Left to Right: Hashim Thachi (KLA Leader), Bernard Kouchner (UNMIK Chief), Sir Michael Jackson (NATO Command),
Gen. Agim Ceku (Commanding KLA General), Gen. Wesley Clark (Commanding NATO General)
"Weasley" Clark in Very Bad Company
Posted on 08/17/2009 8:07:31 PM PDT by neverdem
Much has been done in six months to deal with the ongoing war in Afghanistan. We have restated that our aim is to eliminate the threat of Al Qaeda; built a new leadership team, including Special Representative Richard Holbrooke; reinforced our troop strength and adjusted our tactics; and have begun augmenting our force with synchronized diplomatic, political and economic efforts.
But can we explain how all of this adds up to an effective strategy that will sustain American engagement in one of the world's least accessible regions?
The American people are growing increasingly wary. In a new CNN/Opinion research poll, fully 54% of respondents now say they oppose the U.S.-led fight against the Taliban and their Al Qaeda allies. Those are striking numbers, and a serious warning to the Obama administration.
The difficulty here lies less in PowerPoint presentations and more in the complexities of the war itself. Our real enemy, Al Qaeda, may now be more entrenched in Pakistan than in Afghanistan. Taking the fight directly into Pakistan with ground forces risks expanding the conflict and undercutting a fragile Pakistani civilian government.
The similarities to Vietnam are ominous. There, too, an insurgency was led and supported from outside the borders of the state in which our troops were fighting. There, too, sanctuaries across international borders stymied U.S. military efforts. There, too, broader political-strategic considerations weighed against military expansion of the conflict and forecast further struggles in the region.
And there, too, American public support slid away over time as our engagement ratcheted up and casualties mounted.
Our Vietnam experiences provide powerful lessons in how to explain strategy and retain public support, so we can ultimately succeed.
First, we must maintain a clear and unwavering purpose - and not overstate our accomplishments. In Vietnam, we seemed to change our objectives whenever they were seriously challenged. At one time or another we fought to halt Communist aggression from the North, to avoid the fall of the "Southeast Asian dominoes," to prevent a slaughter should the Viet Cong take over, and to maintain U.S. "credibility." And we kept promising "light at the end of the tunnel," until Tet shattered public expectations and support.
So in Afghanistan, we must avoid confusing Americans by citing too many justifications for our presence. We aren't there to create democracy for Afghans, stabilize a nuclear-armed Pakistan or deal with strategic rivalry on the subcontinent. These may be means to an end, but we must not lose public focus on Al Qaeda. And we must be cautious in claiming progress.
Second, we must realize that, as we ratchet up our military commitment against the insurgency in Afghanistan, we will take increased losses, and this will limit our political staying power. We must get the balance right between the urgency of the mission and the costs and risks of actions to speed up our success. In Vietnam it turned out there were actually extraordinary military measures that might have been decisive against the North, but we were self-deterred from taking them until it was too late. We should have gone after the North by air more heavily sooner; we should have cut off their base areas in Cambodia and Laos sooner and more effectively.
Our military must seek to find more effective measures against the enemy headquarters and base areas in Pakistan - and the Predator strikes are a good start. Let's not wait too long to act.
Finally, we gain nothing by blaming our hosts or their culture. In Vietnam, we constantly complained about the ineffectiveness of our allies and engineered the ouster of South Vietnamese leaders. In the end, we simply ended up owning the problem. In Southwest Asia today, Americans must recognize that local leaders and their institutions do not share our own priorities and values. We cannot really build a nation for other people, and the American public must not expect it. Instead we will be working quietly behind the scenes to focus greater regional efforts against Al Qaeda.
Our commitment to defeating Al Qaeda need be nothing like our tragedy in Vietnam - unless we make it so. Under the Obama administration, we are off to a good start. Let's learn from America's errors, not relive them.
Clark is a former supreme commander of NATO, led the alliance of military forces in the Kosovo war (1999) and is a senior fellow at the Ron Burkle Center at UCLA.
Normally, that's heresy to a rat.
We could start to buy the opium from the farmers to defund the Taliban. We could sell it at cost to countries that legitimately need morphine.
Messiah’s first mistake was sticking that idiot Holbrooke in there.
Weasley Clark trying to sound relevant again?
FUBO and Michelle could also take a lesson or two from 1789-1799 France
“Weasley” Clark is an opportunistic Traitor.
And a Fraud.
You beat me to it.
Sorry.
Weasly Clark can take is power point presentation and hang it in his ***
That said, Afghanistan is becoming problematic.
Afghanistan: Where empires go to die.
The Afghanis are very tough and persistent fighters. Just ask the Brits and the Russians, who both tried and failed. And the Russkies are sure to take their sweet revenge by arming the insurgents, as we did against them. Clark is right in saying this could be Obama’s Vietnam.
I am not about to give Clark any credit for clarity L0L
The situation in Afghanistan is deteriorating for sure, but I dont need a lecture from Weaselly Clark
Striking? It's 4 points off exactly half the respondents, and it's a CNN poll -- they couldn't cook it any better than that?
To be fair, Clark's campaign against the Branch Davidians in Waco was one of the most brilliant feats of military prowess since Alexander the Great.
I still wonder what it must be like to be the only Genral Officer ever fired by the only draft dodger to serve as president.
Wealsley is an apt name and not one restricted to one person’s use.
He’s good at whackin’ civilians and trying to start WWIII with the Russkies.
He’s good at having his picture taken in funny hats and on the cover of Gay magazines
Yes, I just meant that I did not see your post before I used it. He is probably described as “Weasley” more times than he is described by his own name. I’d agree that it fits him well.
If the ‘Bama was capable of learning anything from history, he wouldn’t be trying to stampede America into national socialism.
Left to Right: Hashim Thachi (KLA Leader), Bernard Kouchner (UNMIK Chief), Sir Michael Jackson (NATO Command),
Gen. Agim Ceku (Commanding KLA General), Gen. Wesley Clark (Commanding NATO General)
"Weasley" Clark in Very Bad Company
Bingo!
For the sort of half-hearted vacillation that has been every Democrat's gift to military policy the aerial assassination campaign - let's call it what it is, a contemporary Phoenix program - has been rather too successful for its own good. It allows the sort of dabbling reluctance that characterized LBJ's "escalation" policy, and if there is a lesson to be garnered from Vietnam here it is that half-measures are worse than no measures.
It may be strategically tempting to attempt to split al Qaeda from their Taliban hosts and come to a sort of modus vivendi with the latter (especially given the seeming stagnation in the Karzai government). In view of past history with respect to the Taliban and the fully-supported al Qaeda camps both in Afghanistan and now in Pakistan, the hope of long-term success along those lines is highly dubious. It affords 0bama an easy out, however. And Hillary will be whispering in his ear, "take it, and concentrate on domestic matters."
The alternative, as Clark points out, is a higher-level and more costly engagement in Pakistan, with all the complications of war in a resentful, nuclear-armed country. 0bama isn't up to it. And his team isn't up to it even if he is. Neither are they likely to be up to pulling out and taking the political consequences of the re-establishment of the Taliban that Bush threw out of Kabul. And so what they will do is toss the stinking sack back into the military's lap, hoping for a nice, low-level engagement until the next election cycle is over. And they and the media will be blaming Bush the entire time. Watch it happen.
Disclaimer: Opinions posted on Free Republic are those of the individual posters and do not necessarily represent the opinion of Free Republic or its management. All materials posted herein are protected by copyright law and the exemption for fair use of copyrighted works.