and a photograph.
Mihdhar was a Saudi citizen born May 16, 1975.9
Mihdhar’s passport was issued on
April 6, 1999.10 Mihdhar’s passport contained the same indicator of extremism as Nawaf
al Hazmi’s. But because this indicator of extremism was unknown at the time to U.S.
intelligence officials, the consular officer adjudicating their visas had not been warned to
watch for it.
Both Hazmi and Mihdhar’s visa applications were destroyed before September
11, according to routine State Department document destruction practices in place in
Jeddah, so we could not review them. The electronic records of their applications, their
photographs, and information about the visas issued to them still exist, however, and are
10
maintained in the State Department’s Consular Consolidated Database (CCD), and we
have reviewed this material.
It is not possible to state with certainty whether either Hazmi or Mihdhar were
interviewed by a consular officer in connection with their visa applications.11 The
consular officer who approved Hazmi’s visa stated, “I do not remember these specific
applications.”12 State Department computer records did not provide any help in this
regard, because they do not indicate whether the applicant has been interviewed.13
If either of these two were interviewed, they must have convinced the officer they had
good reasons to be going to the United States: both were issued visas after CLASS record
checks showed no derogatory information about them. Hazmi’s visa was issued on April
3, 1999

3.) September 3. Ahmed al Ghamdi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. He presented a new Saudi passport only
13 days old. There is no evidence that he was interviewed.42

4.) September 10. Hani Hanjour again applied for a B-1/B- (tourist/business) visa in
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, submitting a new passport issued on July 24, 2000. His statement
on the application that he would like to stay for three years in the United States raised
concerns among the consular staff that he was at risk of becoming an immigrant to the
United States. A consular employee who screened Hanjour’s application forwarded him
to a consular officer for an interview. Hanjour told this officer that he was going to attend
flight training school in the United States and wanted to change his status to “student”
from “tourist” once he arrived in the United States.43 “Look, you have spent enough time
in the States” to know what you want to do there, the officer told Hanjour. His prior
travel to the United States, the officer said to him, disqualified Hanjour from receiving a
tourist visa in order to go to the United States and find a school “because he had been in
the States long enough to decide what he wanted.”44 For these reasons, the officer denied
Hanjour’s application under INA section 221(g), a general denial that, as noted above,
allowed the applicant to return with additional information in support of his application.

September 25. Hanjour returned to the Jeddah consulate and, apparently having listened
to what the consular officer told him, submitted another application for a student visa.
This time, Hanjour stated a desire to attend the ELS Language Center in Oakland,
California. A consular official—probably the intake screener—wrote a note on his
application indicating that Hanjour had been denied a visa under section 221(g) on
14
September 10. The same consular officer who had interviewed Hanjour in connection
with his September 10 application also processed this one. He recalled to us that Hanjour
or someone acting on his behalf submitted an INS school enrollment form, or I-20—
required to qualify for a student visa—to the consulate late on September 25, 2000.49 “It
came to me, you know, at the end of the day to look at it. I saw he had an I-20, and it [his
visa] was issued.”50
State Department electronic records indicate that this approval allowed Hanjour to
“overcome” his September 10 visa denial, another indication that multiple applications
can be considered “one case.” State Department records erroneously recorded the visa
issued to Hanjour as a B-1/B-2 (business/tourist) visa when, in fact, it was an F (student)
visa that was printed and put in Hanjour’s passport.51 In addition, Hanjour had already
received an approved change of status to attend this same English language school in
1996. But that approval was granted by the INS in the United States, and the State
Department had no record of it. The consular officer told us that if he had known this
information, he might have refused Hanjour the visa.

5.) October 2000
October 17. Hamza al Ghamdi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete.52 Al
Ghamdi listed his occupation as “student” but left blank the question asking the street
address of his school. Ghamdi’s travel patterns indicated that he may have presented a
passport containing fraudulent travel stamps associated with al Qaeda when he applied
for this visa.53 The consular officer who adjudicated his case was not familiar with this
kind of manipulation; in addition, he told us that because of the workload in Jeddah, he
rarely had time to thumb through passports. Ghamdi was not interviewed, because
nothing in his application raised concerns in the mind of the consular officer who
adjudicated it and there was no hit in the CLASS system.54 His visa application was
granted.

6.) October 23. Mohand al Shehri, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. Al
Shehri listed his occupation as “student,” but listed the street address of his school as
“Riyadh K.S.A.” He claimed he was a 21-year-old student who would be supporting
himself in the United States.55 He was not interviewed, according to the officer who
issued this visa, because “We only interviewed Saudis if there was a previous denial of a
visa application or if there was something wrong with the application.”56 Shehri
apparently raised no such concerns. The officer noted that the lack of handwritten notes
on the application was a further indication that he had not interviewed Shehri.57

7.) October 28. Ahmed al Nami, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Nami’s application was incomplete.58 He
15
listed his occupations as “student” but did not provide a complete address for his school.
He listed his intending address in the United States as “in Los Angeles.” Nami’s passport
may have contained fraudulent travel stamps associated with al Qaeda.59 However, his
passport did not survive, so we can not be sure. On his application, Nami indicated that
“My friend Moshabab” would be traveling with him.
On the same day, Mushabib al Hamlan, a Saudi and a friend of 9/11 hijacker Ahmed al
Nami, acquired a two-year B1/B2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.60
Hamlan was selected to participate in the plot but backed out after obtaining his visa,
perhaps at the urging of his family.

8.) November 12. Ahmad al Haznawi, a 20-year-old Saudi national, applied for and
received a two-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.64 There is
evidence that Haznawi may have presented a passport with fraudulent travel stamps
associated with al Qaeda.65 Haznawi listed his occupation as “student” but left blank the
line on which he was asked to supply the street address of his present school. He stated
that he would provide financial support for his visit. He was not interviewed.

9.) November 20. Majed Moqed, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete. He
claimed to be a “student” but left blank the line on which he was asked to supply the
street address of his present school.67 The officer who adjudicated his visa said they did
not interview Moqed: “I would have written some notes on the application form[] if I
had.”68 He was not interviewed because, according to the officer who issued the visa,
“We only interviewed Saudis if there was a previous denial of a visa application or if
there was something wrong with the application.”69 Incompleteness by itself evidently
did not trigger an interview.

10.) November 21. Satam al Suqami, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.70 There is very strong evidence that the
passport Suqami submitted with this application had fraudulent travel stamps now
associated with al Qaeda.71 Suqami left blank the line on which he was asked to supply
the name and street address of his present employer. The consular officer who issued the
visa said he interviewed Suqami because he described his present occupation as “dealer,”
the word Saudis often put on their applications when they meant “businessman.” The
officer testified that he asked Suqami a number of questions, including, he believes, who
was paying for the trip.72 Although the officer stated that notes were always taken during
interviews,73 none were written on Suqami’s application, raising the possibility that the
officer’s memory of having conducted an interview was false. In any case, Suqami
evidently raised no suspicions and his application was approved.

11.) April 2001: April 21. Ahmed al Nami acquired a new Saudi passport, #C505363, replacing the one
(#C115007) he had used to acquire a visa on October 28, 2000, in Jeddah, a visa he never
used. He may have acquired this new passport because there was evidence of travel to
Afghanistan in his previous one.106

12.) April 21. Ahmed al Nami acquired a new Saudi passport, #C505363, replacing the one
(#C115007) he had used to acquire a visa on October 28, 2000, in Jeddah, a visa he never
used. He may have acquired this new passport because there was evidence of travel to
Afghanistan in his previous one.106
April 23. Nami applied for and received a B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah with
his new passport. There is evidence from a handwritten note on his application that Nami
was interviewed briefly, either by a consular officer or by a consular staff member, to
clarify an entry on his application. The words “My friend Mosh” are crossed out under
the question asking the “names and relationships of people traveling with you.” This is
probably a reference to Mushabib al Hamlan, another potential 9/11 hijacker who applied
for a visa with Nami on October 28, 2000. Nami also crossed out a box checked “no”
under the question asking if he had ever applied for a U.S. visa previously, changing his
answer to “yes.” It is not clear what prompted this change—possibly his brief interaction
with a consular official—but it is accurate. However, he failed to complete his response
and state where and when he had previously applied for a U.S. visa. Doing so would have
revealed that he was applying for a new visa long before the expiration of the two-year
visa he acquired the previous October. Nami’s action could have raised questions, had it
been coupled with the fact that he was applying with a new passport. But it would not
have been noticed by the consular officer who issued the visa, because Saudis were not
required to fill in their applications fully, Saudis were rarely interviewed, and State’s
name check system did not automatically call up prior visa issuances; it called up only
prior refusals.107

13.) May 2001
May 2. Majed Moqed and Ahmed al Ghamdi arrived together at Dulles International
Airport in Washington, D.C. Both Saudis were admitted as tourists for six months by
different immigration inspectors. Ghamdi’s Customs declaration indicated that he had
more than $10,000 with him upon entry, but the Customs inspector who processed him
did not fill out the required additional electronic forms when money in excess of $10,000
is brought into the United States.112
Also on this day, Shehhi arrived in Miami and was granted a six-month tourist stay.113
Meanwhile, Atta and, we believe, Jarrah were attempting to extend Jarrah’s length of
stay to September 2001.

14.) June 2001
June 1. The Visa Express Program was introduced for all Saudi citizens applying for
visas in Saudi Arabia in an effort to make the consular workload more manageable and to
reduce the size of the crowds outside of the embassy. The concept was simple. Instead of
going to the U.S. consulate to apply for a visa, the applicant filled out the form at one of
ten approved travel agencies. After collecting the application, the visa application fee,
24
and the applicant’s passport, the travel agency delivered these documents to the embassy
in Riyadh or to the consulate in Jeddah, and picked up the package of documents the next
day. If the application was approved, then the agency was responsible for returning the
passport (now containing the visa) to the applicant. If the consular officials determined
that an interview was necessary, then the travel agency was responsible for so notifying
the applicant by providing him or her with a letter from the consular section. Applicants
were rejected only after an in-person interview.131 (Visa Express will be discussed in
further detail in chapter 5.)
June 8. Ahmad al Haznawi and Wail al Shehri arrived together at Miami from Dubai,
United Arab Emirates. Both Saudis were admitted as tourists for six months by the same
primary inspector.132

15.) June 10. Saeed al Ghamdi acquired a new Saudi passport, #C573895, replacing the one
(#B516222) he used to acquire a visa on September 4, 2000, in Jeddah. He may have
acquired this new passport because there was evidence of travel to Afghanistan in his
previous passport.133

16.) June 12. Just like Nami (who applied April 23), Saeed al Ghamdi acquired a second
two-year B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in Jeddah. His application was incomplete and
he was not interviewed. Ghamdi’s visa application indicated that he had never applied for
a U.S. visa before, a curious similarity to Nami’s application.134 This was not true, since
he had applied for and acquired a visa on September 4, 2000. However, the State
Department computer system was not set up to catch this false statement; as noted above,
it called up only prior refusals. Ghamdi’s application was submitted by Minhal Travel
and processed through the Visa Express program.135 We considered the possibility that
the false answer reflected a mistake by the travel agency personnel, but the same
signature appears on both visa applications, and State records indicate that the September
application was submitted in person. Thus, it appears that Ghamdi was directly involved
in preparing the June visa application containing the false statement. He may have
omitted information about his prior visa in order not to raise suspicion about his new visa
application in his new passport—without the travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan—when
his old visa, which was multiple entry, was still valid.

17.) June 13. Mihdhar applied for and received his second B-1/B-2 (tourist/business) visa in
Jeddah. Mihdhar’s passport had been issued only 13 days earlier and, like up two other
hijackers, it contained an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation still unknown at that
time to U.S. intelligence officials. His application was incomplete. For example, he listed
his occupation as “businessman,” but left blank the name and street address of his present
employer. Mihdhar’s application also indicated that he had not previously applied for a
U.S. visa or been to the United States, though he had in fact traveled to the United States
on a B-1/B-2 visa issued in April 1999 (also in Jeddah). Thus, his application contained
two false statements. However, the State Department’s computer system was not set up to
catch these false statements by bringing up Mihdhar’s prior visa history. Mihdhar’s
application was processed through the Visa Express program, and his application was
submitted by Al Tayyar Travel. It is possible that these questions were answered falsely
because of a mistake by the travel agency personnel; and unlike Ghamdi’s, Mihdhar’s
25
application was signed only on the line for the “preparer” of the application. It is unclear
why Mihdhar or the travel agency would wish to hide the fact of his prior travel. Mihdhar
may have feared that it could compromise operational security of the 9/11 plot. He also
may not have wanted to highlight that he had obtained a new passport since his previous
visa.136
Consular officials have told us that evidence of the prior visas or travel to the United
States actually would have reduced concern that the applicants were intending to
immigrate. Thus, if the officers had learned the truth about these issues—and received an
adequate explanation for the mistakes on the applications—they likely would have had no
good reason to deny visas to these hijackers. On the other hand, if they had interviewed
Mihdhar, Nami, and Ghamdi and received suspicious answers to their questions, the
outcome might well have been different.

18.) June 18. Abdul Aziz al Omari, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. There is strong evidence that Omari
presented a passport containing the travel stamps now known to be associated with al
Qaeda when he applied for this visa since the fraudulent stamps predate this application.
Moreover, his application was incomplete, and he listed his home address as a hotel in
Jeddah. He was not interviewed. His application was processed through the Visa Express
program and was submitted by Attar Travel.137

19.) June 20. Salem al Hazmi, a Saudi, applied for and received a two-year B-1/B-2
(tourist/business) visa in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. His application was incomplete, and he
listed his occupation as “unemployed.” The passport he supplied was four days old and
contained an indicator of possible terrorist affiliation. 142 His application, processed
through the Visa Express program, was submitted by Ace Travel. According to the
consular officer who approved this application, the fact that Hazmi was “unemployed”
26
was not of concern “because they have a terrible unemployment problem in Saudi Arabia,
and a lot of people have money but they don’t have jobs.”143 Although unemployment
would have been a “big deal” in another country, the officer said, Saudis like Hazmi
“weren’t looking for jobs even though they were unemployed.”144

20.) Two of the hijackers were issued visas in Berlin; two were issued visas in the
United Arab Emirates. The remaining 15 were issued a total of 18 visas in Saudi
Arabia, 14 of which were issued in Jeddah (11 by the same consular officer), and
4 in Riyadh.204

That is an interesting narrative, but I don’t think it holds up under scrutiny.

At your leisure take a look at the history of building collapses all over the world, and look at the details about buildings that fell in their own footprints.

You will figure out the pattern...

And the fellow who was in charge, his name was John Brennan. He was the person who overrode those concerns and cautions and ordered those visas stamped in Jeda.”

Such a load of crock. Atta, Shehhi, and Jarrah all got their visas in Germany. And Brennan was't the station chief in Jeddah at the time the hijackers entered. From 1999 he was Chief to Staff to the CIA Director and in March, 2001 became Deputy Director.

I have read them and seen the YouTube videos.
I just do not believe that “someone” blew up WTC7.

Occam’s Razor explanation is a lot simpler.

It all goes back to the fact that there just was not enough water pressure to put out multiple structural fires happening all at the same time.

This is why the whole city of Chicago burned down back in the 1800’s.

“You will figure out the pattern...”

I used to get into discussions like this on Usenet. Here’s how I usually shut it down.

How much explosives had to be emplaced to bring the building down?

How many Mossad agents were required to move that much explosives and why didn’t anyone see them?

Probably the FBI and the CIA.

If someone already said this, I apologize.

But it’s worth repeating.

Support from our dear friends, the ~~Saudis~~ Deep State...

The government wants to disarm us after 245 yrs 'cuz they plan to do things we would shoot them for!

tumblr-lykntn-Ccde1qbvl57o1-500

At no point in history has any government ever wanted its people to be defenseless for any good reason ~ nully's son

The biggest killer of mankind

Nut-job Conspiracy Theory Ping!

To get onto The Nut-job Conspiracy Theory Ping List you must threaten to report me to the Mods if I don't add you to the list...

Here’s another newsflash for the Post: There were supposedly going to be 20 hijackers, 5 each for the four planes, but one for Flight 93 that went down in Pennsylvania was apparently a no-show and that flight only had four.

Also when ALL flights were abruptly grounded, several groups of 5 swarthy military age males, quietly disappeared, abandoning their luggage, and leaving the airports to parts unknown...

The reason the Twin Towers collapsed was the sprinkler system was not designed to pump enough water to put out a fire in BOTH buildings at the SAME time. They designed it to suppress a fire in ONE building. They never imagined that both buildings would ever catch on fire at the same time. That is why the ONE tower did NOT collapse after the first time they blew it up with a truck bomb. The sprinkler system worked. It put out the fire so that the structural support members not compromised in the initial blast did not fail from the heat of the fire.

Katherine Smith ping

Five Men with Mideast Ties Indicted in License Scam (Tennessee License Scandal)

TENN DRIVER LICENSE SCANDAL: FLAMING DEATH NO ACCIDENT, FBI SAYS

Car fire set off suspicions as crew fought it (Smith Tennesee License Scandal)

License suspect had WTC repair pass, but Port Authority did its own work [Tennessee License Scandal]

The pass gave him access to the buildings' sprinkler systems.

I bet he "fixed" them real good...

Treason is not too strong a word.

Back then, the FBI and CIA, and other Intel agencies were “compartmentalized” by... can’t remember her name, darnit!

Jamie Gorelick’s wall

Didn't see a Wikipedia entry.

Odd that...

All this talk and no one mentions Able Danger.

Spector and Gorelick really put the lid on that during the 9/11 cOmmission hearings.

All the conspiracy theories about explosions, Mosad, whatever, were often fed into by the government as a smoke screen to camouflage and cover the REAL conspiracy.....Gorelick's hiding of the ChiCom/Clinton money connections with her "Chinese Wall". Had it not been for that, military intel and FBI likely may have been able to connect the dots.

Unintended consequences

I used to use a sarcastic tag line never believing I'd live long enough to see people asking, "Able Danger?...What's an Able Danger?"

One such group was at Newark airport, in sight of the WTC

Able Danger?...What's an Able Danger?"

Carlos Danger's uncle, DUH!

Oddly, can remember reading much of this information years ago, as if it were yesterday.....

and so i have to ask, How the F has anything changed for the better?

After reading your #115 I’d think you might be a little more serious .....silly me