Most especially with one particular Southerner, named Jefferson Davis.
Even in 1864, when defense would seem paramount, Davis selected "RE Lee, Jr." -- John Bell Hood -- as the most aggressive leader he could find to replaced the more cautious Johnson in Georgia.
Davis's vision was for Hood to defeat Thomas at Nashville, then March North to take... (wait for it)... Chicago!
Rockingham: "...while the weight of resources made an eventual Union victory seem inevitable given enough time."
Well... I'd say, before Grant took over in the East there was nothing, zero, "inevitable" about Union victory.
Lincoln's generals had all demonstrated they didn't understand the concept of "winning".
They acted as if they thought fighting Confederates to a stalemate, that was winning enough, then McClellan could be President in 1865 and strike a deal.
I think absent Grant, that's just what would happen.
Rockingham: "The best chances for the Confederacy thus were foreign intervention or the election of a peace candidate like McClellan."
Both of which were more likely had battle results been less favorable to the UNion.
-—Well... I’d say, before Grant took over in the East there was nothing, zero, “inevitable” about Union victory.-—
Right. The whole strategy for a force with inferior numbers in men, material and resources is to fight long enough so that the superior force gets tired of expending blood and treasure, just wants it to end, and is willing to quit or negotiate.
You can argue that something like this worked successfully in both the American Revolution and Viet Nam.