Also see Post 14 - http://freerepublic.com/focus/f-bloggers/3844781/posts
. Good lead... thanks
On April 5, 2016, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (the D.C. Circuit) overturned the decision of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia (the District Court) in United States v. Fokker Services B.V., finding that the requirement of court approval to exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act does not grant judges the authority “to second-guess the Executive’s exercise of discretion over the initiation and dismissal of criminal charges.”1 The District Court opinion had provoked considerable interest from both prosecutors and the defense bar, raising questions over the interplay between prosecutorial discretion and judicial review of criminal settlements. In finding the District Court had overstepped its authority, the D.C. Circuit confirmed that charging decisions (as opposed to sentencing) are firmly within the purview of the executive branch, and that deferred prosecution agreements concern the core prosecutorial decisions about what charges to bring and, if brought, whether to dismiss them. https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2016/04/dc-circuit-affirms-primacy-of-prosecutorial-discre
United States v. Fokker Servs. BV, No. 15-3016
Fokkering Judge Sullivan.
The problem is that this isn't a charging decision because he already has been convicted. At this point, it's at sentencing. And Rule 48(b) changed the common law rule that the government could nolle pros without leave of court.
It's not clear cut either way.