‘Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971)
His citizenship was taken by denaturalization, not expatriation. There is a totally different line of cases dealing with expatriation.”
Your entire erroneous analysis includes trying to make fine distinctions that the law does not make.
You are trying to analyze these issues the way the law was in 1410.
The law does not separate out pigeon hole areas of the law as you imagine.
The law does not identify cases as “denaturalization” cases or something else.
You DO have to look at what the QUESTION PRESENTED was.
What the court says along the way means NOTHING, really.
The only thing that counts is the question that the court was answering, and what the answer was.
So if the court is answering the question: How much tax do you owe on selling a business?
And the court comments in the middle of that “Alaska is not really part of the United States” that comment LITERALLY MEANS NOTHING and is TOTALLY IGNORED in the interpretation of the court case.
The ONLY thing that counts is what was the question the court was asked to decide and what was the answer.
Courts do not give “advisory opinions” commenting on other topics, and if they do (they shouldn’t) advisory opinions are IGNORED as IRRELEVANT and have NO legal meaning or authority whatsoever.
In Rogers v. Bellei, you ASSUME because you want to twist the facts to fit your narrative that it has something to do with naturalization.
That is impossible. Was there a swearing in ceremony? NO! Was there a naturalization petition? NO! Did a judge administer the oath of citizenship? NO!
There was no naturalization.
3. By Italian law the plaintiff acquired Italian citizenship upon his birth in Italy. He retains that citizenship. He also acquired United States citizenship at his birth under Rev.Stat. S: 1993, as amended by the Act of May 24, 1934, S: 1, 48 Stat. 797, then in effect. ^2 That version of the statute, as does the present one, contained a residence condition applicable to a child born abroad with one alien parent. ...The application of these respective statutes to a person in plaintiff Bellei's position produces the following results:
1. Not until 1934 would that person have had any conceivable claim to United States citizenship. For more than a century and a half no statute was of assistance. Maternal citizenship afforded no benefit. One may observe, too, that if Mr. Bellei had been born in 1933, instead of in 1939, he would have no claim even today. Montana v. Kennedy, supra. ...
1. Over 70 years ago the Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Gray, reviewed and discussed early English statutes relating to rights of inheritance and of citizenship of persons born abroad of parents who were British subjects, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 668—671, 18 S.Ct. 456, 464-465, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898). The Court concluded that 'naturalization by descent' was not a common-law concept but was dependent, instead, upon statutory enactment. ...
Mr. Justice Gray has observed that the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment was 'declaratory of existing rights, and affirmative of existing law,' so far as the qualifications of being born in the United States, being naturalized in the United States, and being subject to its jurisdiction are concerned. United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S., at 688, 18 S.Ct., at 472. Then follows a most significant sentence:
'But it (the first sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment) has not touched the acquisition of citizenship by being born abroad of American parents; and has left that subject to be regulated, as it had always been, by Congress, in the exercise of the power conferred by the constitution to establish an uniform rule of naturalization.' ...
Further, it is conceded here both that Congress may withhold citizenship from persons like plaintiff Bellei and may prescribe a period of residence in the United States as a condition precedent without constitutional question. ...
Our National Legislature indulged the foreign-born child with presumptive citizenship subject to subsequent satisfaction of a reasonable residence requirement, rather than to deny him citizenship outright, as concededly it had the power to do ...
Even the dissents, which would have benefitted greatly from a position that Bellei was not natrualized, did not take that position.
This provision [1790 Act] is the earliest form of the statute under which Bellei acquired his citizenship. Its enactment as part of a 'Rule of Naturalization' shows, I think, that the First Congress conceived of this and most likely all other purely statutory grants of citizenship as forms or varieties of naturalization. However, the clearest expression of the idea that Bellei and others similarly situated should for constitutional purposes be considered as naturalized citizens is to be found in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 18 S.Ct. 456, 42 L.Ed. 890 (1898):'The fourteenth amendment of the constitution * * * contemplates two sources of citizenship, and two only,—birth and naturalization. Citizenship by naturalization can only be acquired by naturalization under the authority and in the forms of law. But citizenship by birth is established by the mere fact of birth under the circumstances defined in the constitution. Every person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, becomes at once a citizen of the United States, and needs no naturalization. A person born out of the jurisdiction of the United States can only become a citizen by being naturalized, either by treaty, as in the case of the annexation of foreign territory; or by authority of congress, exercised either by declaring certain classes of persons to be citizens, as in the enactments conferring citizenship upon foreign-born children of citizens, or by enabling foreigners individually to become citizens by proceedings in the judicial tribunals, as in the ordinary provisions of the naturalization acts.' 169 U.S., at 702-703, 18 S.Ct., at 477.
Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988)
Juozas Kungys seeks our review of a judgment and opinion of the Third Circuit remanding his case for the completion of denaturalization proceedings.
Such "denaturalization" proceedings only pertain to persons who obtain citizenship by naturalization, and such cases can and do occur when the citizenship in question was conferred at birth.
A completely different line of cases, outside of denaturalization cases, exists for persons who are not naturalized, but go from "citizen" to "not citizen." Just for shorthand, I refer to this set as expatriation cases, although the correct use of language has "denaturalization" as a subset of expatriation.
The number of errors in your contentions would make substantive rebuttal tedious. I rank you in the top ten despicable liars on FR. Congratulations!