North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say

NYT ^ | AUG. 14, 2017 | WILLIAM J. BROAD and DAVID E. SANGER

[TigerLikesRooster]

North Korea’s Missile Success Is Linked to Ukrainian Plant, Investigators Say

North Korea’s success in testing an intercontinental ballistic missile that appears able to reach the United States was made possible by black-market purchases of powerful rocket engines probably from a Ukrainian factory with historical ties to Russia’s missile program, according to an expert analysis being published Monday and classified assessments by American intelligence agencies.

The studies may solve the mystery of how North Korea began succeeding so suddenly after a string of fiery missile failures, some of which may have been caused by American sabotage of its supply chains and cyberattacks on its launches. After those failures, the North changed designs and suppliers in the past two years, according to a new study by Michael Elleman, a missile expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

[TigerLikesRooster]

Link to the report quoted in the article:

The secret to North Korea’s ICBM success

How has North Korea managed to make such astounding progress with its long-range missile programme over the last two years? Here, Michael Elleman shares the first solid evidence that North Korea has acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine from illicit networks in Russia and Ukraine.

Date: 14 August 2017

By Michael Elleman, Senior Fellow for Missile Defence

North Korea’s missile programme has made astounding strides over the past two years. An arsenal that had been based on short- and medium-range missiles along with an intermediate-range Musudan that repeatedly failed flight tests, has suddenly been supplemented by two new missiles: the intermediate-range Hwasong-12 and the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), Hwasong-14. No other country has transitioned from a medium-range capability to an ICBM in such a short time. What explains this rapid progression? The answer is simple. North Korea has acquired a high-performance liquid-propellant engine (LPE) from a foreign source.

Available evidence clearly indicates that the LPE is based on the Soviet RD-250 family of engines, and has been modified to operate as the boosting force for the Hwasong-12 and -14. An unknown number of these engines were probably acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine. North Korea’s need for an alternative to the failing Musudan and the recent appearance of the RD-250 engine along with other evidence, suggests the transfers occurred within the past two years.

Tests reveal recent technical gains

North Korea ground tested a large LPE in September 2016, which it claimed could generate 80 tonnes’ thrust. The same LPE was again ground tested in March 2017. This test included four smaller, steering engines. On 14 May 2017, with Kim Jong-un overseeing test preparations, North Korea launched a new intermediate-range ballistic missile, the Hwasong-12. The single-stage missile flew on a very steep trajectory, reaching a peak altitude of over 2,000km. If the Hwasong-12 had used a normal flight path, it would have travelled between 4,000 and 4,500km, placing Guam, just 3,400km away, within range.

The success of the Hwasong-12 flight in May gave North Korean engineers the confidence needed to pursue a more ambitious goal: the initial flight testing of a two-stage missile capable of reaching the continental United States. Less than two months after the Hwasong-12 test, the two-stage Hwasong-14 was launched on 4 July. A second Hwasong-14 was tested on 28 July. The Hwasong-14 launches flew on very steep flight paths, with the first shot reaching an apogee of 2,700km. The second test peaked at about 3,800km.

North Korea’s announced results were independently confirmed by the Republic of Korea, Japan and US. In both tests, the mock warheads plummeted towards the East Sea, 900–1,000km from the launch point. If flown on a trajectory that maximises range instead of peak altitude, the two missiles would have reached about 7,000km and 9,000km respectively, well exceeding the 5,500km minimum distance for a system to be categorised as an ICBM.

The dimensions and visible features of the Hwasong-12 indicate an overall mass of between 24,000 and 25,000kg. The Hwasong-12’s acceleration at lift-off, as determined by the launch video aired by KCNA, is about 8.5 to 9.0m/s2. Assuming North Korea did not manipulate the launch video, the thrust generated by the Hwasong-12’s complete engine assembly is between 45 and 47 tonnes’ thrust; the main engine contributes between 39 to 41 tonnes’ force, and the auxiliary engines about 6 tonnes’ force. The Hwasong-14 has an estimated mass of 33,000–34,000kg, and an initial acceleration rate of about 4–4.5m/s2, resulting in a total thrust of 46–48 tonnes’ force.

/skipped

[gaijin]

Excellent reporting !

better than MSM journalists by a mile.

thank you!

[mad_as_he$$]

Nice find. Thanks for posting.

[minnesota_bound]

So it’s the Russians.... again.

[Army Air Corps]

Ping.

[GOPJ]

...acquired though illicit channels operating in Russia and/or Ukraine.

Claims that the LPE is a North Korean product would be more believable if the country’s experts had in the recent past developed and tested a series of smaller, less powerful engines, but there are no reports of such activities.

Time to call Putin in for a chat...maybe Mar a largo for dinner?

[Rashputin]

These engines were, and still are, made in Ukraine, not Russia.

Whatever oligarch controls the plant that makes them decides who to sell them to, not the so-called government in Kiev.

It's not"the Russians" again, it's the use getting blow-back from it's own actions . . . . again.

[mvonfr]

These engines were, and still are, made in Ukraine, not Russia.

Uzhmash specifically.

Question #1: if this a Poroshenko operation, it is OK?

Question #2: if this was a join Poroshenko/CIA operation, is it still OK?

Question #3: if this leads to NK nukes hitting continental US, is it still OK?

Regardless of the answers, it is all Putin's and Trump's fault.

[Rockitz]

I wonder how many deliveries they have made and if they are passed through an intermediary like China? If we can shut of that supply then we may only have to take out a few dozen units, then this fledgling NorKo capability may die on the vine.

[Rockitz]

It may actually be cheaper to buy Yuzhmash production of the RD-250 and use it on a cheap target vehicle for missle defense so that NorKo doesn’t get it, than anything else the DOD is contemplating.

[TigerLikesRooster]

It seems increasingly clear that their sudden leap in missile technology is a fraud, which I suspected. I wasn't sure where new rocket engines came from. So, they are made by Ukrainian factories, but there is still the question of who delivered from which warehouse as this article says. Directly from Ukraine or somebody else’s inventory? Did Russian or Chinese government know about it before engines turn up in N. Korea or after?

[nuconvert]

thanks

[blackpacific]

I was thinking that the recent rapid rise of DPRK missile techology was not their own, potentially a showcasing of Chinese capabilities both on road mobile land launchers and submarine class.

Excellent and insightful articles. Thanks.