Posted on 07/09/2020 7:22:08 PM PDT by Meatspace
I think the method is called fragging
Georgia did not send any delegates to the fourth Congress, you historically-challenged moron. That was the Congress in session right after the Treaty of Paris was signed in September 1783. I guess they just forgot, huh?
But the claim is that George III recognized the 13 colonies as 13 separate countries and my question is who was there to sign for the sovereign nation of Georgia? Either you can answer it or, more likely, you can't.
Yes, I noticed that after I made my post. I should have said "all or most". The link I provided said that there was a period where people decided to capitalizing not all but whichever nouns they considered important.
I remember running into capitalizing nouns in my grad school German classes. I took German and Russian back then because a Ph.D. required we prove competence in two foreign languages. I've since forgotten everything else I learned about German and Russian. I did use the Russian once though from a Russian math book in the first peer reviewed paper I wrote after graduating.
"We have now the honor to submit to the consideration of the United States in Congress assembled, that Constitution which has appeared to us the most advisable.
The friends of our country have long seen and desired, that the power of making war, peace, and treaties, that of levying money and regulating commerce, and the correspondent executive and judicial authorities should be fully and effectually vested in the general government of the Union: But the impropriety of delegating such extensive trust to one body of men is evident — Hence results the necessity of a different organization.
In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence. This important consideration, seriously and deeply impressed on our minds, led each state in the Convention to be less rigid on points of inferior magnitude, than might have been otherwise expected; and thus the Constitution, which we now present, is the result of a spirit of amity, and of that mutual deference and concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered indispensible.
It is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all — Individuals entering into society, must give up a share of liberty to preserve the rest. The magnitude of the sacrifice must depend as well on situation and circumstance, as on the object to be obtained. It is at all times difficult to draw with precision the line between those rights which must be surrendered, and those which may be reserved; and on the present occasion this difficulty was encreased by a difference among the several states as to their situation, extent, habits, and particular interests. That it will meet the full and entire approbation of every state is not perhaps to be expected; but each will doubtless consider, that had her interest been alone consulted, the consequences might have been particularly disagreeable or injurious to others; that it is liable to as few exceptions as could reasonably have been expected, we hope and believe; that it may promote the lasting welfare of that country so dear to us all, and secure her freedom and happiness, is our most ardent wish.
With great respect,
We have the honor to be,
Sir,
Your Excellency's most obedient and humble servants,
George Washington, President.
By unanimous Order of the Convention.
His Excellency
The President of Congress.
Notice that Washington tells the President of Congress that they strove for a consolidated government and then goes on to tell him; "it is obviously impracticable in the federal government of these states, to secure all rights of independent sovereignty to each, and yet provide for the interest and safety of all"; in other words the states will not retain all their right to sovereignty.
Now at this point the continental congress could have told the convention to go pound sand, you exceeded the authority we gave you and we will not send this to the people to ratify. They obviously did not do this. Why? Most likely because the defects in the articles were widely understood by a majority of the continental congress and they agreed with George Washington that if their wasn't a change in the form of government then "our national existence" might be in jeopardy.
As we know the continental congress did send it to the people for ratification and the people did ratify it. Rendering the question on if the constitutional convention exceeded it's authority moot.
Finally, we should notice that woodpusher is now the second Lunatic Lost Causer on these threads to argue that Crazy Roger Taney was correct in his Dred Scott opinions.
We should all notice that, as usual, BroJoeK has no argument, but just calls names. He might do better with court opinions if he read them before imparting his knowledge of what they decided. As a matter of law, the final interpreter of state law is the highest court of a state. In the case of Scott v. Emerson, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that Scott was not a citizen of the state of Missouri pursuant to Missouri law, and Scott took no appeal to that decision. In Scott v. Sandford, Scott’s claim of jurisdiction depended upon his being a citizen of Missouri, John Sanford being his owner, and John Sanford being a citizen of a state other than Missouri, asserted as being New York. In fact, Scott was not a citizen was not a citizen of Missouri, and Sanford was never his owner. Thus the claim of jurisdiction failed.
Unlike BroJoeK, the rest of you should notice that I did not claim that Taney was correct in all his opinions. What I claimed at #443 was “Scott v. Sandford was correctly decided.” In Scott v. Sandford, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that the Circuit Court never had jurisdiction to hear the case and remanded the case to the Circuit Court with instructions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction. As usual, BroJoeK is all talk and no substance. He seems entirely focused on his dicta.
woodpusher: "The freed slave was neither a citizen nor an alien. Freed slaves uniquely held no municipal status as citizens or aliens, and were ineligible for naturalization under the terms of federal law."DoodleDawg: "Nonsense. If a slave was born in the U.S. and was later emancipated then citizenship is assumed with his newly freed status. Nothing in the Constitution supports the concept of a free person being neither citizen or alien and ineligible for citizenship."
[BroJoeK] Right, by all laws & practice of the time -- when
indentured servants complete their term of indenture, they became full citizens in every respect. Even prisoners became citizens again on completion of their sentences.
All should take notice that, as usual, BroJoeK devolves into dishonest, bordering on insane, argument. Slaves were NOT indentured servants. The children of indentured servants were not born to a life of indentured servitude. That would even be true for the slave free state of Illinois and its folks serving a 99-year indentured servitude.
The laws back then cannot be swept away by denying they existed.
OFFICIAL OPINIONS of The Attorneys General of the United States, Advining the President and Heads of Departments in relation to their official duties; and expounding the Constitution, subsisting treaties sith foreign governments and with Indian Tribes, and the public laws of the country. Volume I, Washington, 1852pp. 506-509.
RIGHTS OF FREE VIRGINIA NEGROES.Free negroes in Virginia are not citizens of the United States in the sense in which the term “citizens” is used in the acts regulating foreign and the coasting trade, so as to be qualified to command vessels.
Office of the Attorney General,
November 7, 1821.Sir: The question propounded for my opinion on the letter of the collector at Norfolk is, “Whether free persons of color are, in Virginia, citizens of the United States, within the intent and meaning of the acts regulating foreign and coasting trade, so as to be qualified to command vessels?”
I presume that the description, “citizen of the United States,”
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used in the constitution, has the same meaning that it has in the several acts of Congress passed under the authority of the constitution; otherwise there will arise a vagueness and uncertainty in our laws, which will make their execution, if not impracticable, at least extremely difficult and dangerous. Looking to the constitution as the standard of meaning, it seems very manifest that no person is included in the description of citizen of the United States who has not the full rights of a citizen in the State of his residence. Among other proofs of this, it will be sufficient to advert to the constitutional provision, that “the citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.” Now, if a person born and residing in Virginia, but possessing none of the high characteristic privileges of a citizen of the State, is nevertheless a citizen of Virginia in the sense of the constitution, then, on his removal into another State, he acquires all the immunities and privileges of a citizen of that other State, although he possessed none of them in the State of his nativity: a consequence which certainly could not have been in the contemplation of the convention. Again: the only qualification required by the constitution to render a person eligible as President, senator, or representative of the United States, is, that he shall be a “citizen of the United States” of a given age and residence. Free negroes and mulattoes can satisfy the requisitions of age and residence as well as the white man; and if nativity, residence, and allegiance combined, (without the rights and privileges of a white man; are sufficient to make him a “citizen of the United States” in the sense of the constitution, then free negroes and mulattoes are eligible to those high offices, and may command the purse and sword of the nation.
For these and other reasons, which might easily be multiplied, I am of the opinion that the constitution, by the description of “citizens of the United States,” intended those only who enjoyed the full and equal privileges of white citizens in the State of their residence. If this be correct, and if I am right also in the other position—that we must affix the same sense to this description when found in an act of Congress, as it manifestly has in the constitution—then free people of color in Virginia are not citizens of the United States in the sense
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of our shipping laws, or any other laws, passed under the authority of the federal constitution; for such people have very few of the privileges of the citizens of Virginia.
1. They can vote at no election, although they may be freeholders.
2. They are incapable of any office of trust or profit, civil or military.
3. They are not competent witnesses against a white man in> any case, civil or criminal.
4. They are not enrolled in the militia, are incapable of bearing arms, and are forbidden even to have in their possession military weapons, under the penalties of forfeiture and whipping.
5. They are subject to severe corporal punishment for raising their hand against a white man, except in defence against a wanton assault.
6. They are incapable of contracting marriage with a white woman, and the attempt is severely punished.
These are some only of tho incapacities which distinguished them from the white citizens of Virginia; but they are, I think, amply sufficient to show that such persons could not have been intended to be embraced by the description “citizens of the United States,” in the sense of the constitution and acts of Congress.
The allegiance which the free man of color owes to the State of Virginia, is no evidence of citizenship; for he owes it not in consequence of any oath of allegiance. He is not required or permitted to take any such oath; the allegiance which he owes is that which a sojourning stranger owes—the mere consequence and return for the protection which he receives from the laws. Besides the general reasons which I have advanced for the exclusion of free negroes and mulattoes in Virginia from the description of “ citizens of the United States,” under the constitution and laws of the Union, there are special reasons in support of that exclusion with regard to the command of vessels. Under our laws, such persons are not competent witnesses to affect, by their oaths, the life or property of a white man; yet if, by the constitution and laws of the United States, they are citizens competent to the command of vessels, they become
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clothed with all the duties, powers, and authority of masters of vessels; and, among them, with the competency of affecting by their oaths, protests, &c., the property of white men, insurers, owners, freighters, and of the government itself; of which various instances under our laws, as well as under the maritime law generally, will immediately occur to you. Now, it could never have been the intention of Congress, in requiring that the master of a vessel should be a citizen of the United States; to create a citizen by the assumption of that employment, and clothe the man with rights and privileges of citizenship, which he did not previously possess. The act looked only to those who were previously citizens, and to whom alone it confines the right of entering on the employment
In addition to these considerations, I may observe, with the collector, that Congress itself has recognised the distinction between citizens of the United States and persons of color, natives of the United States, in several instances; e.g., the 1st section of the act of 3d March, 1813, “for the regulation of seamen on board the public and private vessels of the United States;” and the 3d, 5th, 6th, and 7th sections of the act of March 1, 1817, “concerning the navigation of the United States.”
Upon the whole, I am of the opinion that free persons of color in Virginia are not citizens of the United States, within the intent and meaning of the acts regulating foreign and coasting trade, so as to be qualified to command vessels.
I have the honor to remain, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
WM. WIRT.
To the Secretary of the Treasury.
Naturalization was initially restricted to free white aliens. By virtue of the Chinese Exclusion Act, no Chinese were eligible for naturalization until the time of World War II.
A Treatise on the Laws Governing the Exclusion and Expulsion of Aliens in the United States, by Clement L. Bouvé, Of the district of Columbia Bar, Member of the American Society of International Law, Wasington, D.C., Jon Byrne & Co., 1912, pp. 376-379, on STATUS.
B.) Through the Acquisition of American Citizenship.Acquisition of municipal status under the immigration law is, of course, possible only to those who on seeking to enter the United States, are subject to the provisions of that law. Aliens who have been admitted to this country through the favorable decision of the proper immigration officers can be said to have acquired a municipal status, by virtue of the operation of those laws, but, if through one cause or another an alien has from any other legitimate source acquired the right to enter and reside in the United States the immigration acts are not applicable to him, and the municipal status which he acquires on entering the country exists independent of any provision of the special statute governing the admission of aliens. This principle is generally conceded.
As the immigration act purports to include in its operation all aliens, or at least all aliens seeking to “enter” the United States, a status which will exempt persons seeking tc enter from the operation thereof must be incompatible with the condition of alienage. It is conceded that persons not aliens in the sense of the immigration act are not subject to its provisions.83 Since it is admitted that, generally speaking, citizenship acquired by naturalization or mar-
83 Taylor v. United States, 207 U. S. 120, 52 Law Ed. 130; Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U. S. 1, 48 Law Ed. 317
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riage removes the person claiming it from the operation of the immigration laws, and that citizenship may be acquired by this process, why is it, when there is no dispute as to the actual facts on which the right to enter is based, that the Department of Commerce and Labor takes the view, and the courts have more than once held that such persons are subject to the operation of those laws? Merely because it is contended that granting that conditions may exist under which citizenship may be acquired by aliens, they cannot exist when at the time the resulting exempting status is ought to be established the person desiring to acquire it is suffering from disabilities which, if an alien, would render him excludable under the provisions of the act.
With certain rare exceptions, noted later,84 the only political status other than alienage known to our law is citizenship. This can be acquired in one of two ways, by naturalization or marriage; for, citizenship resulting from the fact of birth cannot be said to be “acquired.” The question to be determined, then, is how far, if at all, rights claimed by virtue of naturalization or marriage to an American citizen are affected by the provisions of the immigration law; in other words, under what circumstances, if any, aliens giving proof of the existence of a state of facts, which under the general laws of the United States dealing with the subject, ordinarily gives rise to a change in political status, are subject to the operation of the immigration laws.
(1.) By Naturalization.
The right of aliens to acquire citizenship in the United States is purely statutory.85 “The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution,” says MR. JUSTICE GRAY, speaking for the court, in the case of United States v. Wong Kim Ark,
84 That occupied by natives of Porto Rico and the Philippines.
85 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 37 Law Ed. 905; United States v. Rodgers, 185 Fed. 334- - - - - - - - - -
“in the declaration that ‘all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside’ contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only: birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the Constitution. Every person born in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof becomes at once a citizen of the United States and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of Congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.” 86
When the claim to admission is based on citizenship, either as the necessary result of birth in this country or acquired by any one of the different processes of naturalization, the facts being admitted, the political effect of those facts or combinations of facts generally involves no question of immigration law. In ordinary cases, only one question presents itself to the solution of the immigration officers—whether or not the person presenting himself for admission is personally qualified under the immigration law to enter. If found to be suffering from disabilities which operate to exclude, the applicant is without more assigned for deportation. But it frequently occurs that, granting the existence of disabilities which would be fatal to his admission if an alien, the claim is made
86 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 42 Law Ed. 890.
that the applicant is a citizen of the United States, supported by allegation of the existence of facts from which the political status of citizenship purports to result. This raises at once a new issue of fact—that is, whether the facts from which the exempting status is alleged to result are as represented. This question being decided by the examining officers in the affirmative, there remains only the pure question of law as to whether the political results of those acts is American citizenship; and this would seem to depend wholly on those laws of the United States which designate how and when American citizenship can be acquired.
The naturalization of an alien changes his political status from that of alienage to citizenship and may affect the political condition of his wife and minor children. As regards the alien himself, his naturalization is, of course, sufficient to remove him from the operation of the act, but the mere declaration of intention does not change his political status of alien to that of citizen.87 The fact of naturalization being shown, the applicant must be admitted as a matter of course, not because he has proven his right to admission under the immigration acts but because he has shown that immigration officers have no jurisdiction over him whatsoever.
All such cases necessarily involve no question of the acquisition of a municipal status under the immigration law, but, on the contrary, the proof of a political status which places the party beyond the reach of the provisions of that law.
Slaves enjoyed no status. They were not citizens and they were not aliens. The 14th Amendment was not a feelgood measure just to pass the time of day for bored legislators. It was necessary law to change the “freedmen” into citizens.
Black’s Law Dictionary, 11th Ed.
Status. (17c) 1. A person’s legal condition, whether personal or proprietary; the sum total of a person’s legal rights, duties, liabilities, and other legal relations, or any particular group of them separately considered . 2. A person’s legal condition regarding personal rights but excluding proprietary relations . 3. A person’s capacities and incapacities, as opposed to other elements of personal status . 4. A person’s legal condition insofar as it is imposed by the law without the person’s consent, as opposed to a condition that the person has acquired by agreement . • For an insightful discussion of these four senses, see C.K. Allen, “Status and Capacity,” in Legal Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence 28-70 (1931).“By the status (or standing) of a person is meant the position that he holds with reference to the rights which are recognized and maintained by the law — in other words, his capacity for the exercise and enjoyment of legal rights.” James Hadley, Introduction to Roman Law 106 (1881). “The word ‘status’ itself originally signified nothing more than the position of a person before the law. Therefore, every person (except slaves, who were not regarded as persons, for legal purposes) had a status. But, as a result of the modern tendency towards legal equality formerly noticed, differences of status became less and less frequent, and the importance of the subject has greatly diminished, with the result that the term status is now used, at any rate in English Law, in connection only with those comparatively few classes of persons in the community who, by reason of their conspicuous differences from normal persons, and the fact that by no decision of their own can they get rid of these differences, require separate consideration in an account of the law. But professional or even political differences do not amount to status; thus peers, physicians, clergymen of the established Church, and many other classes of persons, are not regarded as the subjects of status, because the legal differences which distinguish them from other persons, though substantial, are not enough to make them legally abnormal. And landowners, merchants, manufacturers, and wage-earners are not subjects of the Law of Status, though the last-named are, as the result of recent legislation, tending to approach that position.” Edward Jenks, The Book of English Law 109 (P.B. Fairest ed., 6th ed. 1967).
By the way, stan is still around - just posts under a different moniker.
“It would seem that he who best predicted what would result probably had the best understanding.”
There is much truth in that.
Blacks flock to the Democrat Party because of The New Deal. Listen pal, “Bro Joe K’’ cleans your clock so don’t think you’re going to come picking a fight with me. You’re a loser. A Lost Cause Loser. Piss off.
... I rose yesterday to ask a question which arose in my own mind. When I asked that question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation was obvious. The fate of this question and of America may depend on this. Have they said, We, the states? Have they made a proposal of a compact between states? If they had, this would be a confederation. It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated government. The question turns, sir, on that poor little thing — the expression, We, the people, instead of the states, of America. I need not take much pains to show that the principles of this system are extremely pernicious, impolitic, and dangerous. Is this a monarchy, like England — a compact between prince and people, with checks on the former to secure the liberty of the latter? Is this a confederacy, like Holland — an association of a number of independent states, each of which retains its individual sovereignty? It is not a democracy, wherein the people retain all their rights securely. Had these principles been adhered to, we should not have been brought to this alarming transition, from a confederacy to a consolidated government.
Patrick Henry, speech to the Virginia ratification convention 1788
He understands that the government under the articles is a confederation. Under the constitution it is a consolidated government. Which is exactly what George Washington said it was in his letter that accompanied the transmittal of the constitution to the President of the Congress.
"In all our deliberations on this subject we kept steadily in our view, that which appears to us the greatest interest of every true American, the consolidation of our Union, in which is involved our prosperity, felicity, safety, perhaps our national existence."
George Washington's letter to the President of the Congress 1787
I believe woodpusher’s original comment was that Henry and Jefferson predicted what the Constitution would BECOME, not what it was thought to be in 1788 (recall Henry’s famous “I smell a rat,” comment). It was the old “Federalists vs Anti-Federalists” standoff, and was one of the reasons for the Bill of Rights.
I understood that. My comment is that woodpusher is wrong that Henry was afraid of what it would BECOME. Henry understood what it WAS. The constitution formed a consolidated government established by the people. The articles of confederation was a league formed by the states.
The anti-federalist at the time of ratification of the constitution did not want it ratified. They wanted to continue under the Articles of Confederation. They lost that battle, but they did win in getting the bill of rights added to the constitution.
I found this very succinct contrast between Federalists and Anti-Federalists:
POLITICAL BELIEFS
Federalists: Believed the Union would fail without a strong central government.
Anti-Federalists: Wanted strong state governments (closer to the people).
WHO SHOULD RULE
Federalists: Distrusted rule by the people.
Anti-Federalists:
TRUSTING THE PEOPLE
Federalists: Distrusted rule by the people.
Anti-Federalists: Distrusted elites; thought they were corrupt.
WHO WERE THEY?
Federalists: Property owners, landed wealthy, well-to-do.
Anti-Federalists: Small farmers, shopkeepers, laborers, merchants.
I think that is a good contrast, though somewhat simplified. I’m going to go through those and share my thoughts on each.
Political Beliefs-
I completely agree with the federalists on this one. If we stayed under the Articles of Confederation I do not believe the United States of America would still exist. We would have broken into a bunch of little countries a la Europe and fought among ourselves. I would argue that the federalist tried to design a system where the central government was strong but still had checks and balances on it.
WHO SHOULD RULE -
I also distrust mob rule and remember half of all Americans are below average intelligence. All I have to do is look at the Antifa mobs to see that. I also don’t trust elites to do what is right for the people. Too many of our elites want whats good for their bottom dollar which results in the crony capitilism we have. I’d say I’m in-between a federalist and anti-federalist here.
TRUSTING THE PEOPLE
I think I answered this above.
WHO WERE THEY?
Federalists- George Washington, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison(at first)
Anti-Federalist- Patrick Henry, Thomas Jefferson, Samuel Adams, James Madison(later)
gotta go with George Washington on this one. I probably would have been a federalist if I was around during that time. Though I would have agreed with the anti-federalist that the constitution needed a bill of rights.
Really? Because you say so? Well that settles that! </sarcasm>
You can cut and paste by the yard and it does not change the fact that the overwhelming majority of Taney's decision does not relate to the fact of the matter before the court and because of that just about everyone of Taney's comments in his written opinion were made in dicta. As such, they are not binding as precident.
Scott's first case, Scott v. Emerson, was tried in state courts eventually coming before the Missouri Supreme Court where the court ruled that Scott had never been emancipated and remained a slave. As such, he had no standing to sue in court since he was property and not a citizen. When Scott took the case to federal court and sued Sandford, the lower court ruled against him and cited the Missouri Supreme Court decision as the basis for their ruling. So the matter before the U.S. Supreme Court was not whether blacks could ever be citizens or whether the Missouri Compromise was constitutional or any of the other crap you posted. The matter before the court was whether Scott, as a slave, could sue in court? Once Taney said he could not then the matter was settled, and every other element he set forth in his decision, comments he had been waiting for decades to put in a judicial ruling, comprised obiter dictum and not ratio decidendi. In terms of precedent they are nothing but the mutterings of a hate-filled old man and while they can be used to as support other judicial rulings they are not binding as precedent.
I see I left out the Anti-Federalists’ “Who Should Rule?”
Anti-Federalists: Believed that ordinary people should have great input into government.
Right now there are a lot of “ordinary people” burning police stations and tearing down monuments. Don’t think I want them to have much input.
“Right now there are a lot of “ordinary people” burning police stations and tearing down monuments. Don’t think I want them to have much input.”
And there are more who are not.
Listen pal, “Bro Joe K” cleans your clock so don’t think you’re going to come picking a fight with me. You’re a loser. A Lost Cause Loser. Piss off.
This is not a sporting event, and you are not winning. BroJoeKaepernick does not clean clocks.
I did not pick a fight with you. I did not say a thing about you. I commented on the Civil War era.
I did not realize that a counterpoint would reduce you to howling in a puddle of warm piss.
You can cut and paste by the yard and it does not change the fact that the overwhelming majority of Taney's decision does not relate to the fact of the matter before the court and because of that just about everyone of Taney's comments in his written opinion were made in dicta. As such, they are not binding as precident.
That’s what I said, dear. The Opinion was issued seriatim. There are nine of them. Only something agreed upon by five or more is an Opinion of the Court. You are absolutely fixated on the dicta that do nothing.
Taney’s massive amount of dicta is in response to the even more massive dicta of Juscitce Benjamin Curtis who sat on the bench and listened to his older brother argue the case, and then leaked his opinion to the press before the Court had authorized the release of any opinion.
Taney’s dicta was only 56 pages long. Curtis's dicta was 70 pages long.
When Scott took the case to federal court and sued Sandford, the lower court ruled against him and cited the Missouri Supreme Court decision as the basis for their ruling.
What the U.S. Supreme Court said:
So in this case. As Scott was a slave when taken into the State of Illinois by his owner, and was there held as such, and brought back in that character, his status, as free or slave, depended on the laws of Missouri, and not of Illinois.It has, however, been urged in the argument, that by the laws of Missouri he was free on his return, and that this case, therefore, cannot be governed by the case of Strader et at v. Graham, where it appeared, by the laws of Kentucky, that the plaintiffs continued to be slaves on their return from Ohio. But whatever doubts or opinions may, at one time, have been entertained upon this subject, we are satisfied, upon a careful examination of all the cases decided in the State courts of Missouri referred to, that it is now firmly settled by the decisions of the highest court in the State, that Scott and his family upon their return were not free, but were, by the laws of Missouri, the property of the defendant; and that the Circuit Court of the United States had no jurisdiction, when, by the laws of the State, the plaintiff was a slave, and not a citizen.
Moreover, the plaintiff, it appears, brought a similar action against the defendant in the State court or Missouri, claiming the freedom of himself and his family upon the same grounds and the same evidence upon which he relies in the case before the court. The case was carried before the Supreme Court of the State; was fully argued there; and that court decided that neither the plaintiff nor his family were entitled to freedom; and were still the slaves of the defendant; and reversed the judgment of the inferior State court, which had given a different decision. If the plaintiff supposed that this judgment of the Supreme Court of the State was erroneous, and that this court had jurisdiction to revise and reverse it, the only mode by which he could legally bring it before this court was by writ of error directed to the Supreme Court of the State, requiring it to transmit the record to this court. If this had been done, it is too plain for argument that the writ must have been dismissed for want or jurisdiction in this court. The case of Strader and others v. Graham is directly on point; and, indeed, independent of any decision, the language of the 25th section of the act of 1789 is too clear and precise to admit of controversy.”
In the directly on point Strader v. Graham, 7-2, the Court was unanimous in its finding of a lack of jurisdiction. McLean in dissent stated, "I agree there is no jurisdiction in this case, and that it must be dismissed." Catron in dissent stated, "no jurisdiction exists to examine the State decision."
As Strader stated on jurisdiction,
In fact, when the Constitution was adopted, the settlement of that vast territory was hardly begun; and the people who filled it, and formed the great and populous States that now cover it, became inhabitants of the territory after the Constitution was adopted; and migrated upon the faith that its protection and benefits would be extended to them, and that they would in due time, according to its provisions and spirit, be admitted into the Union upon an equal footing with the old States. For the new government secured to them all the public rights of navigation and commerce which the Ordinance did or could provide for; and moreover extended to them when they should become States much greater power over their municipal regulations and domestic concerns than the Confederation had agreed to concede. The six articles, said to be perpetual as a compact, are not made a part of the new Constitution. They certainly are not superior and paramount to the Constitution, and cannot confer power and jurisdiction upon this court. The whole judicial authority of the courts of the United States is derived from the Constitution itself, and the laws made under it.It is undoubtedly true, that most of the material provisions and principles of these six articles, not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States, have been the established law within this territory ever since the Ordinance was passed; and hence the Ordinance itself is sometimes spoken of as still in force. But these provisions owed their legal validity and force, after the Constitution was adopted and while the territorial government continued, to the act of Congress of August 7, 1789, which adopted and continued the Ordinance of 1787, and carried its provisions into execution, with some modifications, which were necessary to adapt its form of government to the new Constitution. And in the States since formed in the territory, these provisions, so far as they have been preserved, owe their validity and authority to the Constitution of the United States, and the constitutions and laws of the respective States, and not to the authority of the Ordinance of the old Confederation. As we have already said, it ceased to be in force upon the adoption of the Constitution, and cannot now be the source of jurisdiction of any description in this court. In every view of the subject, therefore, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, and the writ of error must on that ground be dismissed.
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