There is considerable confusion in print concerning the number, location, timing, and who it was that actually scored the torpedo hits on Bismarck. Virtually all British sources that I am aware of indicate that the two torpedoes definitely struck. Some, including the official action reports, mention the possibility of a third hit as well. As to location, the few that do so indicate invariably specify that the torpedo that struck the stern did so on the starboard side, while all seem indicate that other hit did so on the port side. The sources seem evenly split as to which hit first. As to who actually scored the hits, the only sources that I am aware of that indicates who scored both hits are Kennedy (Pursuit: The Chase and Sinking of the Battleship Bismarck) and Archbold (The Discovery of the Bismarck) which, assume that the hit on the stern came from the starboard side and give credit to Godfrey-Faussett’s second sub-flight.
On the other hand, based on what I know of the German official report (I have not seen a direct translation of the original) radioed from Bismarck on 26 May categorically states that two torpedoes hit home, the first hitting the stern, though the side of the ship struck is not indicated. The Bismarck survivor accounts that I am aware of all agree in their recollection that all the torpedoes struck the port side. As to the number of hits, they seem fairly split between two and three. As to the actual timing of the hits, Burkard von Müllenheim-Rechberg, Bismarck’s senior surviving officer, is adamant in their belief that, regardless of how many hits were received, the last hit was the one on the stern.
Based on the historical evidence from the attacking flight crews, the survivors, and the only action report available from the German side (Lütjens radioed report), I believe the sequence of events as recorded above is correct. My rationale is as follows:
First, I do not believe that Admiral Lütjens would have erred in either the number of hits or in the timing. It is inconceivable to me that, knowing that his report was likely to be his only opportunity to get the pertinent facts to Group West, that he would have been incorrect in those two most critical facts. Second, I believe that the Germans were in a much better position to know which side of the ship was actually hit, and all the evidence the survivors presented concerning known damage and flooding occurred on the port side. Therefore, my conclusion is that two torpedoes struck Bismarck’s port side on 26 May. But who obtained the hits?
The most critical aspect of this issue is the order in which the various sub-flights actually delivered their attacks. Based on the aircrew reports there is, in my opinion, little doubt that Godfrey-Faussett’s second sub-flight (less Beale), attacking from starboard, and the third and fourth sub-flights (less Keane), attacking from port, attacked before Coode’s sub-flight. The fact that the attack commander did not actually lead the initial aspects of the attack is critical to understanding how the attack actually unfolded.
Coode’s initial reports noted that his crew observed no indication of damage. Clearly then, whatever happened to Bismarck occurred after Coode was well into his withdrawal. Likewise, the action reports leave little doubt that Keane and Owensnith, the first British flight crews to observe damage to Bismarck, attacked after Coode.
Both of these flight crews were highly experienced. Keane had served continuously in 818 Squadron since 1 October 1939, Goddard, his observer, since 27 March 1940. With their Telegraphist Air Gunner Milliner, they had survived the Norwegian Campaign flying from HMS Furious. Owensmith and his observer Topham, having each joined 820 Squadron on 23 February 1940, and the equally long serving Telegraphist Air Gunner Watson had done the same from HMS Ark Royal. Both crews had served continuously on Ark Royal ever since, flying on countless operations.
While Keane’s crew indicates the hit was elsewhere, they attacked immediately after Coode and were well into their withdrawal when they observed a hit. Given the poor visibility and the fact that Keane was taking evasive action during the withdrawal, it is highly likely that the crew only had a fleeting instant to observe the only visible results - the plume caused by the hit. With the aircraft and ship both moving violently, at relatively high speed, in my opinion little more could be accurately observed.
On the other hand, Owensmith, attacking from the opposite side at roughly the same time Coode’s section was turning to withdraw, was definitive that Bismarck reacted strangely to a hit on her port side aft. As he was heading right for her on his attack run, he was in a perfect position to note both the hit and Bismarck’s reaction to it, as his chance of success depended on observing those very reactions. Therefore, I find his observations highly credible.
Furthermore, almost all sources agree that Beale, attacking alone from the forward points of the compass, slipped in virtually unseen and scored the hit amidships. He stated clearly that he encountered no AA fire until after he dropped. Since he had actually returned to HMS Sheffield before making his attack there is, in my opinion, little doubt that he was one of the last attackers. If his torpedo hit, it did so well after Keane and Owensmith were on their way home.
Finally, both the British and German records agree that the attack began around 2055 and lasted roughly a half an hour. Therefore, indications are that both sides were timing events from the roughly same starting point. Lütjens’ report indicates that the first torpedo hit home at 2105, roughly ten minutes into the attack and the second hit at 2115. Since the British agree on the timing of the attack, and Coode observed no damage as he withdrew, my conclusion is that the first attackers (the second, third, and fourth sub-flights) could not have scored a hit.
Since Owensmith and Keane saw a hit, but Coode did not, the first hit must have been scored by somebody that came after Coode and before Owensmith. By process of elimination, this can only mean Keane or Moffatt. Since Keane at no time credited himself with the hit, I conclude that Moffatt got it, though that is really just an assumption. Likewise, since Beale was one of the last attackers, in my opinion, there can be little doubt that his hit was the second one indicated by Lütjens and that it struck Bismarck amidships.
- “With Gallantry and Determination” The Story of the Torpedoing of the Bismarck By Mark E. Horan
Interesting. Thanks.