[Pentagon] Reform, and that

It happens like clockwork every time the presidency changes hands, especially when it changes parties: Retired colonels and majors, soi-disant “defense analysts” and tenured bureaucratic insiders whose opinions have been unfashionable under the ancien regime emerge to craft a series of Bold Recommendations On Reforming Defense. The latest Group of 13 from the Center for Defense Information throws on the mantle of “non-partisanship” - CDI’s mantra includes increasing international cooperation (read: the perenially effective UN); reduced reliance on unilateral military power to resolve conflict (read: passing the Global Test); reduced reliance on nuclear weapons (read: a second chance to lose the Cold War) ; a transformed and reformed U.S. military establishment (read: another go at re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic); and prudent oversight of defense programs (read: kill your favorite programs, fund mine, I’ll do it for you) - knowing that such will attract the attention of those partisans who never much liked playing soldier, and potentially shield them from those who did.

Defense is perpetually in need of reform, and there’s no doubt the authors are disinterested patriots, but Washington, DC is an expensive place to live and every man could use a little bit more to keep the wind out:

The reward for thinking outside the box in a politically congenial way can often open up access to any one of the dozens of presidentially appointed, senate approved jobs that could vault a retired flag or cubby-holed crank over legions of career civil servants into a lucrative Special Executive Service position complete with a six-figure salary and a cushy office on the E-Ring, ready to act on the grudges they’d carefully nurtured while twiddling thumbs in Coventry. Failing that, there’s always there’s always the talk show circuit.

So maybe I’m a bit jaded then, but I read “America’s Defense Meltdown - Pentagon Reform for President Obama and the New Congress” with a jaundiced eye, believing that any reform pitched at the new Congress, in particular, will have less to do with reforming DoD and the services than throttling them. Barney Frank has bills to pay, and we’ve already had that whole mandatory vs. discretionary discussion. It ain’t like you can just print the stuff.

The paper is appended below for those who want to read the whole thing (271 pages), but I’ll summarize the summaries for the MTV afflicted:

History: Our military costs too much, takes too long to adapt to changing circumstances, we have too few bodies and the ones we do have are “pampered, sluggish and weak-muscled.”

Shattering Illusions: The Constitutionally appointed power of presidents both Democratic and Republican over the military has resulted in unpopular wars that have diminished our national prestige. This “nation building” stuff is hard.

Leading the Human Dimension out of a Legacy of Failure: People are our most important asset and we suck at managing and leading them. (This chapter is written, in part, by a retired Army major.)

Maneuver Forces - The Army and Marine Corps after Iraq: World War II-style frontal assault with defined battle lines are so last century, and we will never need to launch an Inchon-style amphibious assault again. What’s needed is a more joint, mobile and dispersed construct with Army and Marine Corps forces harmonized into a rotational deployment schedule with the Army. So long, Marines. It was nice having you.

A Traveler’s Perspective (?) on Third and Fourth Generation War: More Marines should be trigger pullers, and they should have fewer officers above the company level. America’s premier 9/11 force is not light and agile enough. Marine aircraft should be cheaper, single mission CAS aircraft rather than more expensive multi-mission machines. I suppose because we’ll always have the Air Force there to help out.

Navy: The carrier strike group is an obsolescent remnant of World War II. Decouple the carriers from their air wings and become a ferry ship for whatever suits your purpose. After all, if your purpose ends up being something so exotic as prompt and sustained combat operations from the sea, you could always wait twelve months or so while the ship and airwing get integrated and trained. Submarines are today’s capital ships, because there’s nothing like the compelling sight of a submarine under the waves to provide a visible reminder of US deterrent power. Shift the focus of a maritime nation’s naval forces from controlling the sea lanes so vital to commerce and security, and become a coast guard for failed states. Because most of them don’t have one. Purchase more CAS aircraft like the A-10, I suppose because we won’t have the Air Force there to help out.

Air Force: Strategic bombing forces are too dominant in Air Force doctrine (which I believe will come as a surprise to both the Fighter Mafia and the strategic bomber bubbas). It is possible to buy 9000 single mission aircraft under current procurement constraints that will be more effective than the unaffordable top-of-the-line world beaters currently in procurement. Because even if we’ve historically managed to sweep the skies of enemy aircraft using the best technologies we can afford, and the best trained pilots to fly them, with the result that no US soldier or Marine has suffered an air attack since Korea, quantity has a quality all its own. And anyway, more replacement pilots are being born every day. Besides, the Navy and Marine Corps are also to buy single-mission CAS aircraft, and we wouldn’t want the USAF to bring different capabilities to the fight.

Air Mobility: More, smaller tankers for Special Operations air warfare. Less strategic and tactical airlift to get them there along with the heavy forces and support. Because those guys are really, really good at camping out for long periods of time, all alone.

Acquisition Reform: Our move away from larger forces to a lighter, more maneuverable, more deployable force has resulted in increased cost per trigger puller and a great deal of maneuver and deployment. Stuff got broken because we used it so much. Now it has to be replaced. This is presented as insight.

The Defense Budget is Out of Control: A new panel of independent, objective professionals should be convened by the president to assess how to fix this problem. We might even know a few guys who could do it.

I haven’t read the article yet, so I may revise and extend my remarks in a later post.

The Center for Defense Information is the refuge for leftists and pacifists who, for unknown reasons, blundered into the military and hung around long enough to become self-proclaimed “experts”. The Navy has produced more than its share of these misfits, apparently the Naval Academy has a reputation in some circles as some sort of a Brown on the Severn.

Most of these intellectual warriors, while happy to take the King’s Shilling throughout their careers, were careful to avoid the inherent risks involved with actual combat or piloting jet powered aircraft in dangerous circumstances.

These brainiacs came to Washington early and stayed, content to expound incessantly on the virtues of surrender. I suspect that they might have become hawks, but found the competition a little too stiff for their liking and therefore drifted into leftie land where mediocrity enjoys lifetime rewards.

Being a Navy grad I must present at least some sembelance of protest:

Most of the “brown on the severn types” went to west point prior to having majors in specific fields - ie at Navy my degree was a BS in Physics, my counterpart at WP received a BS in General Science. AF followed the Navy pattern, Coasties the WP pattern. Since those days WP has adopted the Navy scheme to provide true degrees in a field. There were those that were peeved that Navy went the extra lengths.

I knew the lefties at Navy as well as the ultra conservatives - but they existed at WP and AF just the same. Though my experience was AF had far more than others, there are probably those who would contest - and that’s fine. My point is they exist everywhere and not just in one service. Without a doubt the best were those who held true to the “old school” mentality of non-affiliated independents... the job is to project power to deter and maintain the peace, if deterence fails the job is to project power and eliminate the threat. (Listened to a Korean marine one time, he said about Korea: “We didn’t want to kill’em - just wound’em so it would take 2 more to carry the wounded back”)

I will admit that Navy has a larger Washington contingent - this is mainly driven by the capital intensive nature of the service and the programs required to operate it. Without ships you have no service. AF is similar in this regard. Army often feels left out in this regard because even without huge capital programs you can still field an army. You can count on two hands the number of times the standard firearm has changed in that service.

As to the inherent risks - most have no choice in if they see combat, especially in the Navy. I have glasses so I can’t be a pilot, and I’m not fond of going backwards at mach 3 with no control - so I opted surface warfare. I choose an overseas based ship for higher op tempo, but when the first GW started my ship was left behind in case North Korea or something else in East Asia went sour. Like one FFG is going to do much. I was idiot enough to volunteer for the extra combat roles that were requested by the ships in theater and was turned down for command needs. My point is no one chooses to go in theater or not - it is all dependent on where you are when things start to happen. Everyone I knew had a goal for command - you don’t get that sitting behind a desk.

As to the hanging around - with today’s up or out there aren’t a lot of people who get to just “hang around” to become experts. Lord knows I don’t claim to be.

The article specifically discusses colonels/captains/generals/admirals. People don’t make bird or above unless they have a spotless record. Not like Nimitz’s day when you could run a ship aground and still make flag. That being said are there career politicians in service - damn better believe it. I saw more fruit salad handed out to people who didn’t deserve it than I care to remember.

I think this is more about retirees who are bored and can’t stand not having a foot in the ring. They migrate left because there is less understanding and a greater need to fill the knowledge gap on that side of the aisle. Some might argue they are selling their soul, the left makes the same arguement about the hawks. Again the best are those who stay independent and mission focused.

JMO

Since my first post, I have read the bios of the authors, the preface, and the executive summaries.

To your point that I was unfair to the Navy and to USNA, I take your point, but note that CDI has somehow managed to hoist an Admirals flag from their mizzen throughout their sordid history, general officer flags have been less frequent.

We can see from the bios, that CDI have managed to get a good cross section of each service plus civilian bureaucrat whiners to author this “non-partisan” partisan screed. If you think it not a screed, just read the preface. The authors are mostly bureaucrats, and not very successful ones at that. A couple of Colonels in the lot, but most did not progress to that level, no doubt an insult to their obvious intellect and ability that led them to criticize those that found them wanting.

Among this bunch, I know COL Doug MacGregor and am quite familiar with MAJ Vandergrift. Both enjoy a reputation within the Army for their opinions and thoughtful pieces on the Army of the future. In MacGregor’s case, he became an inflexible zealot. When his magnum opus, “Breaking the Phalanx”, received rave reviews, became mandatory reading, and was embraced by Army Leadership for its innovative approach, MacGregor proceeded to throw a hissy fit because the Army refused to adopt ALL of his ideas and recommendations without exception or modification. Ever since, he has been tilting at windmills. It is either his way or the highway, and he has found refuge amongst those whose lot in life is to rail against the current administration.

From a reading of the executive summaries, these chapters seem to be a hodgepodge collection of half baked ideas whose common theme is but “we don’t like what’s being done now, and we will do the opposite”. Good grist for the political mill, but not worth much else. Are we really to take seriously William Lind’s notion that we should scrap all destroyers, frigates, and cruisers, and rely on converted merchant ships to perform their role? Even an infantry dude like me can recognize that as a ludicrous suggestion. I suspect that Lind has never been to sea and wouldn’t know larboard from starboard, but is a real fixture at the Army Navy Club.

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