Posted on 07/24/2010 10:03:41 PM PDT by Ernest_at_the_Beach
KENNER, LA. -- If there is no smoking gun in the Deepwater Horizon disaster, it is because there is smoke coming from so many places.
After months of oil-spill misery and endless recriminations about what happened and why, it is increasingly clear that the complex operation of drilling an exploratory well in the deep water of the Gulf of Mexico failed in a complex way. No single decision or misstep in isolation could have caused the blowout, but any number of decisions might have prevented it had they gone the other way.
The calamity, the evidence now suggests, was not an accident in the sense of a single unlucky or freak event, but rather an engineered catastrophe -- one that followed naturally from decisions of BP managers and other oil company workers on the now-sunken rig.
Such was the theme that began to emerge from hearings this past week in Kenner, La., where a federal investigatory panel, meeting in a nondescript Radisson hotel near the New Orleans airport, questioned survivors of the April 20 explosion that killed 11 of their co-workers. Government investigators describe a situation in which BP repeatedly had to make "risk-based decisions," and in every instance chose the least expensive option even though it potentially elevated the risk. That steadily whittled away at the margin of error until there was no margin left and gas found a spark on the Deepwater Horizon.
For example, on the day of the blowout, BP managers decided to skip a typically routine, and time-consuming, "cement bond log" test that could have detected fissures in the cementing of the well. They did not use the recommended 21 "centralizers" to position the well prior to the cement job, deploying just six instead.
(Excerpt) Read more at washingtonpost.com ...
fyi
>> That steadily whittled away at the margin of error until there was no margin left and gas found a spark on the Deepwater Horizon.
Interesting way to frame the situation. And I’m not arguing its validity.
Since when is sabotage an “iffy decision”?
Where is the sabotage event?
and, "The two senior BP people on the rig at the time of the blowout, well site leaders Donald Vidrine and Bob Kaluza -- who held the position traditionally known as "company man" -- didn't show up after being listed as witnesses for Tuesday's hearing. Vidrine cited medical reasons; Kaluza's lawyer said he was exercising his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. One other company man did appear: Ronald Sepulvado, the longest tenured of the well site leaders on the rig. Four days before the disaster, Sepulvado had taken a helicopter back to dry land to attend what he called "BOP school" -- classes where he learned about blowout preventers and well control. He said he sent his replacement, Kaluza, an e-mail discussing the job, and also talked to him for about 30 minutes during the "handoff."
While Sepulvado was gone, an iffy well turned into a killer well. -------Just connecting some dots here.
I'm no petroleum engineer but if Baraq Petroleum was in the process of completing the well, I don't think it's an exploratory well. I guess the WaC0mp0st failed in their fact checking again.
“iffy”? ..... decisions......WaPo....must be an opinion piece....=.=
“Government investigators describe a situation in which BP repeatedly had to make “risk-based decisions,” and in every instance chose the least expensive option even though it potentially elevated the risk. That steadily whittled away at the margin of error until there was no margin left and gas found a spark on the Deepwater Horizon.”
As I have been saying on all of these threads, it is amazing to me how BP was ALWAYS taking the “it will be okay” view on all of their data coming in. They had known for MONTHS that this was a problem well. And the folks on the rig (drillers, etc.) argued with them at each point.
Pressure spike? “It is leveling out - keep removing the mud”.
Alarms? “Computer is acting up, keep going.”
Another pressure spike? “Thats what the pinchers are for.”
That last quote is direct from the BP company man from earlier testimony in replying to arguing on the rig with the driller.
And MANY of the earlier things (less stringent BOP tests, thinner casing, etc.) was done with the okay of the Federal regulators.
This was considered an exporatory well. And the “completion” was not to “complete” it for production, it was to be cemented in to “plug” it, but with the ability to drill through the plugs later on.
They thought the cement “plug” at depth (near the pay zone) was doing the job of plugging the hole. Although the driller argued that much of their data said the cement wasn’t holding. A “cement bond log” using a downhole tool was not run. I believe that an earlier attempt at logging the deeper portion of the hole was stalled because the too got stuck in the hole due to casing problems. (Hmmm - there’s a clue things might not be so good down there).
Then they rushed the removal of the heavy mud before the cement would have made a hard bond even if it had been doing the job.
The plan was to remove the mud (replacing with sea water) above the lower cement plug, and then place a shallower plug - I suppose from the ocean floor and down for a certain depth.
At least that is what I have been able to gather from the various articles, and some limited knowledge of how the drilling process goes.
Thanks for posting this article. I think it confirms what many of us have been saying all along.
This I find really disturbing:
“A BP lawyer at one point asked a line of questions hinting that the company believes that a Transocean tool pusher offered an incorrect interpretation of the negative test that downplayed the unexpected pressure in the well.
The tool pusher could not testify — he was among the 11 who were killed in the explosion. “
BP lawyers are pretty desperate if they are trying to pin the blame on a dead man who cannot SPEAK UP FOR HIMSELF.
I read that the TOOL PUSHER was arguing with BP execs over the MUD/SEAWATER issue when the RIG caught fire, and that he said something to the effect of “ARE YOU HAPPY NOW?”.
I swear when I read your post, I thought I was reading my own writing.
They did not recognize that gas was already coming up with the mud....that the bottom plug had not worked.
Why is a big question.
BO/VS=BO/BS
Got yo get ssome shut eye...nite.
That is not risk management. That is cost management. Now we know how good the government is at cost management, 1.4 Trillion in the red this year. So I guess that means the government must have eliminated all our risk, right ?
That's not quite the testimony. The statement wasn't made by the BP company man, it was made by the driller in response to the Company Man's order to displace the mud with seawater. The direct quote is, "I guess that's what the pinchers are for".
“Why is a big question.”
I had a quote on my bulletin board - not sure where it is now. But it went something like:
“We pick the best theory, and then find the data that supports that theory.”
I’m not sure if the guy that said it meant it in earnest or not. But it was meant as a reminder to me to NOT fall into that trap. But too many people do.
Especially someone like the Company Man that had already made his decision to “Just do it - I’m the Boss”. A company man that was probably under the gun because the job was already over time and over budget, with each day that ticked by another million dollars in costs.
I recall an old article that said the various indicators were “miss-interpreted”. I guess that is one way to put it when your information doesn’t fit your preconceived notions.
Thank you for the correction! I could have sworn I read it as the company man saying it. But here is an article from May showing you are correct:
*************
One employee was so mad, the rig’s chief mechanic Doug Brown testified, that he warned they’d be relying on the rig’s blowout preventer if they proceeded the way BP wanted.
“He pretty much grumbled, ‘Well, I guess that’s what we have those pinchers for,’ “ Brown said of Jimmy Harrell, the top Transocean official on the rig. “Pinchers” was likely a reference to the shear rams in the blowout preventers, the final means of stopping an explosion.
Brown said in sworn testimony on Wednesday that the BP official stood up during the meeting and said, “This is how it’s going to be.”
Read more: http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/05/26/94859/after-long-argument-bp-official.html#ixzz0ug4Rm6Ac
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.