So, even in a just war, it turns out it is difficult to get people to kill even people who are trying to kill them, even if they have been trained and more importantly conditioned to kill.
The lack of character of the Indian police—at least the ones D’sousa encountered cannot be intellectualized away.
Their lack of character and courage makes the accessories to the massacre.
That you would defend their failure to act is astounding to me.
Their lack of courage, common sense, autonomy-—whatever. cannot defend their failure to do the right thing and save lives.
What do you mean, “Conditioned to kill.”?
A huge number of Japanese and Germans died in WWII by stray bullets from unfired weapons if the study you refer to is illustrative of American combat units in general.
I have a problem with studies undertaken by liberals, psychologists, and and the anti-firearms camp.
You’re referring to studies by S.L.A. Marshall’s “Men Against Fire,” and the claims made therein are not without substantial controversy. It appears that Marshall’s source data wasn’t nearly as good as he would have liked to claim.
LTC (ret) Grossman’s work “On Killing” is more substantial, and claims that, yes, most people are who not experienced for de-sensitized prior to events show reluctance to fire.
Americans, as a rule, are less sensitive in these issues than other cultures. Americans are, on the whole, more violent and aggressive than many, many other cultures around the world. So while we Americans are wondering “WTF?” in the reluctance for anyone with arms and opportunity to engage the terrorists, remember that other cultures are not like American culture. We have a unique culture which, quite frankly, scares the crap out of many other cultures around the world in our propensity for all levels of violence - including just being the crap out of someone with fists and anything else close at hand.
And I’m not talking about our hardened combat veterans - of which we have many more than the rest of the world. I’m talking about our common “Joe American” in the street — has the capability to scare the crap out of people from the rest of the world for just being himself. That we have so many combat vets who are not, as the media portrays them to the rest of the world, shambolic psychos wandering around the halls of state pysch wards, but well-adjusted pillars of their communities - and who are big fuzzy teddy bears with barely concealed claws - scares many non-Americans to death.
I’ve seen this over and over and over again in Silicon Valley, where we’d have people from all over the world show up to work. When they’d travel outside the little enclave of the Bay Area in California, they were genuinely scared of Americans - until they got to know them.
Furriners just don’t ‘get’ us - at all. If an American were in that situation and had arms and started shooting back, you can bet your hangie-down parts that the world pretty would be having a cow right about now.
In a squad of 10 men, on average fewer than three ever fired their weapons in combat. Day in, day out — it did not matter how long they had been soldiers, how many months of combat they had seen, or even that the enemy was about to overrun their position. This was what the highly regarded Brigadier General Samuel Lyman Atwood Marshall, better known as S.L.A. Marshall, or ‘Slam,’ concluded in a series of military journal articles and in his book, Men Against Fire, about America’s World War II soldiers. Marshall had been assigned as a military analyst for the U.S. Army in both the Pacific and Europe. The American, he concluded, comes ‘from a civilization in which aggression, connected with the taking of life, is prohibited and unacceptable….The fear of aggression has been expressed to him so strongly and absorbed by him so deeply and pervadingly — practically with his mother’s milk — that it is part of the normal man’s emotional make-up. This is his great handicap when he enters combat. It stays his trigger finger even though he is hardly conscious that it is a restraint upon him.’
Marshall’s claims did not go unchallenged, but despite the disagreements they were widely accepted as truth both within the nation’s military and by those writing about the war and its American fighting force. Marshall continued in his role as analyst and self-proclaimed military historian before, during and after the Korean War, authoring many more books and frequently appearing as a guest lecturer at Fort Leavenworth and other installations around the United States. It is not an exaggeration to say that he was more or less a living legend by the mid-1960s. Largely due to his influence, noncommissioned officers and officers sent to Vietnam at the beginning of the American buildup were concerned that their soldiers and Marines would not fire at the enemy.
The American fighting man made sure that these concerns were short-lived. He showed little hesitation to use a rifle, pistol, shotgun, machine gun, grenade launcher or whatever other weapon he carried. Marshall himself visited Vietnam to conduct studies similar to those done during World War II and later emulated in Korea. He concluded that much had changed since those earlier conflicts and that it was not unusual for close to 100 percent of American infantrymen to engage the adversary during firefights in Vietnam. It seemed that all was well. Marshall had seemingly found that the Americans’ hesitation to fire was all but gone.
Some 20 years later, the validity of Marshall’s analysis was called into doubt. Respected researchers interviewed those who had accompanied him in World War II and also pored over his personal notes during the mid-1980s. Convincing evidence pointed to his having fabricated his World War II ratio-of-fire values, still so widely accepted at the time. The question seemed inevitable: Had there been a problem with Americans’ willingness to engage the enemy in World War II? If so, had it actually been rectified during the Vietnam War as Marshall claimed, or was the research done there just as flawed as had been the case a quarter of a century before?
The concern was fundamental to the nation’s military readiness. Americans would die needlessly and wars would be much extended if U.S. troops failed to perform the essential act of firing on the enemy. Compelled to determine whether a problem existed, I conducted a survey of 258 1st Cavalry Division Vietnam veterans in 1987. My motivation had nothing to do with determining Americans’ willingness to use their weapons in World War II; any results from Vietnam would not apply to a war fought decades before. The question was whether there might be an existing problem in the U.S. armed forces. Despite Marshall’s fall from grace, there were those who had agreed with him. The issue was important enough to investigate rigorously. Since Vietnam was the most recent U.S. war, its veterans were the men who could provide answers to critical questions addressing willingness to fire. Ultimately it was their responses that formed the basis for a detailed study of this issue and the influence of training, the 12-month rotation and the six-month command tour on the American fighting man’s combat performance. The results of that study were published in 2000 in the book Reading Athena’s Dance Card: Men Against Fire in Vietnam. This article summarizes those findings relating to whether men fired their weapons and what factors influenced their willingness to do so.