Posted on 07/19/2017 12:51:49 PM PDT by Lorianne
[Editors Note: Below is Thomas Joscelyns testimony before the House Homeland Security Committees Task Force on Denying Terrorists Entry into the United States. The hearing is titled, The Terrorist Diaspora: After the Fall of the Caliphate. A version with footnotes will also be posted.]
Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and other distinguished Committee Members, thank you for inviting me to testify today concerning foreign fighters and the threat some of them pose to the U.S. and Europe.
The fall of Mosul and the likely fall of Raqqa wont be the end of the Islamic State. The group has already reverted to its insurgent roots in some of the areas that have been lost. It also still controls some territory. The Islamic State will continue to function as a guerrilla army, despite suffering significant losses. In May, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) assessed that even though it was losing significant ground, the Islamic State will likely have enough resources and fighters to sustain insurgency operations and plan terrorists [sic] attacks in the region and internationally going forward. Unfortunately, I think ODNIs assessment is accurate for a number of reasons, some of which I outline below. I also discuss some hypothetical scenarios, especially with respect to returning foreign fighters or other supporters already living in Europe or the U.S.
Recent history. The Islamic States predecessor quickly recovered from its losses during the American-led surge, capitalizing on the war in Syria and a politically poisonous environment in Iraq to rebound. Indeed, Abu Bakr al Baghdadis organization grew into an international phenomenon by the end of 2014, just three years after the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq was completed. Baghdadis men did this while defying al Qaedas leaders and competing with rival jihadist groups. This recent history should give us pause any time we hear rhetoric that sounds too optimistic about the end of the Islamic States caliphate. The enterprise has had enough resources at its disposal to challenge multiple actors for more than three years. There is no question that the Islamic States finances, senior personnel, and other assets have been hit hard. But it is premature to say its losses amount to a deathblow.
Uncertainty regarding size of total membership. While it is no longer at the peak of its power, the Islamic State likely still has thousands of dedicated members. We dont even really know how many members it has Iraq and Syria, let alone around the globe. Previous U.S. estimates almost certainly undercounted the groups ranks. In September 2014, at the beginning of the US-led air campaign, the CIA reportedly estimated that the Islamic State could muster between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters. This figure was more than three times the previous estimates, CNN noted. By December 2016, the U.S. military was estimating that 50,000 Islamic State fighters had been killed. By February 2017, U.S. Special Operations command concluded that more than 60,000 jihadists had perished. Two months later, in April 2017, the Pentagon reportedly estimated that 70,000 Islamic State fighters had been killed.
Taken at face value, these figures (beginning with the September 2014 approximation) would suggest that Abu Bakr al Baghdadis enterprise was able to replace its entire force structure more than two times over, while fighting multiple enemies on numerous fronts. This is, of course, highly unlikely. Even with its prolific recruiting campaign, it would be impossible for any cohesive fighting organization, let alone one under the sustained pressure faced by the Islamic State, to train, equip and deploy fighters this quickly. It is far more likely that the U.S. never had a good handle on how many jihadists are in its ranks and the casualty figures are guesstimates. The purpose of citing these figures is not to re-litigate the past, but instead to sound a cautionary alarm regarding the near-future: We likely do not even know how many members the Islamic State has in Iraq and Syria today.
The Islamic State is an international organization. Since November 2014, when Abu Bakr al Baghdadi first announced the establishment of provinces around the globe, the Islamic States membership grew outside of Iraq and Syria. This further complicates any effort to estimate its overall size. Some of these provinces were nothing more than small terror networks, while others evolved into capable insurgency organizations in their own right. The Libyan branch of the caliphate temporarily controlled the city of Sirte. Although the jihadists were ejected from their Mediterranean abode by the end of 2016, they still have some forces inside the country. Similarly, Wilayah Khorasan (or Khorasan province), which represents the caliphate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, seized upwards of ten districts in Afghanistan as of early 2016, but has since lost ground. More recently, jihadists in the Philippines seized much of Marawi, hoisting the Islamic States black banner over the city. Wilayah Sinai controls at least some turf, and is able launch spectacular attacks on security forces. It was responsible for downing a Russian airliner in October 2015. Other provinces exist in East Africa, West Africa, Yemen and elsewhere.
In May, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) reported that the so-called caliphate is seeking to foster interconnectedness among its global branches and networks, align their efforts to ISISs strategy, and withstand counter-ISIS efforts. Gen. John Nicholson, the commander of U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, has said that Wilayah Khorasan went through an application process and the Islamic State mothership provided it with advice, publicity, and some financial support. Although it is impossible to judge the extent of the Islamic States cohesion, as much of the data is not available, there is at least some connectivity between the groups leadership and its provinces elsewhere. This is best seen on the media side, as the organization is particularly adept at disseminating messages from around the globe in multiple languages, despite some recent hiccups in this regard.
While their fortunes may rise or fall at any given time, this global network of Islamic State provinces will remain a formidable problem for the foreseeable future. Not only are they capable of killing large numbers of people in the countries they operate in, this structure also makes tracking international terrorist travel more difficult. For instance, counterterrorism officials have tied plots in Europe to operatives in Libya.
SNIP
every last ISIS should be killed . Men , boys , women and , well ...maybe not girls ....
Imprison none . Take them out to the same ditches that they themselves filled
ISIS is an ideology
It is deeply embedded within Islam as a whole (the whole idea of one true Islamic caliphate).
“every last ISIS should be killed ... Imprison none. Take them out to the same ditches that they themselves filled”
I can’t disagree. It’s a case of removal of “root and branch”. Few may admit so but it’s what possibly awaited the Japanese people if they hadn’t surrendered in 1945.
On some backside of ISIS, I’m awaiting the overture for a Mid-East “Marshall Plan”. It’s gotta be brain-rot festering in globalist minds.
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