https://cases.justia.com/federal/appellate-courts/ca6/13-3720/13-3720-2014-04-11.pdf?ts=1411029623
Before: MERRITT, BOGGS, and STRANCH, Circuit Judges.
BOGGS, Circuit Judge. Cordell Drummond shot himself in the leg and lay bleeding off a public street. Two Springfield Township police officers called paramedics and then stood by with guns drawn, reasonably believing that Drummond may have been armed and dangerous. Sharon Pierce, individually and as administratrix of Drummond’s estate, sued the Township under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Township’s police officers violated Drummond’s due-process rights by failing to provide medical aid and by preventing civilian bystanders from providing aid. The district court granted summary judgment for the Township. Because the Township did not deprive Drummond of a constitutional right, we affirm.
A man lying on his stomach on the ground, with two police officers holding down his legs, and one kneeling on his neck, who first passes out, and then goes into cardiac arrest, cannot reasonably be believed to be armed and dangerous, wouldn't you say?
And, of course, you left out the details of the case, which say :
"In the five minutes intervening, Powers and Downs did not touch Drummond, handcuff him, or restrain him in any way. They observed that Drummond was bleeding and had blood on his hands and pants, but they could not observe the severity of Drummond’s injury or the extent of his blood loss. "
That's a wee bit different, you know, then one of the POLICEMEN, himself, trying to take George Floyd's pulse, not finding any, and telling a fellow policemen, who not only does not try to verify, does not attempt CPR, but KEEPS KNEELING ON HIS NECK.
As to the brandishing the mace?
From your own link above:
After the officers radioed dispatch, Jason Drummond, Cordell’s uncle and a resident of Birchridge Drive, approached the scene. Jason Drummond did not speak, and the officers did not know his identity, intentions, or whether he was armed. Downs held Jason Drummond at gunpoint momentarily and ordered him not to walk closer.
Whereas in the George Floyd case, at least one of the bystanders identifies on video as a first responder and begs Mr. Kneecap to get up and check for a pulse. Not the same thing at all. Not even close.
You've been caught lying again.
And, just to make the rubble bounce.
Your own case, repeats the discussion of the denial of due-process violations, as it is an appeals court, following the original court ruling.
The original court followed the logic of DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989).
That was a case where a turd of a social worker didn't intervene in a case where a kid got beat up to the point of permanent brain damage.
To read from this appeal verbatim:
Pierce’s first theory of liability is that the Township assumed a special responsibility to assist Drummond because they placed him in custody. It is true that the DeShaney doctrine contains what has been called a “custody exception” in which “the State’s affirmative act of restraining the individual’s freedom to act on his own behalf . . . trigger[s] the protections of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 200. Different standards apply to determining whether an individual is in “custody” for Fourth Amendment purposes and for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment and DeShaney’s custody exception.
For Fourth Amendment purposes, individuals are in custody when a police officer restrains their liberty in such a way that reasonable persons would believe that they were not free to leave. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988); Ewolski v. City of Brunswick, 287 F.3d 492, 506 (6th Cir. 2002).
For purposes, however, of the Fourteenth Amendment and of DeShaney’s custody exception, custody requires that the state restrain an individual “through incarceration, institutionalization, or other similar restraint.” DeShaney, 498 U.S. at 200. DeShaney’s custody exception requires, “at a minimum—actual, physical restraint of the suspect by the police.” Cutlip v. City of Toledo, 488 F. App’x 107, 114 (6th Cir. 2012). DeShaney’s custody standard is a “difficult and more exacting standard than for a Fourth Amendment seizure.”
Id. The essential point is that, although both standards involve determining whether an individual is in “custody,” they are “legally different concepts.” Id. The mother brought suit under § 1983, alleging that the police acted recklessly and with wanton disregard to her civil rights. Id. The Supreme Court held that the Due Process Clause does not confer a right to have the State enforce a restraining order. Id. at 767–68. 9 In this case, even viewing the facts in Pierce’s favor, Drummond was not in custody for DeShaney purposes.3
He was not incarcerated, institutionalized, or subjected to “other similar restraint.” Id. Nor was he handcuffed, arrested, restrained, or even touched by the police. Drummond was incapacitated by a self-inflicted gunshot wound, and he collapsed to the ground before the officers reached him. Under these circumstances, Drummond was not in custody for DeShaney purposes
So in your case, the lawyer sued under the violation of the wrong Constitutional amendment for the circumstance.
But, in the case of George Floyd, the case of DeShaney's custody exception IS FULFILLED. "actual, physical restraint of the suspect by the police." Including ALL of the conditions spelled out by your appellate court: handcuffed, arrested, restrained, AND touched.
So, you pulled a case out of your ass, which applied to utterly different circumstances, and you are utterly, irretrievably, and forever WRONG.
Liar.
The case was dismissed on summary judgment for failure to state a claim. The court read the submissions, decided there was no legal case requiring a trial, and threw the plaintiff's case out.
Your insane rant loses again.
The Court wrote:
We sympathize with Drummond’s relatives, but we agree with the district court’s cogent analysis that the Township did not deprive Drummond of a constitutional right. In this case, construing the facts in the light most favorable to Pierce, Springfield Township did not violate Drummond’s rights under the Due Process Clause. Because Pierce fails to state a claim under § 1983, we agree with the district court’s reasoning and AFFIRM its judgment
Merritt, J., concurring wrote:
I think it is better to conceptualize the case as one in which the police had custody and a duty to act without “deliberate indifference” to Drummond’s medical needs. The standard of “deliberate indifference” is explained in Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). In light of the caution the situation required and the obvious medical attention needed, the police acted without “deliberate indifference” in calling for an ambulance which came immediately. Given the specific facts of this case, I cannot see how the police could be at fault in their conduct in briefly maintaining the status quo while the ambulance was on its way.
It should be noted that your obtuse attempt to introduce an element of qualified immunity, you are once again reminded that qualified immuity only applies to CIVIL cases.
I can't decide whether to water you or spray you with RoundUp.