Posted on 03/04/2010 7:56:50 AM PST by Publius
John Jay had been battle tested in the diplomatic offices and salons of Paris and Madrid, and had navigated the infant Republic through the shoals of French, Spanish and British intrigue. More than anyone else, he understood the duplicity behind the smiles and kind words from European powers, both friendly and not so friendly. He knew precisely what the Great Powers of Europe were up to. He was nobody’s fool.
In this essay, Jay explores the dangers of one foreign policy versus thirteen separate foreign policies.
1 To the People of the State of New York:
2 It is not a new observation that the people of any country – if, like the Americans, intelligent and well informed – seldom adopt and steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting their interests.
3 That consideration naturally tends to create great respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient powers for all general and national purposes.
4 The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
5 Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their safety seems to be the first.
6 The safety of the people doubtless has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations, and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define it precisely and comprehensively.
7 At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.
8 As the former of these comes first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed.
9 Let us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in their opinion that a cordial union, under an efficient national government, affords them the best security that can be devised against hostilities from abroad.
10 The number of wars which have happened, or will happen, in the world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and weight of the causes, whether real or pretended, which provoke or invite them.
11 If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire whether so many just causes of war are likely to be given by United America as by Disunited America, for if it should turn out that United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in a state of peace with other nations.
12 The just causes of war for the most part arise either from violation of treaties or from direct violence.
13 America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime and therefore able to annoy and injure us.
14 She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain and Britain, and with respect to the two latter has in addition the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
15 It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies.
16 Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it, for although town or country or other contracted influence may place men in state assemblies or senates or courts of justice or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government, especially as it will have the widest field for choice and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the states.
17 Hence it will result that the administration, the political counsels and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious than those of individual states, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations as well as more safe with respect to us.
18 Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of treaties as well as the laws of nations will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner; whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in thirteen states or in three or four confederacies will not always accord or be consistent; and that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges appointed by different and independent governments, as from the different local laws and interests which may affect and influence them.
19 The wisdom of the Convention in committing such questions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and responsible only to, one national government cannot be too much commended.
20 Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith and justice, but those temptations, not reaching the other states, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless and good faith and justice be preserved.
21 The case of the treaty of peace with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
22 Because even if the governing party in a state should be disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may and commonly do result from circumstances peculiar to the state and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice meditated or to punish the aggressors.
23 But the national government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves nor want power or inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
24 So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations of treaties and the laws of nations afford just causes of war, they are less to be apprehended under one general government than under several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the safety of the people.
25 As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good national government affords vastly more security against dangers of that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
26 Because such [violence is] more frequently caused by the passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two states than of the Union.
27 Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual states who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
28 The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering on some states and not on others, naturally confines the causes of quarrel more immediately to the borderers.
29 The bordering states, if any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation and a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely by direct violence to excite war with these nations, and nothing can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions which actuate the parties immediately interested.
30 But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the national government, but it will also be more in their power to accommodate and settle them amicably.
31 They will be more temperate and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in capacity to act advisedly than the offending state.
32 The pride of states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all their actions and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or repairing their errors and offenses.
33 The national government, in such cases, will not be affected by this pride but will proceed with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
34 Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a state or confederacy of little consideration or power.
35 In the year 1685 the state of Genoa, having offended Louis XIV, endeavored to appease him.
36 He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France to ask his pardon and receive his terms.
37 They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace.
38 Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful nation?
Jay’s Critique
This is a very short piece, confined to a single subject.
7 At present I mean only to consider [the matter of safety] as it respects security for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against dangers from foreign arms and influence, as from dangers of the like kind arising from domestic causes.
At this point in Jay’s lengthy career, foreign policy was his most noted area of expertise; indeed, except for Franklin, he was pre-eminent in the field, having served as the Confederation Congress’ Secretary for Foreign Affairs for the five years preceding the Federalist Papers. Thus his word on the matter must have carried considerable weight. Having negotiated with several foreign nations already, he has an eye for potential sources of friction.
13 America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of them, except Prussia, are maritime and therefore able to annoy and injure us.
14 She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain and Britain, and with respect to the two latter has in addition the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
The last phrase is an allusion to the presence of Spanish claims in the south, and British in the north and west of the new nation, both of which would in time produce armed conflicts.
15 It is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done by one national government than it could be either by thirteen separate states or by three or four distinct confederacies.
There is, of course, the obvious point that it is far less likely for foreign governments to play one regional government off against another than it is to split a unified federal government.
20 Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often tempt the governing party in one or two states to swerve from good faith and justice, but those temptations, not reaching the other states, and consequently having little or no influence on the national government, the temptation will be fruitless.
But Jay’s argument takes an interesting turn first.
16 Because when once an efficient national government is established, the best men in the country will not only consent to serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it, for although town or country or other contracted influence may place men in state assemblies or senates or courts of justice or executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men to offices under the national government, especially as it will have the widest field for choice and never experience that want of proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the states.
17 Hence it will result that the administration, the political counsels and the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise, systematical and judicious than those of individual states, and consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations as well as more safe with respect to us.
In short, inasmuch as it offers a wider arena, the federal government will attract superior talent. It is a point unlikely to be attractive to the prickly state governments of the time; indeed, the reader has already encountered the objection of Samuel Bryan in Centinel #1 that it would likely lead to an aristocracy, a ruling class remote from the citizens. This at best would be a two-edged sword.
The reader comes to Jay’s speculation – for that is all that it is – that a unified federal government will be less likely to embark in needless wars with the sundry Native American tribes.
27 Not a single Indian war has yet been occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble as it is, but there are several instances of Indian hostilities having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual states who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
It is not apparent whether Jay was ascribing the lack of such wars to the centralization of the existing federal government – which is, after all, the issue at hand – or to its weakness. In any case, the implication is that a strong federal government will be less likely to be swayed by local circumstances into an inappropriate response, and yet strong enough to respond in places where local governments could not. There are, however, disadvantages to the remoteness of a central federal government alluded to by Jay in the previous piece – and unacknowledged in this one – that would also become apparent in the coming century.
There would be, for example, a local commander who vociferously opposed the decision made by the federal government to relocate certain tribes to reservation areas that made little sense to anyone actually on the scene. In fact, this commander would travel back to Washington DC to testify against such policies, nearly costing him his command for insubordination, and in the end losing his life attempting to enforce policies he detested. His name was George Armstrong Custer.
Jay could hardly have foreseen the specifics, but the principles were certainly not difficult to anticipate. The subsequent history of the federal government with respect to treaties with Native Americans would be a sorry one indeed and remains a point of political sensitivity to this day. Would a decentralized set of governments, more aware of local conditions, have done any better? In any case, one cannot cede Jay this particular point, but the advantages of negotiating, whether with foreign or native nations, on the basis of a single united front, are not to be denied. Jay leaves the reader with a cautionary tale.
35 In the year 1685 the state of Genoa, having offended Louis XIV, endeavored to appease him.
36 He demanded that they should send their Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their senators, to France to ask his pardon and receive his terms.
37 They were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace.
38 Would he on any occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation from Spain, or Britain, or any other powerful nation?
The warning is clear. Power is respected, it is the only thing that is respected between nations, and a single unified federal government speaking for the United States would possess a credibility and a potential menace that smaller regional, or even state, governments could not match. Jay knew from personal experience that such a credibility, such a menace, was necessary to preserve the peace in a world that could be most predatory toward the weak.
The resolve and unity of the new nation was to be tested, and soon, first by the Barbary states and then the British. Jay himself would be instrumental in putting off the latter test for nearly twenty years, but in the end it would come. When it did, despite the occupation and burning of the new nation’s capital, the British would find themselves engaged by one nation, not thirteen. It would prove barely enough.
Discussion Topics
Earlier threads:
FReeper Book Club: The Debate over the Constitution
5 Oct 1787, Centinel #1
6 Oct 1787, James Wilson’s Speech at the State House
8 Oct 1787, Federal Farmer #1
9 Oct 1787, Federal Farmer #2
18 Oct 1787, Brutus #1
22 Oct 1787, John DeWitt #1
27 Oct 1787, John DeWitt #2
27 Oct 1787, Federalist #1
31 Oct 1787, Federalist #2
Jay made a clear argument just based on statistics. Most people struggle with the concept that an airplane with two engines is twice as likely to have an engine failure as a plane with one engine. But it is the truth. Each engine has a one percent chance of failure. Two engines have two times one percent, or two percent chance for failure.
A nation with thirteen powers acting on their own behalf is 13 times more likely to engage in mischief than a nation with one power. Jay’s ideals, though, are obvious from his poor prediction of the state of Indian affairs. Jay believed that the central government would attract the best and brightest because of increased opportunity to do good. He ommitted the fact that it would also attract the most unscrupulous characters because of the increased opportunity to do harm.
His time spent in European courts should have made this clear. Often the king’s men do not care about the best interests of the king. They have repeatedly acted intentionally to harm the monarchy and promote their own interests. Sometimes this was good, sometimes it was not. Jay’s opinion here is a glossover, and for that reason, I’ve ignored it for many years.
In reality, the question was not union or disunion. The question was whether to keep their federal system or replace it with the consolidated national system of the new Constitution.
“Most people struggle with the concept that an airplane with two engines is twice as likely to have an engine failure as a plane with one engine. But it is the truth. Each engine has a one percent chance of failure. Two engines have two times one percent, or two percent chance for failure.”
True, but the probability of a one engine plane running on zero engines is 1%.
The chance of a two engine plane running on zero engines is 1% of 1%.
We of course know this was very possible - we have the examples of the United States of Central America, the Grand Columbian Republic, and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, all of which broke up into component parts shortly after they achieved independence. Mexico underwent a similar breakup during the 19th Century, with some of the components eventually reuniting with Mexico (Republic of Yucatan, Republic of the Rio Grande), and others winding up part of Mexico's neighbor to the north (Texas, California).
My opinion is that the Constitution was the last chance before permanent disunion. There's nothing inevitable about one large republic between Canada and Mexico, to my knowledge no republic had ever existed on that scale (The Roman Republic was not - it was a city-state with an empire grafted onto it - and eventually the empire corrupted the Republic.) Breaking up into a bunch of perpetually squabbling independent states was probably the most likely outcome, and it is part of American Exceptionalism that it did not happen.
The Antifederalists may not have wanted disunion and perpetual turmoil and war, but if they had succeeded in blocking the ratification of the Constitution that is probably what they would have gotten.
No but if in it he concludes that Hamilton was trying to undermine the republic from the outset he is right on!
I have put it on my list.
No. In fact, I haven’t read any DiLorenzo. I know, it’s a travesty. I’ll get around to it at some point. Why do you ask?
That's one spin on it. A different spin is that we were 13 separate countries from the start, united by purpose, habits, morals, commerce, etc. That's why we were a confederation of states, and not a unified, consolidated republic. I personally think the pro-constitution crowd was whooping up fear as policians always do when trying to push through bigger government.
We of course know this was very possible - we have the examples of the United States of Central America, the Grand Columbian Republic, and the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, all of which broke up into component parts shortly after they achieved independence. Mexico underwent a similar breakup during the 19th Century, with some of the components eventually reuniting with Mexico (Republic of Yucatan, Republic of the Rio Grande), and others winding up part of Mexico's neighbor to the north (Texas, California).
All of which argues AGAINST forming one giant consolidated republic, as opposed to maintain the confederation of states. Of course, how long did it take AFTER the Constitution until we DID break up? 60 some odd years. Not very long. Which renders your entire point moot. We DID consolidate and we DID break up. I'd argue that consolidation made the breakup MORE likely.
For your consideration...
Antifederalist No. 3 NEW CONSTITUTION CREATES A NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; WILL NOT ABATE FOREIGN INFLUENCE; DANGERS OF CIVIL WAR AND DESPOTISM
Like the nome de plume “Publius” used by pro Constitution writers in the Federalist Papers, several Antifederalists signed their writings “A FARMER.” While the occupation of the writers may not have coincided with the name given, the arguments against consolodating power in the hands of a central government were widely read. The following was published in the Maryland Gazette and Baltimore Advertiser, March 7, 1788. The true identity of the author is unknown.
There are but two modes by which men are connected in society, the one which operates on individuals, this always has been, and ought still to be called, national government; the other which binds States and governments together (not corporations, for there is no considerable nation on earth, despotic, monarchical, or republican, that does not contain many subordinate corporations with various constitutions) this last has heretofore been denominated a league or confederacy. The term federalists is therefore improperly applied to themselves, by the friends and supporters of the proposed constitution. This abuse of language does not help the cause; every degree of imposition serves only to irritate, but can never convince. They are national men, and their opponents, or at least a great majority of them, are federal, in the only true and strict sense of the word.
Whether any form of national government is preferable for the Americans, to a league or confederacy, is a previous question we must first make up our minds upon....
That a national government will add to the dignity and increase the splendor of the United States abroad, can admit of no doubt: it is essentially requisite for both. That it will render government, and officers of government, more dignified at home is equally certain. That these objects are more suited to the manners, if not [the] genius and disposition of our people is, I fear, also true. That it is requisite in order to keep us at peace among ourselves, is doubtful. That it is necessary, to prevent foreigners from dividing us, or interfering in our government, I deny positively; and, after all, I have strong doubts whether all its advantages are not more specious than solid. We are vain, like other nations. We wish to make a noise in the world; and feel hurt that Europeans are not so attentive to America in peace, as they were to America in war. We are also, no doubt, desirous of cutting a figure in history. Should we not reflect, that quiet is happiness? That content and pomp are incompatible? I have either read or heard this truth, which the Americans should never forget: That the silence of historians is the surest record of the happiness of a people. The Swiss have been four hundred years the envy of mankind, and there is yet scarcely an history of their nation. What is history, but a disgusting and painful detail of the butcheries of conquerors, and the woeful calamities of the conquered? Many of us are proud, and are frequently disappointed that office confers neither respect or difference. No man of merit can ever be disgraced by office. A rogue in office may be feared in some governments-he will be respected in none. After all, what we call respect and difference only arise from contrast of situation, as most of our ideas come by comparison and relation. Where the people are free there can be no great contrast or distinction among honest citizens in or out of office. In proportion as the people lose their freedom, every gradation of distinction, between the Governors and governed obtains, until the former become masters, and the latter become slaves. In all governments virtue will command reverence. The divine Cato knew every Roman citizen by name, and never assumed any preeminence; yet Cato found, and his memory will find, respect and reverence in the bosoms of mankind, until this world returns into that nothing, from whence Omnipotence called it. That the people are not at present disposed for, and are actually incapable of, governments of simplicity and equal rights, I can no longer doubt. But whose fault is it? We make them bad, by bad governments, and then abuse and despise them for being so. Our people are capable of being made anything that human nature was or is capable of, if we would only have a little patience and give them good and wholesome institutions; but I see none such and very little prospect of such. Alas! I see nothing in my fellow-citizens, that will permit my still fostering the delusion, that they are now capable of sustaining the weight of SELF-GOVERNMENT: a burden to which Greek and Roman shoulders proved unequal. The honor of supporting the dignity of the human character, seems reserved to the hardy Helvetians alone. If the body of the people will not govern themselves, and govern themselves well too, the consequence is unavoidable-a FEW will, and must govern them. Then it is that government becomes truly a government by force only, where men relinquish part of their natural rights to secure the rest, instead of an union of will and force, to protect all their natural rights, which ought to be the foundation of every rightful social compact.
Whether national government will be productive of internal peace, is too uncertain to admit of decided opinion. I only hazard a conjecture when I say, that our state disputes, in a confederacy, would be disputes of levity and passion, which would subside before injury. The people being free, government having no right to them, but they to government, they would separate and divide as interest or inclination prompted-as they do at this day, and always have done, in Switzerland. In a national government, unless cautiously and fortunately administered, the disputes will be the deep-rooted differences of interest, where part of the empire must be injured by the operation of general law; and then should the sword of government be once drawn (which Heaven avert) I fear it will not be sheathed, until we have waded through that series of desolation, which France, Spain, and the other great kingdoms of the world have suffered, in order to bring so many separate States into uniformity, of government and law; in which event the legislative power can only be entrusted to one man (as it is with them) who can have no local attachments, partial interests, or private views to gratify.
That a national government will prevent the influence or danger of foreign intrigue, or secure us from invasion, is in my judgment directly the reverse of the truth. The only foreign, or at least evil foreign influence, must be obtained through corruption. Where the government is lodged in the body of the people, as in Switzerland, they can never be corrupted; for no prince, or people, can have resources enough to corrupt the majority of a nation; and if they could, the play is not worth the candle. The facility of corruption is increased in proportion as power tends by representation or delegation, to a concentration in the hands of a few. . . .
As to any nation attacking a number of confederated independent republics ... it is not to be expected, more especially as the wealth of the empire is there universally diffused, and will not be collected into any one overgrown, luxurious and effeminate capital to become a lure to the enterprizing ambitious. That extensive empire is a misfortune to be deprecated, will not now be disputed. The balance of power has long engaged the attention of all the European world, in order to avoid the horrid evils of a general government. The same government pervading a vast extent of territory, terrifies the minds of individuals into meanness and submission. All human authority, however organized, must have confined limits, or insolence and oppression will prove the offspring of its grandeur, and the difficulty or rather impossibility of escape prevents resistance. Gibbon relates that some Roman Knights who had offended government in Rome were taken up in Asia, in a very few days after. It was the extensive territory of the Roman republic that produced a Sylla, a Marius, a Caligula, a Nero, and an Elagabalus. In small independent States contiguous to each other, the people run away and leave despotism to reek its vengeance on itself; and thus it is that moderation becomes with them, the law of self-preservation. These and such reasons founded on the eternal and immutable nature of things have long caused and will continue to cause much difference of sentiment throughout our wide extensive territories. From our divided and dispersed situation, and from the natural moderation of the American character, it has hitherto proved a warfare of argument and reason.
A FARMER
DiLorenzo makes some of your points.
Doesn’t matter. When one engine fails, it often leads to a crash.
At the Virginia Constitutional Ratifying Convention, Governor Edmund Randolph remarked:
“We want a government, sir — a government that will have stability, and give us security; for our present government is destitute of the one and incapable of producing the other. It cannot, perhaps, with propriety, be denominated a government, being void of that energy requisite to enforce sanctions. I wish my country not to be contemptible in the eyes of foreign nations. A well-regulated community is always respected. It is the internal situation, the defects of government, that attract foreign contempt: that contempt, sir, is too often followed by subjugation.”
“Consider the commercial regulations between us and Maryland. Is it not known to gentlemen that the states have been making reprisals on each other — to obviate a repetition of which, in some degree, these regulations have been made? Can we not see, from this circumstance, the jealousy, rivalship, and hatred that would subsist between them, in case this state was out of the Union? They are importing states, and importing states will ever be competitors and rivals. Rhode Island and Connecticut have been on the point of war, on the subject of their paper money; Congress did not attempt to interpose.”
Sounds like a modern Democrat. John Kerry or Joe Biden.
Your Farmer doesn't understand the difference between a federal and a national (a better term would be unitary, like modern France, where all power is concentrated in the national government and the departments are just creatures of that national government. That is not the government the Framers of our Constitution put together, although Mr. Farmer doesn't seem to be aware of that.
Oh, Mr. Farmer, you were being sarcastic? My mistake. But then why are you opposing the vehicle by which you and your fellow Americans will rule themselves in peace and prosperity?
I could go on, but I see no need. This guy's wrong, I don't see any reason to continue beating his poor dead horse. And this drivel makes my brain hurt.
The Anti-federalists were wrong, as they learned when the Constitution was ratified and put into operation. It's too bad that the writers of the various Anti-federalist screeds that have survived were not forced to sit down and publicly admit, “Well, I was wrong...” and describe exactly how they misunderstood how the Constitution would work. But that is life, people who make mistakes prefer to let them slide into oblivion.
Please don't ever throw some monstrosity like this at me and force me to read through it ever again. Ever. Because I won't. Life is too short to spend much time pointing out how the clueless were clueless when said clueless are some 200 years(plus or minus) dead.
"Notwithstanding their intelligence, and earnest solicitude for the good of their country, this system {The Articles of Confederation} proved totally inadequate to the purpose for which it was devised. But, sir, this was no disgrace to them. The subject of confederations was then new, and the necessity of speedily forming some government for the states, to defend them against the pressing dangers, prevented, perhaps, those able statesmen from making that system as perfect as more leisure and deliberation might have enabled them to do. I cannot otherwise conceive how they could have formed a system that provided no means of enforcing the powers which were nominally given it. Was it not a political farce to pretend to vest powers, without accompanying them with the means of putting them in execution? This want of energy was not a greater solecism than the blending together, and vesting in one body, all the branches of government."
"The utter inefficacy of this system was discovered, the moment the danger was over, by the introduction of peace"
Kinda sums it up.
Wish I had time to respond other than to say the above quote is funny.
Patrick Henry actually did that, and then he sided with Hamilton in the disagreement over the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, which Henry saw as fostering disunion and as possibly treasonous.
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