I’m not keen on illegal drugs and would probably vote to outlaw pot in my state. That said, I only support the federal drug war where it seeks to protect the nation’s borders. I agreed 100% with Justice Clarence Thomas when he supported California’s right to medical marijuana laws:
Gonzales V. Raich
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1454.ZD1.html
The federal government is way too powerful in way too many ways, the drug war being just one of them. I think the 10th Amendment is probably the only chance of preserving the union as we know it. Why? Because the people in my state have virtually nothing in common with the leftists on the coasts.
I honestly respect California’s right to create its own Marxist hell. My problem with California and the other blue states is that they aren’t content to leave me alone in my state. They seem hell bent on making all states follow their totalitarian, one world government path, something which the US Constitution clearly never intended.
Why?
Gonzales V. Raich
http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/03-1454.ZD1.html
Brilliant! Particularly section II.A:
'The majority holds that Congress may regulate intrastate cultivation and possession of medical marijuana under the Commerce Clause, because such conduct arguably has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority’s decision is further proof that the “substantial effects” test is a “rootless and malleable standard” at odds with the constitutional design. Morrison, supra, at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).
'The majority’s treatment of the substantial effects test is rootless, because it is not tethered to either the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Under the Commerce Clause, Congress may regulate interstate commerce, not activities that substantially affect interstate commerce–any more than Congress may regulate activities that do not fall within, but that affect, the subjects of its other Article I powers. Lopez, supra, at 589 (Thomas, J., concurring). Whatever additional latitude the Necessary and Proper Clause affords, supra, at 9—10, the question is whether Congress’ legislation is essential to the regulation of interstate commerce itself–not whether the legislation extends only to economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Supra, at 4; ante, at 5 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
'The majority’s treatment of the substantial effects test is malleable, because the majority expands the relevant conduct. By defining the class at a high level of generality (as the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana), the majority overlooks that individuals authorized by state law to manufacture and possess medical marijuana exert no demonstrable effect on the interstate drug market. Supra, at 7—8. The majority ignores that whether a particular activity substantially affects interstate commerce–and thus comes within Congress’ reach on the majority’s approach–can turn on a number of objective factors, like state action or features of the regulated activity itself. Ante, at 6—7 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). For instance, here, if California and other States are effectively regulating medical marijuana users, then these users have little effect on the interstate drug trade.6
'The substantial effects test is easily manipulated for another reason. This Court has never held that Congress can regulate noneconomic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. Morrison, 529 U.S., at 613 (“[T]hus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where that activity is economic in nature” (emphasis added)); Lopez, supra, at 560. To evade even that modest restriction on federal power, the majority defines economic activity in the broadest possible terms as the “ ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’ ”7 Ante, at 23 (quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 720 (1966) (hereinafter Webster’s 3d). This carves out a vast swath of activities that are subject to federal regulation. See ante, at 8—9 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). If the majority is to be taken seriously, the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees, clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a mockery of Madison’s assurance to the people of New York that the “powers delegated” to the Federal Government are “few and defined,” while those of the States are “numerous and indefinite.” The Federalist No. 45, at 313 (J. Madison).
'Moreover, even a Court interested more in the modern than the original understanding of the Constitution ought to resolve cases based on the meaning of words that are actually in the document. Congress is authorized to regulate “Commerce,” and respondents’ conduct does not qualify under any definition of that term.8 The majority’s opinion only illustrates the steady drift away from the text of the Commerce Clause. There is an inexorable expansion from “ ‘commerce,’ ” ante, at 1, to “commercial” and “economic” activity, ante, at 20, and finally to all “production, distribution, and consumption” of goods or services for which there is an “established … interstate market,” ante, at 23. Federal power expands, but never contracts, with each new locution. The majority is not interpreting the Commerce Clause, but rewriting it.
'The majority’s rewriting of the Commerce Clause seems to be rooted in the belief that, unless the Commerce Clause covers the entire web of human activity, Congress will be left powerless to regulate the national economy effectively. Ante, at 15—16; Lopez, 514 U.S., at 573—574 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The interconnectedness of economic activity is not a modern phenomenon unfamiliar to the Framers. Id., at 590—593 (Thomas, J., concurring); Letter from J. Madison to S. Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 The Founders’ Constitution 259—260 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987). Moreover, the Framers understood what the majority does not appear to fully appreciate: There is a danger to concentrating too much, as well as too little, power in the Federal Government. This Court has carefully avoided stripping Congress of its ability to regulate interstate commerce, but it has casually allowed the Federal Government to strip States of their ability to regulate intrastate commerce–not to mention a host of local activities, like mere drug possession, that are not commercial.
'One searches the Court’s opinion in vain for any hint of what aspect of American life is reserved to the States. Yet this Court knows that “ ‘[t]he Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers.’ ” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457 (1991)). That is why today’s decision will add no measure of stability to our Commerce Clause jurisprudence: This Court is willing neither to enforce limits on federal power, nor to declare the Tenth Amendment a dead letter. If stability is possible, it is only by discarding the stand-alone substantial effects test and revisiting our definition of “Commerce among the several States.” Congress may regulate interstate commerce–not things that affect it, even when summed together, unless truly “necessary and proper” to regulating interstate commerce.'