We already have a "Patrol Frigate."
It's called the "Coast Guard."
Posted on 03/29/2012 8:24:32 PM PDT by sukhoi-30mki
Industry view: Why the Navy needs a ‘Patrol Frigate’
In this commentary, Huntington-Ingalls Industries’ corporate director of customer relations, Patrick H. Stadt, makes the case for a U.S. Navy version of the company’s National Security Cutter.
The fourth of eight planned National Security Cutters is currently in production at Huntington Ingalls Industries’ Ingalls Shipbuilding in Pascagoula, Miss. The first three cutters have been delivered to the U.S. Coast Guard and are already proving themselves as highly capable, multi-mission ships.
The NSC’s capabilities not only support the traditional U.S. Coast Guard missions of search and rescue, fisheries enforcement and counter narcotic patrols, but also add national/homeland defense and support of Navy missions to the mission set. Principally designed to carry out all of those Coast Guard missions, the NSC is also highly capable today of fulfilling several missions in support of naval requirements, particularly where greater endurance and mission flexibility are key factors.
With minor configuration variations, the NSC can become a Patrol Frigate that can perform additional missions against a broad array of threats including air, submarine, and surface. As navies worldwide grapple with balancing affordability, capability, and performance, integration of Patrol Frigates into a fleet mix will efficiently and effectively capitalize on the ships’ strengths to carry out a broad range of frigate missions.
The NSC was originally designed as the replacement for the aging Hamilton class of 378-foot cutters built in the late 1960s. NSCs were first envisioned to have modern propulsion and communications systems but relatively few major differences when compared to the cutters they were replacing.
During the design spirals that refined the requirements, the terrorist attacks of 9/11 occurred, and along with the disposition of the nation, the requirements changed for the NSC. The new cutters had become much more than just replacements for the old Hamiltons.
These post-9/11 requirements for the NSC resulted in a better armed, more survivable cutter with enhanced communication and aviation capabilities. With the exception of ice operations and aids to navigation, the NSC is fully capable of carrying out all of the varied missions of the service.
Not only do they possess this multi-mission capability on every deployment, they do so independent of any other floating unit. Their 12,000 nautical mile range allows for extensive on-station operations; the optimally sized crew of 110 is trained and capable of carrying out the numerous missions while embarking only an additional six-person aviation detachment for normal ops and an additional 11 persons for wartime ops.
With a top sustained speed of 28 knots and endurance based on food stores of 60 days, the NSC is a ship capable of projecting a relevant, persistent, independent presence. Its armament is similar to the combat system suite found on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, which also includes soft kill and other electronic warfare systems. Fully interoperable with the U.S. Navy, it is also capable of underway refueling and replenishment. With this degree of flexibility and capability inherent in the NSC, it stands out as a ship that could greatly benefit navies around the globe in mission areas envisioned for small surface combatants and quickly fill the gaps caused by the decreasing numbers of frigates.
To quantify how NSC as a Patrol Frigate could be complementary to other small surface combatants, HII used a modeling and simulation program that was derived from a personnel and fuel cost evaluation tool. Prior to running any simulations, HII retained MicroSystems Integration, an established modeling and simulation company, to validate the model and its input assumptions. After minor adjustments, the model was found to be sound and useable for the purpose of analyzing various operational scenarios employing patrol frigates and small surface combatants.
For the purpose of the modeling, the 2010 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment’s paper on “Littoral Combat Ships, An Examination of its Possible Concepts of Operation” was employed to baseline the mission areas and operational scenarios. The CSBA paper was also the prime reference in “The Littoral Combat Ship and Irregular Warfare,” an article written by Capt. Robinson Harris and posted on the Second Line of Defense website on Sept. 14. The CSBA paper suggested 19 varied missions, including special forces insertion and extraction; maritime interdiction; influence/humanitarian assistance, disaster response operations, and resource protection, the last being the focus of Capt. Harris’ discussions.
MicroSystems Integration used historic U.S. Navy data from the 2010 Navy Program Guide to calculate the expected frequency for each of the 19 missions for the LCS-type ship during an average year and then assigned the preferred ship to each. The history was taken from legacy ships that now perform “LCS type” missions. Preferred ships for a given mission were determined through numerical analysis of rated parameters consisting of speed, endurance/presence, defense, small boat launch and recovery, aircraft launch and recovery, command and control, draft, and stealth. For the purpose of this analysis, the Patrol Frigate was “as built, operating independently” (equivalent to the current NSC configuration) and the LCS was “missionized, operating independently” (a blended version of the two LCSs currently in production).
The analysis determined that out of the 19 missions traditionally performed by small surface combatants, seven indicated the Patrol Frigate was the preferred ship. When compared against a non-missionized LCS, (just the seaframe, no mission systems), the Patrol Frigate was the preferred ship in 15 missions.
To compare operational costs (fuel and personnel), six modeled scenarios were run based on proposed scenarios in the CSBA paper, ranging from securing loose nuclear weapons to maritime interdiction. For those two scenarios, the Patrol Frigate reflected an operational savings of approximately 29 percent and 33 percent, respectively, when compared to an LCS-type ship. In all six scenarios (the two above and convoy protection, maritime stability operations, counter piracy/counter crime, and humanitarian assistance/disaster response), the Patrol Frigate reflected an operational savings of approximately 26 percent.
The modeling and simulation performed supports the premise that the Patrol Frigate would make an affordable and strong contribution to the low-end of a traditional threat spectrum. By constructing a mixed fleet of high-conflict and low-conflict capable ships, navies around the globe can glean significant budgetary savings while better aligning ship capability with anticipated mission scenarios.
The Patrol Frigate is an optimum balance of affordability, capability, and proven performance for low-conflict, high-endurance missions and would be a cost effective addition to combatant fleets around the world.
Read more: http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/03/28/industry-view-why-the-navy-needs-a-patrol-frigate/#ixzz1qZCMkbMd DoDBuzz.com
H-I pitches ‘Patrol Frigate’ as cheaper alternative to LCS
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2012/03/28/h-i-pitches-patrol-frigate-as-cheaper-alternative-to-lcs/
Even back in the late 90’s the CG had become the maritime equivalent of ‘jack-booted thugs’. Why give them them any more toys?
You clearly don’t live anywhere with a body of water deeper than your intellect.
“Its armament is similar to the combat system suite found on the U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships”
WOW,, so it almost has the firepower of an M-1 Tank,, and a seagoing equavalent to a smart 81mm mortar!!
Sad sad sad,,
An embarrassment,,,
It is absolutely imperative that the government buy my product. /sarc
Thanks for the post that is very interesting. How large of a crew would they carry, less then a hundred like a small DE? My other question is would they be more for short duration patrols and missions? I apologize in advance for my silly questions, but I learn so much from the articles like these.
We already have a "Patrol Frigate."
It's called the "Coast Guard."
Im sorry,, not an M-1 tank,, more like ALMOST a Sherman with its 75mm. This baby has a 57mm that can shoot 5 pounds of hot steel almost 6 miles. And if thats not enough,, it also will be mounting Griffin missiles that are high angle of attack,,and deliver a 13 lb whallop a full 3.5 miles away!
This thing is almost scary,, anywhere we sail it, that kind of power will almost be downright insulting. It’s a floating provocation!
But im sure it will preform its main mission wonderfully, successfully delivering lesbian surface warfare officers to flag rank.
Actually the NSC has much greater endurance and range than the LCS; LCS-1, at least, can’t cross the Atlantic even at normal cruise speed without refueling.
And both versions of the LCS are out of fuel almost instantly if they go to their much ballyhooed, but worthless, 40+ knot top speeds.
The article is a bit out of date in that the USCG has been cut back to 6, not 8, NSCs.
Northrop Grumman (before the Ingalls spinoff) was promoting the Patrol Frigate for 3 years; sort of odd to see this in the media as if it’s a brand new idea.
No, mate, back in 96-2000’, I lived on one of the loveliest 41’ Formosa ketches in San Diego Bay. She was the ‘Ann Marion’ and probably still was the loveliest when a couple that bought her and took her up to Marina del Rey.
And so douche bag, what do you sail, or have you sailed, not that we’re comparing dick lengths, but just curious where you’re coming off, or short.
Punk.
So hypothetically if instead of living on a nice boat in San Diego Bay, you were on a crab boat in the Bering Sea taking on water in 20 foot seas, would you call the “jack booted thugs” and what do you think they’d have to use to respond?
Just FYI the cutter in that picture is 43 years old.
Tougher, cheaper than the LCS
You obviously have no idea of the depredations the CG has imposed on innocent boaters on the West Coast going back some 10+ years.
Now, I’m not going to call you a douche bag for your opnion but is it grounded any practical experience with dealing with the CG? On the West Coast? Lately?
It’s like calling 911. Don’t unless it’s medical emergency. And even the, you don’t on which they’ll come.
Hell, in my day 4,000 tons was a Destroyer.
We need 100 of them.
Yeah, once again I posted without reading, fully and completely the article, but I wasn’t aware that was a requirement on FR.
Really didn’t like the CG back then.
Still don’t.
Still reads like a marketing projection, full of vapor-ware, “superman” capabilities and really cheap to produce and maintain!! I have been around long enough to have developed a good BS detector...
Besides, NAVSHIPS civilian engineers like to f*** with everything under their purview (job security), and drive up costs excessively while bullying contractors to absorb the additional costs for requirements changes under risk of cancellation. A-holes!
JC
Friend of mine had a very nice power boat...
Just putting around LA/LB harbor with a boat load of friends he got stopped by HP or CG (I forget & don't even know if CG can act in harbor)...
Only thing he really remembers of the encounter was the deck mounted MG manned and aiming down his throat.
I think he sold the boat and I know he shifted energies to drag racing.
He felt it was safer.
OTOH: CG did great work in Vietnam and from what I hear they are doing same over seas in the WOT etc.
The LCS (at least in LCS-1 class) is overweight and all classes are UNDERARMED. This is not peculiar to USN ships because the majority are underarmed. Part of the reason comes from the Blue Water mindset of the SWO community. The SWO community has been spoiled for years operating under the layered defense umbrella of the carrier or amphibious strike group. However, the closer you get to the shore: (1) the less standoff distance you have and (2) your reaction time decreases exponentially. {Don't believe it? Consider the USS VINCENNES (CG-49) shoot down, by accident, of the Iranian Airbus airliner during the Persian Gulf War. This is what happens when distances and reaction times are compressed.]
Quite bluntly, the SWO community hasn't figured out that Green Water (and Brown Water) operations are magnitudes more dangerous places than their experiences have taught them. If the USN gets into a shooting war in Green waters, we are going to get a lot of expensive gray ships sunk or badly damaged and take a lot of killed and wounded. I have debated this with many correspondents, both in the Navy and DoD, and we share this bleak assessment. However, at the highest levels of the Navy and DoD there is LOTS of denial.
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