From Indian POV NAM was not meant to be anti-American organization (even though later on India herself turned very anti-US for obvious reasons). India was a young nation that barely shook off the yolk of centuries of colonization by the West (experienced a painful partition with Pakistan) and did not want turn into another cold war hot bed like Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan. India genuinely wanted to keep both superpowers at bay without antagonizing either. It didn't quite work out. From Indian perspective, America had an exaggerated sense of righteousness that US represented the free world and every country must join her lead. Nothing wrong with that, except India (and countries following India's lead)just wanted to stay out of it. And that caused enormous chagrin for the US.
As for “keeping the status-quo-ante” in the region.....status quo itself was the problem for India. You forget that in 1971 Pakistan with US arms and financial aid started a mass genocide in East Pakistan. 10 million refugees poured into India (India herself was grappling famine and massive poverty about the time). According to Indian government estimates it was cheaper to fight a war then to let another 10 million refugees come in. Status-quo was unacceptable to India. Besides for India there was no such thing as “status-quo” or “balance of power”; It was already upset with American involvement and large arms supply and financial aid to the Pakistani military junta. It was only a matter of time after which they initiated a war against India.
As for US military intervention not taking place....there are a lot of factors to consider such as Leonid Brezhnev threatening Nixon. Indo-Soviet friendship treaty would have got Soviet directly involved in the war in case of US military invasion on India. Secondly US military was already overstretched and losing the fight in Vietnam. Very unlikely they would initiate hostilities against a larger country like India with growing opposition to war back home. Lastly Indian military action was swift and decisive, it did not give any window of opportunity to US to hold off or retaliate against Indian forces.
“From Indian POV NAM was not meant to be anti-American organization (even though later on India herself turned very anti-US for obvious reasons).”
That’s like joining a secret society and naively believing that your joining serve’s YOUR purposes, and not those who founded the society and pull it’s levers (behind the scenes); those who benefited in their agenda by you joining, far beyond any direct benefit (other than benefiting your fantasies) to yourself.
“India was a young nation that barely shook off the yolk of centuries of colonization by the West (experienced a painful partition with Pakistan) and did not want turn into another cold war hot bed like Korea, Vietnam or Afghanistan.”
India was not colonized “by the West”; she was colonized by Great Britain.
The cold-war “hot bed” contexts of Korea or Vietnam had no parallels with, or in India; thus one should either doubt India felt concerns for possibilities for which she had no similar context, or if she did she was believing in a phantom and if she was believing in that phantom she was getting lots of help and influence for such beliefs from both China and the Soviet Union; and domestic political sources influenced by/aligned with them.
If anything, India was simply playing geopolitical realpolitic - playing one (or more) foreign power off against another; for her own totally domestic self-interest, a self-interest based on her needs and not on phantom - non-existent - threats from the U.S. (or even from Britain after Independence).
“India genuinely wanted to keep both superpowers at bay without antagonizing either. It didn’t quite work out.”
One of the key reasons it did not work out was:
because the “non-aligned movement” continued to serve the purposes of it’s Soviet designers, which was not “non-alignment” but “NOT alignment with the U.S.”;
because the “non-aligned movement” continued to serve the purpose of its Soviet designers, which was as an “anti-U.S. movement”;
because the “non-aligned movement” continued to serve its intended purpose, as a tool of (aligned with) Soviet foreign policy aims.
“From Indian perspective, America had an exaggerated sense of righteousness that US represented the free world and every country must join her lead. Nothing wrong with that, except India (and countries following India’s lead)just wanted to stay out of it. And that caused enormous chagrin for the US.”
America’s sense of its place in the world was not exaggerated (1945-1989); it was handed its place by what remained after WWI and WWII, and its “lead” was never about itself; its “lead” was about its senior role in the partnerships of nations that shared its values; nations it had rescued from war, nations it had subdued in war and reformed in its aftermath, nations seeking to build on the same paths of essential freedoms, democracy and free enterprise.
The U.S. was never chagrined by India wanting to chart its own path; a “separate” path.
The U.S. WAS often chagrined by India taking a simplistic view (”correct view “ by Soviet terms) that taking a separate path required taking a path always contrary to the U.S.; as if simply and always being contrary to the U.S. was an essential to being “separate” (not alone in this and often acting as part of the political correctness that dominated the “non-aligned movement”). It was not a “separate” path, but one enjoyed by many and celebrated for the mere fact that it was “anti-American”.
A right idea (a ‘separate path’) based on all the wrong reasons (simply to be contrary to the U.S.) leads to many partnerships with phony allies who share nothing with your essential interests other than that they too are “anti-American”.
It hurt India far more than the U.S., by keeping Indian foreign policy locked in simple anti-Americanism for no good purpose.
Yet, anyone being honest with themselves, then or now, know that it was never U.S. intentions that its aid to Pakistan be used to suppress the separatist movement in East Pakistan in the brutal manner as was done by Pakistan; and, in another matter of honesty, those who knew the situation at time know that India was not 100% absent when it comes to the formation of the desires of East Pakistan to be independent.
“Status-quo was unacceptable to India.”
The status-quo ante I am referring to was simply the status-quo ante of the essential balance of power on the subcontinent; that neither Pakistan or India would think itself so all-powerful (and the other so terribly weak) as to attempt to initiate all-out war with the other.
The refugee issue during the East Pakistan-West Pakistan conflict, and even the Kashmir issue, were flash-points that could (and were) contained or resolved, even if some conflict was involved, without the general balance of power being undone.
“As for US military intervention not taking place....there are a lot of factors to consider such as Leonid Brezhnev threatening Nixon. Indo-Soviet friendship treaty would have got Soviet directly involved in the war in case of US military invasion on India. Secondly US military was already overstretched and losing the fight in Vietnam. Very unlikely they would initiate hostilities against a larger country like India with growing opposition to war back home. Lastly Indian military action was swift and decisive, it did not give any window of opportunity to US to hold off or retaliate against Indian forces.”
You ave followed the Soviet policy line very well - and that’s all it was at the time and all it remains.
Any “threat” from Brezhnev to Nixon was meaningless and served only Soviet foreign policy aims to secure its place with India, for no real material threat from the U.S. existed.