Posted on 11/17/2014 3:08:42 AM PST by sukhoi-30mki
Automatic budget sequestration cut deeply into the U.S. Air Force’s training in 2012. Air Combat Command got just $3,1 billion—three-quarters of what it needed to fully train the thousands of pilots flying the command’s 1,600 F-15, F-16 and F-22 fighters, A-10 attack jets and B-1 bombers.
So the command did something radical—and with far-reaching consequences as American air power retools for fighting high-tech foes following more than decade bombing insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Air Combat Command stripped certain airplanes of many of their missions, thus cutting back on the number of flight hours a particular pilot needed to be officially war-ready. Air-to-air dogfighting and low-altitude maneuvering suddenly became much rarer skills.
Perhaps most interestingly, the command essentially barred F-16s—at a thousand strong, America’s most numerous fighter—from engaging any enemy jet newer than a 1970s-vintage MiG-23.
The mission cuts originated in a May 2012 conversation between four generals—ACC boss Mike Hostage, his operations director Charles Lyon, Donald Hoffman from Air Force Materiel Command and Air Mobility Command’s Raymond Johns.
Hoffman asked Hostage whether, in light of sequestration cuts, the Air Force could finally dispose of its obsolete LANTIRN infrared navigation pods and free up the related maintenance funds.
“From this initial question, a broader question emerged,” Air Combat Command recalls in its official history for 2012, a heavily-redacted copy of which War Is Boring obtained through the Freedom of Information Act.
Johns and Lyon joined the conversation. Johns wanted to retire other aging hardware to save money. Lyon’s idea was to eliminate training. Lyon proceeded to ask the generals in charge of numbered air forces—each of which usually includes several wings and potentially hundreds of planes—which “systems, skills and tactics” they though were no longer important. “For example, low-altitude weapon-delivery or low-level navigation.”
“How good do B-1 aircrews need to be at running around in formation at low altitude?” ACC vice commander Gen. William Rew asked. “They can do it, it’s challenging and it’s hard to do well. But it may not be tactically relevant.”
Based on the feedback, Air Combat Command narrowed the missions it assigns to many planes—and by extension the flying hours pilots spend preparing for those mission.
When it all shook out, Air Combat Command’s roughly 60 B-1 bombers mostly stopped flying low-level attacks—and the command’s hundreds of F-16s gave up a lot of their dogfighting responsibilities.
Block 50 pioneers The idea of changing missions to reduce training and thus save money had a precedent in Air Combat Command, the official history explains. Starting in 2011, Rew advocated reducing close-air-support training for pilots of the latest Block 50 F-16.
In Iraq and Afghanistan, Air Force fighters and bombers were spending most of their time flying slow circles at medium altitude, scanning for insurgents and bombing them with the help of controllers on the ground.
Rew, himself a former Block 50 pilot, explained that his version of the F-16 is wasted on this kind of close air support. The “Wild Weasel” Block 50s specialize in locating enemy air defenses with radar-detecting sensor pods—then destroying them with special radar-homing missiles.
“Pilots could not train to be good at everything,” the history points out. And since no other planes could handle the Wild Weasel mission, the Block 50 crews should spend less time prepping for low-intensity close air support and more time training to escort U.S. planes through heavily-defended enemy territory, Rew argued.
Especially since, after Iraq and Afghanistan, the Air Force could probably expect to face more dangerous foes. Now, the Block 50 F-16s’ mission shift—away from close air support and toward defense-suppression—also demanded their pilots spend at least some time training for air-to-air dogfighting. “The Block 50 F-16 and its pilots were unique in their capacity to serve as a dual-role escort over enemy territory in defense against ground-based and airborne threats,” the history explains.
But the brass only wanted the 1990s-vintage Block 50s tangling with “second- and third-generation adversaries”—meaning 50-year-old MiG-21 designs and MiG-23s from 1970s, respectively. Apparently, more modern MiG-29s and Su-27s were too dangerous for the Block 50s, if the American planes’ pilots were mostly focusing their training on attacking defenses on the ground.
Instead, ACC’s F-15Cs and F-22s would fly ahead to fight the MiG-29s and Su-27s. Based on that assumption, the generals also dialed back air-to-air training for F-15E fighter-bombers and older Block 30 and Block 40 F-16s.
“This particular effort did not seek to eliminate air-to-air training altogether,” the history notes. “Rather, the initiative strove for the proper mix of air-to-air and air-to-ground training.”
Meanwhile, the ACC brass consigned the B-1s to high altitude, reducing the need to train the bombers’ crews for risky low-level flying. But weirdly, bombers are usually especially vulnerable to enemy defenses when they fly high and make themselves more visible.
Likewise, in a high-intensity war, F-16 pilots could probably expect to encounter plenty of MiG-29s, Su-27s or similar fighters—whether or not the fliers had trained to battle these types.
The mission shifts might have saved the Air Force some money, but it’s not entirely clear all the shifts also helped the flying branch prepare for high-tech combat.
Remind me of US Armored doctrine of WW2 wherein US light/medium tanks were not envisioned to battle German tanks — that mission went to purpose-built tank destroyers. Of course the “enemy gets a vote” and US M4 Sherman’s frequently face German tanks, mostly with bad results for the Sherman crews.
Back in the Clinton Administration they destroyed millions of brand new in the box M-14 rifles that were in storage depots as war reserves.
The Clintonites and their tame perfumed prince Generals scoffed at the notion that these 30 year old M-14s would ever be needed for anything and ridiculed anyone who opposed Slick Willies destruction of our new in the box M-14 stockpile with the exception of a small number that the military actually “misplaced” to save them from destruction.
Fast forward to 2004 in the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan where circumstances exposed the weaknesses of the M-16 and demonstrated the desperate need for a longer range , harder hitting main battle rifle. The Army pulled all it's remaining M-14s out of storage and put them into the field saving many American soldiers lives and shortening the war .
Moral of the story is that the Perfumed prince political Generals are all to willing to do the bidding of their political patrons to the detriment of the military readiness and the safety of the AMerican people.
So tell me again how we’re supposed to fight the Russians in Europe, as the chest beaters have been demanding so loudly over Ukraine.
Then three, why the {expletive} aren't we training for these missions!? You think it is expensive? Losing the aircraft and pilot is even more expensive. If you think you can predict what the enemy will do and what we'll have to do to counter those moves you're an idiot with no appreciation of combat history, I don't care if you're a general or whatever. Sure they are expensive. That is the cost of doing business.
Pilot 1: Have enemy aircraft radar contact 100k out at 15k altitude.
Pilot 2: Confirm. Engage?
Pilot 1: Checking with command.
Pilot 2: Status?
Pilot 1: Command cannot yet verify airframe type. If they go hot closing to 90K, then we are to break off.
Pilot 2: Why?
Pilot 1: Command says the airframes are too new for us to handle. Probably ‘29s or ‘27s. F22s will handle.
Pilot 2: F-22s are still in the hanger ...
Pilot 1: Enemy at 90k hot and launching. Break off. Break off.
Pilot 2: How soon will the F-22s be airborne?
Pilot 2: Pilot 1?
Pilot 2: Pilot 1? ...
Back at Command: “Damn! We just lost two planes and two of our best trained pilots. Have those hanger queen F-22s ready to go next time!”
“But Sir, only two of them were ready to fly ... you know doctrine says we can only use the F-22s in flights of three, and cannot launch otherwise unless doctrine criteria is met.’
“Call legal and see if they can find a loop hole ... Meanwhile keep those F16s on the ground until further notice.”
Great pic! I was in the Duluth unit when this was taken. I’ve flown that exact airplane many times. That’s the little dipper on the tail with the North Star up top. MN is the North Star State.
Is it just me, or is this good news for our enemies?
5.56mm
That is interesting. We already spend on defense as much as China, Russia, Saudi Arabia, France, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and India COMBINED.
I would rather have my tax dollars in my pocket, yet we also need to stand up to Putin’s invasions and escalations, and other international responsibilities. It seems I(we) have little choice but to trust the generals to spend their hundreds of billions in the wisest ways possible, while we use congress to put pressure on making the military the best we can with the resources available.
You are correct about the relative match ups, of course. But then we don’t always get to dictate the match ups.
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