Not exactly. Fixed wing CAS is now an Air Force mission. Army could fly other fixed-wing, but not CAS fixed-wing.
Lessons from CAS aircraft attached to Army units was proven to be a tactical and strategic error. Fixed wing CAS can float everywhere, not limited to small ground patches of Army units.
Argument in favor of your position with counter-argument: http://warontherocks.com/2014/02/why-america-needs-an-independent-air-force/
Your premise can be reversed. Something to ponder: We need to attach the Army to the Air Force.
(Think piece found at Army Command and General Staff)
Airpower may now be the primary fire with ground forces serving as supporting fire. This is a radical departure from traditional thought. Airpower was first viewed as a primary fire by an Italian airpower theorist, Giulio Douhet. Starting in 1917, Douhet envisioned massed air attacks that would destroy an army and terrorize a nation into submission.
With today’s technology and weaponry, destroying an enemy with airpower is now a reality, and as far as terrorizing a nation, if not for the Law of Armed Conflict rightfully prohibiting indiscriminate attacks on civilians, this objective could be easily met.
Douhet suggested that airpower could be a primary fire that would be key to a successful war effort. It took nearly seventy years before he was proved correct by the role airpower played in Gulf War I.
In Gulf War I, airpower was the predominant force that ensured a quick and decisive victory. While airpower was not the sole reason for our success, it was the first time in history that airpower truly functioned as it’s own independent maneuver force, as a primary fire, with ground-based fires performing a supporting role.
The effect of strategic targeting in air campaigns can be best seen by contrasting two major Vietnam War air campaigns.
For many military planners and strategic thinkers, the Gulf War I air campaign used the lessons of Vietnam to help produce an historic air campaign plan that for the first time ever, resulted in a war where airpower was the primary fire and landpower merely played a supporting role.
Unfortunately, some of the old school ignored the strategic airpower lessons of Vietnam and Gulf War I.
During the air campaign in Kosovo, Gen Clark (USA), the combatant commander, gave his staff a specific number of targets to hit, but to what end? What was the desired effect? What was the strategic aim envisioned? Gen Clark didn’t want to be bothered, all he cared about was the number of targets on the hit-list, not the effect.
By stating his desire for a specific number of targets, Gen Clark demonstrated his ignorance about what makes airpower powerful, ignored the lessons of history, and abandoned his role in translating political objectives into strategic guidance.
Simply stated, with insightful intelligence, precise targeting, and the ability of airpower to accurately deliver all sorts of weapons effects, we now have a new weapon in our quiver. Now when the time comes to shoot, we have the airpower arrow from which to choose. It is just as lethal, if not more so in some cases, than any other military instrument. To mix metaphors, selecting which weapon to use is like deciding on which golf club to use. With the impressive ability of airpower, combined with exceptional intelligence and targeting, we now have a full golf bag. We can now break par.
And one they have repeatedly proven reluctant to do. It ain't sexy enough for the flyboys.
Army could fly other fixed-wing, but not CAS fixed-wing.
Suggest you check your facts on this one.
Something to ponder: We need to attach the Army to the Air Force.
There is not enough alcohol in the world to make that argument seem logical.
You can not destroy the enemy with air power only reduce it enough for the ground troops to move in and hold. Sandbox One and Two were both excellent examples of this.