Rumsfeld’s Revisionism

Reading former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s op-ed in the New York Times the other day reminded me of John Kennedy’s aphorism that success has a thousand fathers and defeat is an orphan. In this case, Rumsfeld is attempting to claim paternity for the so-called surge and the success we’ve witnessed in Iraq during the last 22 months. The problem is that the reality is at odds with what he is now claiming.

It is not that some of the specific claims Secretary Rumsfeld makes in his op-ed aren’t accurate. He is right, for example, about the progress we were making against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) in late 2006. It’s true as well that Secretary Rumsfeld, late in the day, did support the surge.

The real fault with the piece, in my judgment, is that what Rumsfeld writes is selective and misleading. By that I mean that the causal reader would come away from his op-ed believing that Rumsfeld handed over to General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and Secretary Robert Gates a nation, Iraq, in which all the pieces had been put in place and that we were on the verge of a successful tipping point.

In fact, thanks in large measure to the policies pursued by Rumsfeld, Iraq was, in the latter half of 2006, in a death spiral. Violence, chaos, and a low-grade civil war were engulfing it. The insurgency and Shia militias were gaining strength. Sectarian divisions were deepening. Millions of Iraqis had fled the country. The economy was in shambles. In the words of the Iraq Study Group Report, “[t]he situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating.” Reports are that General Casey himself privately acknowledged that Baghdad was “sliding toward chaos.” Many people believed Iraq was so wrecked it was beyond recovery.

If victory is defined as toppling Saddam and establishing a new government that would prevent the re-emergence of a Sunni Arab ruler patterned after Saddam, that was established a couple of years ago. As soon as the Shiites grabbed a firm hold of the Iraqi state's revenue streams, the Sunni Arabs had lost. If we had left then, there would have been a genocidal massacre of Sunni Arabs.

If victory is defined as keeping democracy alive, the odds are that Iraq will revert to form several years after we leave, if not immediately. The Sunni Arab party and dissident Shiite Arab factions in Iraq would be wise to agitate for the permanent stationing of American troops in Iraq as an honest broker, in case some Shiite Arab dictator-wannabe decides to make himself president-for-life. Obama has committed himself to a withdrawal in two years. Maliki seems - to me - to be angling for a president-for-life slot. Maybe I'm wrong, but I think Iraq will revert to dictatorship after we leave. Is that our problem? As long as Iraq doesn't start sponsoring anti-American terrorists, no. Saddam was a terror sponsor, but he was a minor leaguer. I don't think Maliki would be any worse.

The real pity would be this - after 4,000 dead and $600b in expenditures, we end up with an Iraqi president for life. If this is the end state, it would almost have been better if we had not invaded Iraq. I say almost, because capturing Saddam was a worthwhile objective. The question is whether he was worth the price we paid.

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