Posted on 11/11/2011 11:20:49 AM PST by ravager
NEW DELHI: A set of freshly declassified top secret papers on the 1971 war show that US hostility towards India during the war with Pakistan was far more intense than known until now.
The documents reveal that Indira Gandhi went ahead with her plan to liberate Bangladesh despite inputs that the Nixon Administration had kept three battalions of Marines on standby to deter India, and that the American aircraft carrier USS Enterprise had orders to target Indian Army facilities
The bold leadership that the former PM showed during the 1971 war is well known. But the declassified documents further burnish the portrait of her courageous defiance.
The documents show how Americans held back communication regarding Pakistan's desire to surrender in Dhaka by almost a day.
That the American establishment had mobilized their 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, ostensibly to evacuate US nationals, is public knowledge. But the declassified papers show Washington had planned to use the 7th Fleet to attack the Indian Army.
They also show that Nixon administration kept arming Pakistan despite having imposed an embargo on providing both Islamabad and New Delhi military hardware and support.
They suggest that India, exasperated by continuing flow of American arms and ammunition, had considered intercepting three Pakistani vessels carrying war stores months before the war. The plan was dropped against the backdrop of the Indian foreign ministry's assessment that the interception could trigger hostilities.
The pro-Pak bias of the then US President Richard Nixon and his Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is vividly brought out by their decision to keep three battalions of Marines on standby: a decision which has so far not found mention in any record of the 1971 war.
Documents blame Richard Nixon for Pakistan tilt
A six-page note prepared by India's foreign ministry holds then American president Richard Nixon responsible for the pro-Pakistan tilt during India's 1971 war with her neighbour.
"The assessment of our embassy reveal (sic) that the decision to brand India as an 'aggressor' and to send the 7th Fleet to the Bay of Bengal was taken personally by Nixon," says the note. The note further says, the Indian embassy: "feel (sic) that the bomber force aboard the Enterprise had the US President's authority to undertake bombing of Indian Army's communications, if necessary." As early as June 1971, New Delhi weighed the possibility of intercepting three Pakistani ships loaded with US weapons. This leaves only two other courses regarding interception: That India may intercept the ships before they reach Karachi, or impose a blockade of the Bay of Bengal. Either of these might involve the use of force and would be treated as acts of war, wrote the director (legal and treaties) of MEA.
On December 14, Gen A A K Niazi, Pakistan's military commander for erstwhile East Pakistan, told the American consul-general in Dhaka that he was willing to surrender. The message was relayed to Washington, but it took the US 19 hours to relay it to New Delhi. Files suggest senior Indian diplomats suspected the delay was because Washington was possibly contemplating military action against India.
That’s interesting. Nixon thought he only needed three battalions.
Yes it is. And India had more then a million strong army.
Without reading the documents directly, we are left with individuals’ interpretations of the purpose, and the extent of the purpose of various policies, just as we are left not knowing - from the actual documents - what, if any, was the necessary context for any certain possible U.S. action to move from a possibility to a reality.
I doubt the policies of the Nixon administration were as much pro-Pakistan and anti-India during the 1971 conflict as they were desirous of “keeping the status-quo-ante” in the region.
The entire cold-war era was dominated by keeping “the balance of power” in most regions in the world.
India at the time insisted on the pretenses of the “non-aligned” movement, of which it was a leader; while the U.S. knew the “non-aligned” movement was spearheaded by Soviet influences and it’s purpose was not that certain nations would be “non-aligned” but in fact simply to assure they would be NOT ALIGNED with the U.S. The Soviets became India’s biggest arms supplier during that era of “non-alignment”.
In spite of all that, the U.S. was still more concerned that the balance of power between India and Pakistan not be upset, not go down to total war with each other, not result in one or the other being so threatened that such a war would ensue. No doubt some of what the U.S. was doing may have looked to some Indian’s as a threat to them, but I doubt that was the greater part of U.S. intentions.
This may be supported as more true than the Times of India (and many Indians) would like to admit, in as much as many of the thought to be possible actions by the U.S., against India, never actually took place, in the end.
Again, I suspect that is due to the fact that such possibilities were not open-ended possibilities but depended on the context, particularly was the status-quo-ante in the region in danger.
Indian-Soviet ties were very close back then. Talk to any Indian engineer or software consultant over age 50 and the odds are pretty good he did some graduate studies in the USSR.
From Indian POV NAM was not meant to be anti-American organization (even though later on India herself turned very anti-US for obvious reasons). India was a young nation that barely shook off the yolk of centuries of colonization by the West (experienced a painful partition with Pakistan) and did not want turn into another cold war hot bed like Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. India genuinely wanted to keep both superpowers at bay without antagonizing either. It didn't quite work out. From Indian perspective, America had an exaggerated sense of righteousness that US represented the free world and every country must join her lead. Nothing wrong with that, except India (and countries following India's lead)just wanted to stay out of it. And that caused enormous chagrin for the US.
As for “keeping the status-quo-ante” in the region.....status quo itself was the problem for India. You forget that in 1971 Pakistan with US arms and financial aid started a mass genocide in East Pakistan. 10 million refugees poured into India (India herself was grappling famine and massive poverty about the time). According to Indian government estimates it was cheaper to fight a war then to let another 10 million refugees come in. Status-quo was unacceptable to India. Besides for India there was no such thing as “status-quo” or “balance of power”; It was already upset with American involvement and large arms supply and financial aid to the Pakistani military junta. It was only a matter of time after which they initiated a war against India.
As for US military intervention not taking place....there are a lot of factors to consider such as Leonid Brezhnev threatening Nixon. Indo-Soviet friendship treaty would have got Soviet directly involved in the war in case of US military invasion on India. Secondly US military was already overstretched and losing the fight in Vietnam. Very unlikely they would initiate hostilities against a larger country like India with growing opposition to war back home. Lastly Indian military action was swift and decisive, it did not give any window of opportunity to US to hold off or retaliate against Indian forces.
And my personal opinion would be.... somewhere inside Nixon knew India was doing the right thing by coming to the aid of the Bengalis being massacred by Pakistan so he never made any wrong move. He just didn’t like the idea that this wasn’t happening under US auspices. He didn’t like the idea of losing to a woman from the third world. And he didn’t like seeing his ally’s ass being kicked right under his nose.
Those three USMC battalions, with naval air support, could have done some serious damage to the Indian miitary.
But in the end, though, it would have ended like Vietnam...
And whose client was Pakistan? Their primary allegiance was to China, not the US.
About liberation working for Bangladesh, it’s considered a success story given its history compared to most Muslim nations. Besides if it weren’t for 1971, the world would have to deal with two Pakistans, one of them with nukes pointed as far as Singapore and Sydney.
Chinese intervention (which was expected) on behalf of Pakistan would have crippled India.
http://www.hindu.com/2007/07/02/stories/2007070258901600.htm
I hope you know that the Indian army reached as far as Lahore in 1965 so that’s butt could be handed over to it!! And this was after the Pakis had invaded Kashmir.
You are confusing Kissinger with Alexander Haig.
You do know that the Soviets had a submarine task force trailing the Enterprise during the time the Carrier task force was in the Bay of Bengal right? An attack by the US would have resulted in apocalypse as the Soviets would have gotten involved. Why do you think China never got involved, though its ally was being split into two?
Nixon was just an egomaniac who couldn’t take the fact that Gandhi didnt give two hoots about what he thought of the status-quo/balance of power etc etc between India & Pakistan.
The person who told me the story said Kissinger buthe could have been wrong.
Nope, didn’t know that.
In that case, it would have ended far worse than Vietnam!
3 battalions would have would have gone home in caskets. Imagine Vietnam..... multiplied by 10. A 700,000 strong Pak army lost withing 18 days. 3 USMC battalions would have done better? Kissinger (and Nixon) knew the odds and were wise enough not to make any disastrous move.
“He just didn’t like the idea that this wasn’t happening under US auspices. He didn’t like the idea of losing to a woman from the third world. And he didn’t like seeing his ally’s ass being kicked right under his nose.”
Too much armchair pyshcobabble and too few facts, including too few facts concerning actual foreign policy positions of the Nixon administration.
“From Indian POV NAM was not meant to be anti-American organization (even though later on India herself turned very anti-US for obvious reasons).”
That’s like joining a secret society and naively believing that your joining serve’s YOUR purposes, and not those who founded the society and pull it’s levers (behind the scenes); those who benefited in their agenda by you joining, far beyond any direct benefit (other than benefiting your fantasies) to yourself.
“India was a young nation that barely shook off the yolk of centuries of colonization by the West (experienced a painful partition with Pakistan) and did not want turn into another cold war hot bed like Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan.”
India was not colonized “by the West”; she was colonized by Great Britain.
The cold-war “hot bed” contexts of Korea or Vietnam had no parallels with, or in India; thus one should either doubt India felt concerns for possibilities for which she had no similar context, or if she did she was believing in a phantom and if she was believing in that phantom she was getting lots of help and influence for such beliefs from both China and the Soviet Union; and domestic political sources influenced by/aligned with them.
If anything, India was simply playing geopolitical realpolitic - playing one (or more) foreign power off against another; for her own totally domestic self-interest, a self-interest based on her needs and not on phantom - non-existent - threats from the U.S. (or even from Britain after Independence).
“3 USMC battalions would have done better? “
They would have given a world of hurt to the Indians, but ultimately been finished off. Vietnam X 10 indeed.
Why Nixon thought he needed only 3 battalions...? And why attack India anyway?
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