LIVE thread & Breaking News ~ Japan

Unit 3 has fuel in the core that is suspected to have some partial melting. Unit 4 is the one that had the core offloaded and was in a maintenance outage. I guess I mixed up the numbers.

http://www8.nationalacademies.org/onpinews/newsitem.aspx?RecordID=11263

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Date: April 6, 2005
Contacts: William Skane, Executive Director
Megan Petty, Media Relations Assistant
Office of News and Public Information
202-334-2138; e-mail <news@nas.edu>

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Spent Fuel Stored in Pools at Some U.S. Nuclear Power Plants Potentially at Risk From Terrorist Attacks; Prompt Measures Needed to Reduce Vulnerabilities

WASHINGTON -- Spent nuclear fuel stored in pools at some of the nation's 103 operating commercial nuclear reactors may be at risk from terrorist attacks, says a new report from a committee of the National Academies' Board on Radioactive Waste Management. The report calls on the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to conduct additional analyses to obtain a better understanding of potential risks and to ensure that power-plant operators take prompt and effective measures to reduce the possible consequences of such attacks. Because potential threats may differ according to a specific plant's design, the committee recommended that plant-by-plant vulnerability analyses be performed.

These conclusions were based on a detailed review of security analyses performed by the USNRC, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the nuclear power industry, and independent experts. The committee noted that many security improvements have been instituted at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants since the events of Sept. 11, 2001. On several important questions, however, it was unable to obtain enough information from the USNRC to assess their effectiveness. The committee therefore recommends that an assessment of such measures should be undertaken by an organization independent of the USNRC and the nuclear industry.

"Within the six-month time frame requested by Congress, our committee of technical experts completed a very sound, evidence-based analysis," said committee chair Louis J. Lanzerotti, distinguished research professor at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, Newark, and consultant, Bell Labs, Lucent Technologies, Murray Hill, N.J. "We received input both from scientific professionals and the public. Our findings were unanimous. While the committee identified several terrorist attack scenarios that could have potentially severe consequences if carried out successfully, we also identified two relatively simple measures that could be implemented immediately at vulnerable plants to greatly reduce the risks."

The committee found that an attack which partially or completely drains a plant's spent fuel pool might be capable of starting a high-temperature fire that could release large quantities of radioactive material into the environment. The committee recommended that two measures be taken promptly to reduce the potential for such fires: reconfiguring the position of fuel assemblies in the pools to more evenly distribute decay-heat loads, and making provisions for water-spray systems to cool the fuel that could continue to operate even after the pool or the building in which it is housed is damaged.

The first measure could probably be implemented at all plants with minimal cost and time, and with little exposure of workers to radiation, the committee said. It recommended that the costs and benefits of options for implementing the water-spray system should be examined to decide what requirements should be imposed. Such systems may not be needed at plants where spent fuel pools are located below ground level or are otherwise protected from external line-of-sight attacks.

Congress requested the study following conflicting claims in the media about the safety and security of spent fuel in storage at commercial nuclear power plants, including the risks that spent fuel might be used to construct a radiological dispersal device, or "dirty bomb." The committee concluded the likelihood that terrorists could steal enough spent nuclear fuel from a power plant for use in a dirty bomb is small, given existing security measures. Nevertheless, the USNRC should review and upgrade where necessary its security requirements for protecting those spent fuel rods not contained in fuel assemblies from theft by knowledgeable insiders.

The report being issued today is the public version of a classified report delivered to Congress, USNRC, and the Department of Homeland Security in July 2004. The National Academies obtained the USNRC's cooperation in producing this public report. It contains all of the findings and recommendations of the original classified report, but some have been slightly reworded. Classified national security information and safeguards information have been redacted.

"We believe this report fulfills our responsibility to inform the public and elected officials on a critical national security issue," said Bruce Alberts, president of the National Academy of Sciences. "It also satisfies a second, equally important imperative: to ensure that this report contains no information that might inadvertently aid terrorists. We appreciate the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's assistance in confirming that."

As part of the study, the committee was asked to examine the possible advantages of dry cask storage over pool storage at commercial power-plant sites. The report concludes that pools are necessary to cool spent fuel immediately after its removal from a reactor. But dry cask storage has two advantages for storing spent fuel older than about five years: It is a passive system that relies on air circulation for cooling, and it divides the inventory of spent fuel into a number of individual, robust containers, each containing only a small amount of the total inventory. The committee found that although there are some differences in the robustness of different dry cask designs under various terrorist attack scenarios, the differences are not large, and relatively simple steps could be taken to further reduce potential vulnerabilities.

Once the USNRC completes the recommended plant-specific vulnerability analyses, the agency may conclude that earlier movements of spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage would be prudent at some plants, the report says. The committee was not specifically asked by Congress to recommend whether the transfer of spent fuel rods from pools to a system of dry cask storage should be accelerated, however. Cost-benefit considerations also would be an important part of such decisions.

Finally, the committee observed during the course of its work that current classification and security practices appear to be impeding the sharing of valuable information between the USNRC and nuclear industry operators, negatively impacting constructive feedback and cooperation. The committee recommended that the USNRC improve the sharing of pertinent information on its security analyses of spent fuel storage with nuclear power plants operators and system vendors. More constructive interaction with the public and with independent analysts also could increase confidence in USNRC and industry decisions and their actions to reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel storage to terrorist attacks

This study was sponsored by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The Board on Radioactive Waste Management is part of the National Research Council, the principal operating arm of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering. They are private, nonprofit institutions that provide science and technology advice under a congressional charter. A committee roster follows.
Copies of Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report are available from the National Academies Press; tel. 202-334-3313 or 1-800-624-6242 or order on the Internet at http://www.nap.edu. Reporters may obtain a copy from the Office of News and Public Information (contacts listed above).

[ This news release and report are available at http://national-academies.org ]

NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL
Division on Earth and Life Studies
Board on Radioactive Waste Management

Committee on Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage

Louis J. Lanzerotti ^* (chair)
Consultant
Bell Laboratories
Lucent Technologies
Murray Hill, N.J., and
Distinguished Professor for Solar-Terrestrial Research
New Jersey Institute of Technology
Newark

Carl A. Alexander
Chief Scientist and Senior Research Leader
Battelle Memorial Institute
Columbus, Ohio

Robert M. Bernero
Independent Consultant
Gaithersburg, Md.

M. Quinn Brewster
Hermia G. Soo Professor of Mechanical Engineering
University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign

Gregory R. Choppin
R.O. Lawton Distinguished Professor Emeritus of Chemistry
Florida State University
Tallahassee

Nancy J. Cooke
Professor
Applied Psychology Unit
Arizona State University
Mesa

Gordon R. Johnson
Senior Scientist and Manager
Solid Mechanics Group
Network Computing Services
Minneapolis

Robert P. Kennedy ^*
Consulting Engineer
RPK Structural Mechanics Consulting
Escondido, Calif.

Kenneth K. Kuo
Distinguished Professor of Mechanical Engineering
Pennsylvania State University
University Park

Richard T. Lahey Jr. ^*
Edward E. Hood Professor of Engineering
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Troy, N.Y.

Kathleen R. Meyer
Principal
Keystone Scientific Inc.
Ft. Collins, Colo.

Frederick J. Moody ^*
Independent Consultant
Murphys, Calif.

Timothy R. Neal
Senior Technical Adviser
Los Alamos National Laboratory
Los Alamos, N.M.

Loring A. Wyllie Jr. ^*
Senior Principal
Degenkolb Engineers
San Francisco

Peter D. Zimmerman
Chair of Science and Security and
Director, Centre for Science & Security Studies
King's College
London

RESEARCH COUNCIL STAFF

Kevin D. Crowley
Study Director

^* Member, National Academy of Engineering

Well, It's becoming confusing. I just saw a report talking about both 3 & 4 having fuel assemblies in storage pools.

I believe that 5 & 6 do as well.

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/photo/DY20110315184948847L0.jpg

Beats me. TEPCO has people in the trenches. NRC may have a few boots on the ground but if the are proteges of Jaczko then I would suspect political motives. He is political, no question about it.

It’s confusing... :) What about 5 & 6?

Nite ;)

Terror at N-plant during quake:

http://www.yomiuri.co.jp/dy/national/T110316005275.htm

They were in outages at the time of the quake and have their cores loaded, but are shutdown and undamaged. The chart I read said the SFP temperature was “increasing”, but I have no idea if that is by a little or a lot. I think 5 & 6 have offsite power so unless they are cycling the recirculation cooling, trying to share the load with other units, I don’t know offhand why those temps would be “increasing” if there is no damage.

Japan earthquake: timeline of the disaster, from tsunami to nuclear crisis

The Telegraph (UK)

http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/japan/8382734/Japan-earthquake-timeline-of-the-disaster-from-tsunami-to-nuclear-crisis.html

I'm wondering why they're measuring the rads near the gate. These poor people aren't going to have to work at the gate to fix these reactors. They're going to have to work INSIDE the reactor buildings themselves.

Give us rad measurements as near as possible to the reactor buildings themselves Tepco.

Cooper asks Shikita (Govt spokesman) about why the Japanese government is not discussing the nuclear spent fuel pool being out of water - Shikita completely changed subject and went into the 10 minute phone call with 0bama.

Now when pressed says “there are some situations that need to be internalized”

OK that’s it.

Looks like #3 has fuel assemblies in its pool as well if this article is correct.

Do they ALL, I wonder?

A Japanese military CH-47 Chinook helicopter began dumping seawater on the damaged reactor of Unit 3 at the Fukushima complex at 9:48 a.m., said defense ministry spokeswoman Kazumi Toyama. The aircraft dumped at least four loads on the reactor, though much of the water appeared to be dispersed in the wind. At least a dozen more loads were planned in the 40 minutes that each crew can operate before switching to limit radiation exposure, the ministry said. The dumping was intended both to help cool the reactor and to replenish water in a pool holding spent fuel rods, Toyama said.

6.5 earthquake, Vanuatu. Mar 17 1:48pm at epicenter (11m ago, 79km WNW of PORT-VILA, depth 36km). http://j.mp/hKVRaD

Tsunami Information (Pacific): no destructive widespread tsunami threat exists based on historical data. however earthqu… http://j.mp/e5dbWW

So in other words, it has hit the fan but they don’t want to tell anyone.

I don’t know offhand why those temps would be “increasing” if there is no damage.

Good question.

Wow. So a couple of the reactors had their non-spent rods stored in the pools when the disaster occurred ? Thought they were replacing them as spent, but they were removed for routine maintenance ?

So in less than a year there is a good chance it would kill you- if it stayed at that amount.

I don’t think it would stay at that amount.

Acute exposures of 10 rem lead to changes in blood counts, but no macroscopic effects. Nausea and hair loss start at about 200 rem. LD50/60 for human beings is about 450 rem, without medical intervention. There have been cases of whole-body doses up to 1000 rem with recovery if medical intervention is available.

So, at 33 millirem per hour, you are good for about 300 hours before you'd see changes in blood counts. Nausea and hair loss would take about 6000 hours of continuous exposure (about 36 weeks). LD50/60 would take about 81 weeks of continuous exposure. Say what you will, it is unlikely that anyone will get to LD50/60 with a rate of 33 millirem/hour.

I’m getting the feeling they can’t admit it.

Cooper did have a sweet story on about two dogs, one injured and the other would not leave it’s side. The dog actually put it’s paw around the neck of the other. They were both rescued.

With that, I’m off to bed.

Goodnight