Posted on 08/13/2019 1:54:22 PM PDT by SeekAndFind
The crisis in Hong Kong appears to be careening towards a devastating climax. With China’s government now using rhetoric reminiscent of what preceded the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters – and, indeed, its democracy – could well be in grave danger.
For more than two months, Hong Kong has been beset by protests. Triggered by a proposed law to allow the extradition of criminal suspects to mainland China, the demonstrations have since developed into broader calls to safeguard – or, perhaps more accurately, restore – the semi-autonomous territory’s democracy, including by strengthening state (especially police) accountability.
As the unrest drags on, the Chinese government’s patience is wearing thin – and its warnings are growing more ominous.
The People’s Liberation Army garrison in Hong Kong is, in the words of its commander Chen Daoxiang, “determined to protect national sovereignty, security, stability, and the prosperity of Hong Kong”. To drive the point home, a promotional video showing Chinese military officers in action was released along with the statement.
Yang Guang, a spokesperson for the Chinese government’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, has echoed this sentiment, warning the protesters – whom he calls “criminals” – not to “take restraint for weakness”. He then reiterated the government’s “firm resolve” to “safeguard the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong”.
Chinese soldiers take part in a drill open to the public at the Stonecutters Island naval base in Hong Kong on June 30, to mark the 22nd anniversary of the handover of Hong Kong.
The crisis in Hong Kong appears to be careening towards a devastating climax. With China’s government now using rhetoric reminiscent of what preceded the Tiananmen Square massacre in June 1989, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters – and, indeed, its democracy – could well be in grave danger. For more than two months, Hong Kong has been beset by protests. Triggered by a proposed law to allow the extradition of criminal suspects to mainland China, the demonstrations have since developed into broader calls to safeguard – or, perhaps more accurately, restore – the semi-autonomous territory’s democracy, including by strengthening state (especially police) accountability. As the unrest drags on, the Chinese government’s patience is wearing thin – and its warnings are growing more ominous. The People’s Liberation Army garrison in Hong Kong is, in the words of its commander Chen Daoxiang, “determined to protect national sovereignty, security, stability, and the prosperity of Hong Kong”. To drive the point home, a promotional video showing Chinese military officers in action was released along with the statement. Yang Guang, a spokesperson for the Chinese government’s Hong Kong and Macau Affairs Office, has echoed this sentiment, warning the protesters – whom he calls “criminals” – not to “take restraint for weakness”. He then reiterated the government’s “firm resolve” to “safeguard the prosperity and stability of Hong Kong”.
Zhang Xiaoming, the director of the office, then took matters a step further, declaring that China’s government “has sufficient methods and enough powerful means to quell all sorts of likely unrest”. This came just two months after China’s defence minister argued that China’s stability since the Tiananmen crackdown proved that the government had made the “correct” choice.
Increasingly harsh warnings against Hong Kong’s protesters point not just to a hardening of positions, but also to the ascendance of figures in the Chinese government who favour asserting total control over the territory. And they have been reflected in the response from the police, which has been deploying rubber bullets and tear gas with rising frequency. Hundreds have been arrested, and 44 have been charged with rioting.
Yet, far from being deterred, the protesters are challenging the Chinese government with increasing resolve. In July, they vandalised the outside of the Chinese government’s liaison office in the city centre. Last week, they mounted a general strike that nearly paralysed the city, one of Asia’s most important commercial hubs.
Perhaps counter-intuitively, this radicalisation has come alongside broadening support for the movement, with members of the middle class – such as lawyers and civil servants – openly joining the cause.
With their stark warnings having no effect, China’s leaders may well be sensing that the best – or even the only – way to restore their authority in Hong Kong is by force, though President Xi Jinping may wait until after the celebrations for the 70th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic on October 1 to act. But, whether now or in two months, a Tiananmen-style crackdown is not the answer.
For starters, Hong Kong’s 31,000-strong police force is not up to the task of carrying out such a crackdown. Not only does it lack the manpower; its officers may refuse to use deadly force. After all, there is a big difference between firing rubber bullets at a crowd and murdering civilians.
This means that China would have to deploy the PLA garrison or transfer tens of thousands of paramilitary soldiers (the People’s Armed Police) from the mainland.
Hong Kong’s residents would almost certainly treat Chinese government forces as invaders, and mount the fiercest possible resistance. The resulting clashes – which would likely produce high numbers of civilian casualties – would mark the official end of the “one country, two systems” arrangement, with China’s government forced to assert direct and full control over Hong Kong’s administration.
With the Hong Kong government’s legitimacy destroyed, the city would instantly become ungovernable. Civil servants would quit their jobs in droves, and the public would continue to resist. Hong Kong’s complex transit, communications, and logistics systems would prove easy targets for defiant locals determined to cause major disruptions.
After the Tiananmen crackdown, the Communist Party’s ability to reinstitute control rested not only on the presence of tens of thousands of PLA troops, but also on the mobilisation of the party’s members. In Hong Kong, where the party has only a limited organisational presence (officially, it claims to have none at all), this would be impossible.
And because the vast majority of Hong Kong’s residents are employed by private businesses, China cannot control them as easily as mainlanders who depend on the state for their livelihoods.
The economic consequences of such an approach would be dire. Some Communist Party leaders may think that Hong Kong, which now accounts for only 3 per cent of Chinese GDP, is economically expendable. But the city’s world-class legal and logistical services and sophisticated financial markets, which channel foreign capital into China, mean that its value vastly exceeds its output.
If Chinese soldiers storm the city, an immediate exodus of expats and elites with foreign passports and green cards will follow, and Western businesses will relocate en masse to other Asian commercial hubs. Hong Kong’s economy – a critical bridge between China and the rest of the world – would almost instantly collapse.
When there are no good options, leaders must choose the least bad one. China’s government may loathe the idea of making concessions to the Hong Kong protesters, but considering the catastrophic consequences of a military crackdown, that is what it must do.
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Minxin Pei, a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and the author of China’s Crony Capitalism, is the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in US-China Relations. Copyright: Project Syndicate
China is a communist country. And rules just like any historical communist country has.
That currently has/will throw millions of people into brutal “camps” or “jails” if they don’t think they have the correct attitudes (Uighurs, Christians and Falun Gong).
That has massacred tens of thousands of peaceful protesters to restore order (just like in Tiananmen Square).
That no country in world will do more than verbally protest no matter what they do (China ain’t no Syria or Libya).
How EXACTLY would you think this will end?
Minxin Pei has been in the U.S. too long. She’s looking at China and seeing unicorns.
The PLA will do what it likes.
She did a fine job of laying out the bad options for China.
A direct invasion by the PLA will have all the negative consequences she laid out and will wreck the Chinese economy. That will be the end of their special status and a great decrease in foreign investment.
I expect a long war of attrition, with the screws tightening. I expect them to conduct a propaganda war against the protesters and make them the bad guys.
I don’t expect a direct attack by the PLA.
We will see if China can be smarter than its reactionary, distant, bureaucratic, simplistic and violent Communist DNA usually allows. I doubt it.
There’s no immediate way out of this for China, but if they are smart, they will pay a long game. This present small core of protestors, who have no clear demands, and who are shutting down the subway, airport, downtown, etc...have begun turning average HK people against them.
Shouldn't we be doing the same? Shouldn't we be flooding the world press with urgent calls for restraint the way we do when non-Communist governments are doing bad things? We *know* they will ignore it, so we will make them wreck their PR standing globally and (hopefully) internally weaken them as well.
There’s no immediate way out of this for China, but if they are smart, they will pay a long game.
YES!
Remember the Occupy Wall Street went on for a month or more!
How long the pipeline protests?
Starve them out.
If they had any sense, they would simply say that extradition treaty is dead... or limit it to only murder cases maybe.
This article indicates 2 million of 7 million participated. hardly a small core:
But it’s Breitbart.
Early on the protests were in the 150k range. Still a decent percentage of the population at over 2%. From the NYT and not a “small core”.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/20/world/asia/hong-kong-protest-size.html
Some historical tracking of the size: https://www.statista.com/chart/18953/facts-figures-hong-kong-protests/
The photos show a much different story then a “small core”
Really wish there were a way to directly invest in Singapore. They are most likely to benefit from a HK downturn should the commies make the move.
Excellent recommendation - thank you!
2 million people (by some estimates) came out on Sunday, June 16 (a day off work) against the Extradition Bill being proposed to the HK Legislative Council. Shortly afterwards, HK Chief Executive declared the bill "dead."
Protests ended for a period, and then began again, in much smaller numbers and in different areas (of course, anything is smaller than 2 million) seeking to disrupt - the HK cross Island tunnel, Central, subway stations, and now - the airport.
You make a big mistake conflating the average HK person's wariness of China and strong opposition to the Extradition Bill, or previously the "Sedition Law" - and the phenomenon of several thousands of protestors shutting down HK's public transport infrastructure. I am familiar with the place - these core protestors are quickly burning through the previously deep supplies of public goodwill.
In the end, Beijing does not care about the economic ramifications, only about the control and survival of the Communist Party.
Isn’t Minxin Pei, a mainland name?
Hongkong is not the mainland.
I strongly advocate them, to stand down.
... a professor of government at Claremont McKenna College and the author of China’s Crony Capitalism, is the inaugural Library of Congress Chair in US-China Relations.
I don't know where she came from originally but I would guess she's lived in the USA for quite some time.
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