Posted on 09/27/2008 1:16:46 PM PDT by politicket
Welcome to Lesson 1 of The Basics of Credit Derivatives.
For this lesson I will be referencing the following article: The Ballooning Credit Derivatives Market: Easing Risk or Making It Worse?, which was published in November 2005 by the Wharton School at the University of Pennsylvania.
My comments will be in Red.
Lets get started:
The Ballooning Credit Derivatives Market: Easing Risk or Making It Worse?
Published: November 02, 2005 in Knowledge@Wharton
When Delphi filed for bankruptcy October 8, investors had to start assessing their losses on more than $2 billion in the auto parts maker's bonds, which have recently traded at around 60% of their face value. As bad as that is, there is more. Looming over the market like an invisible and unpredictable giant is an estimated $25 billion in credit derivatives, a form of insurance whose value is directly linked to the ups and downs of Delphi debt.
This paragraph is referencing the bankruptcy of Delphi Automotive Systems, which was once owned by General Motors and was spun off into its own company in 1999. It also talks about the companys bonds. Think of bonds as debt obligations. Youve probably heard the term corporate bonds before. It is one way that a company can raise capital to accomplish its business it sells bonds to investors, in exchange for money to operate. If the company goes belly-up then the bond holders have a higher pecking order than those investors that may have owned common or preferred stock in the company.
The common and preferred shareholders were completely wiped out in this scenario. The bond holders saw that their investment took a haircut and was now only worth 60% of what they paid for it (worth is based on the liquidation or sale of any company assets).
This paragraph also talks about $25 billion in other debt that is hanging over the market from those that bet that Delphi would not go bankrupt and lost. The way that these investors in the market lost is by participating in the selling of insurance to the bond holders. When Dephi filed for bankruptcy the insurance providers had to make good on the full original worth of the bond. In exchange, the bond holder was to hand over the bond (just like when there is a car wreck and the insurance company pays the value of the car in exchange for the car being delivered to them). One problem with this is that the physical number of insured bonds may have not been enough to give back to the insurance providers if there were more insurance providers than there were bonds. When this happens, the bonds have to be purchased by the buyer of the insurance so that they can give them back to the insurance provider. This would be like you taking out two insurance policies on your car and getting into a wreck. You collect from both policies (highly illegal in the car insurance business) and then both insurance companies want the car in return. You only have one car to give back, so you would have to go BUY a second wrecked car of the exact same type, so that you could give it back to the second insurance company.
In summary, what you need to understand from this paragraph is that there was $25 billion dollars of extra debt in the marketplace because of Delphis bankruptcy without any of those in debt physically holding ANY common stock, preferred stock, or corporate bonds. All that they held were bets.
Clear as mud? Good. Lets move on.
What happens to these complex contracts as the underlying bonds plunge in value? Will ripple effects amplify the Delphi damage, spreading harm to institutional and individual investors who otherwise have no stake in Delphi?
The complex contracts that this paragraph refers to are the insurance contracts between the buyer and seller. The seller has absolutely no physical interest in Delphi, except for the bet that they own regarding whether or not the bond will go into default (i.e. not get paid) This would happen if the cash flow backing the bond was insufficient to meet the bonds terms. This paragraph is asking the question: What happens when there are too many sellers of insurance? What effect might this have on the market (and economy) as a whole? Read on
The Delphi situation points to a broader question: Is the credit derivative market, which grew from next to nothing in the mid-1990s to an estimated $5 trillion at the end of 2004 -- and is perhaps more than twice that size today -- pumping new, poorly-understood risk into the financial markets? Or are these exotic products helping to mitigate the shock from corporate crises, as their proponents claim?
Now were getting to the meat. Remember, this article is from the Wharton School arguably the sharpest minds in the investment community. Theyre basically saying uh oh, what happens as the size of this thing begins to spiral out of control. Notice from the paragraph that what began as next to nothing in the mid 90s was estimated at $5 trillion (of bets) in 2004, and was presumed to be twice that amount at the time this article was written or $10 trillion of bets. In 2007, that figure ballooned to around $62 trillion dollars of bets. Since the beginning of this year, there has been an effort under way to identify bets that would be a wash. They have been destroying these insurance contracts (bets) by doing what is known as a tear-up (you can take that quite literally). As of now, there are assumed to be approximately $54 trillion dollars of bets in the market.
The paragraph also ponders whether it is good to pump new, poorly-understood risk into to financial markets? What happens when there are corporate crises? Does this investment strategy help the situation at that point in time or do great harm? Remember folks, this was written in November, 2005. I want you to write a date down on a piece of paper so that you dont forget it as we continue these lessons July, 2007.
"They're huge, and they have grown very rapidly," said Wharton finance professor Richard J. Herring, describing credit-derivatives products. "In principle, they are redistributing risk," he noted, adding that in the past few years, credit derivatives have helped the financial markets weather storms like the bankruptcies of Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat as well as Argentina's debt default.
It was believed for quite some time that the more credit derivatives in existence, the better. The mindset was something like this: If a catastrophe happened with a particular company, and there had been a huge number of sellers of insurance on the corporate debt, then each insurance seller would only end up paying a little bit of the entire bill.
Heres an illustration: Lets pretend that you go out to dinner with four of your friends. After dinner, the bill comes and immediately somebody asks: Whats the damage? In our story, the damage is $100, so each person takes out $20.00, plus a premium (for the tip) and the dinner is complete. What if only one person brought their wallet? They would have incurred greater harm because there was no redistribution of risk the risk being if you eat our food, you pay our bill.
This all sounds logical, right? Theres no downside, is there?
"Those events would have been sufficient in an earlier era to cause major problems to major banks, and even to precipitate a banking crisis," he said. "But the banks have been fairly robust, and the reason is that someone else is holding the credit risk." However, he added, "What we don't know with any new market is whether something that somebody hasn't quite thought through is going to cause a meltdown."
This paragraph should have you sitting a little straighter in your chair. Finance professor Richard Herring is saying how great credit derivatives are, but stating what has now become painfully obvious. Let me repeat: What we don't know with any new market is whether something that somebody hasn't quite thought through is going to cause a meltdown.
There was something they didnt think through correctly, and it is here, has been here since July, 2007, and will continue rolling forward. Lets move along
In September, the Federal Reserve summoned 14 major banks to a meeting to discuss troubles with the credit-derivatives market. The concern was not that these instruments are intrinsically hazardous. Rather, the Fed worried that the market has grown so quickly that participants cannot keep up with the paperwork. If trades were not processed fast enough, investors could lose confidence in the market and a normal crisis could snowball.
Here was a meeting, with the Federal Reserve and the major banks (the brightest minds in the business) and rather than focus on risk assessment from ballooning credit derivative bets they worried about how to fix the system so that they could handle MORE of them. After all, spreading out the risk was a brilliant strategy or so they thought.
The alarm had been raised earlier in the summer by E. Gerald Corrigan, managing director at The Goldman Sachs Group. As president of the New York Federal Reserve Bank in 1999, he managed the Fed's response to an earlier credit crisis, the collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Management.
Here we learn that E. Gerald Corrigan was the one that wanted the Fed and 14 member banks to get together. He was the one that was concerned that more needed to be done to get more credit derivatives flowing through our economic system and that of the world. Mr. Corrigan, who was once the President of the New York Federal Reserve Bank, was managing director at The Goldman Sachs Group. His boss was the CEO of Goldman Sachs, Hank Paulson our current Treasury Secretary of the United States.
Eric. S. Rosen, managing director and head of North American credit trading at JP Morgan, one of the biggest players in this market, addressed this topic during a panel discussion on sales and trading at the October 14 Wharton Finance Conference. "The Fed is getting worried about the infrastructure," he said. Regulators made it clear at the meeting that "they don't care what your [credit derivative trading] volumes are; you've got to get the system in order." His company is spending $100 million on systems to handle the soaring volume. "I think the Fed has got it right," he noted.
Now, we read that on October 14, 2005, the head of JP Morgans North American operations told a group of high-powered financial executives that the Fed is getting worried about infrastructure. They were also told to not worry about trading volumes ($10 trillion of bets at the time), but to get their process in order, so that they could handle even more bets.
Yes, this is the same JP Morgan that the government has given sweetheart deals to in the takeovers of Bear Stearns and Washington Mutual.
The credit-derivatives market barely existed before the mid-1990s. It developed when new mathematical insights made it possible to set prices for more complex instruments. Market participants were also gaining experience with other forms of derivatives tied to stocks, commodities and currencies. Banks and other lenders and investors were looking for new ways to hedge against risks. And investors such as hedge funds, insurance companies and pension funds were looking for ways to take on risk in hopes of earning higher investment yields.
This paragraph is pretty much self explanatory, except I want to expand on a couple of areas. The original credit derivatives market in the 90s was driven, for the most part, by Investment Consultants that were sincerely looking for a larger return for their client portfolio. Over the years, they have created amazing mathematical formulas that rival the 7 spices of Colonel Sanders recipe in their complexity. There is an incredible amount of competition in the Investment Consulting industry and there has always been pressure to get a leg up on your adversaries.
This paragraph talks about Banks (meaning both commercial and investment) looking for new ways to hedge against risk. Understand that they actually were looking for MORE risk, because it provided MORE return. The problem they faced is that the banking industry is heavily regulated and for a long time they were burdened with managing illiquid assets that only gained a good return. Credit derivatives was their salvation. It allowed them to create hedging strategies where they could actively participate in the high risk high gain marketplace, while still meeting the letter of the law in regulatory requirements.
One last point: Notice how insurance companies and pension funds (yes, your retirement) were getting all tingly about the prospect of taking on more risk. Just like the banks, they had been stuck with conservative investing strategies, and credit derivatives were a thing of beauty to them.
Were almost done with this lesson, hang tight..
The driving force in creating the credit-derivatives market, said Herring, was big banks looking for ways to make assets, such as loan portfolios, more liquid.
One word describes this paragraph GREED! The investment and commercial banks of the entire world put everything at risk so that they could participate with the big boys where it involved risk.
You made it through Lesson One! Still hanging in there?
The next post will be Lesson Two. Well still be covering the same article which will encompass the first 3 lessons.
Like I said before, you don't need to trade CDS if you're going to commit accounting fraud.
Like I said before, the CDS business of AIG was regulated by a political appointee of a now disgraced liberal former governor. And as Papabear has pointed out, the people creating this mess had large incentives to be dishonest.
Bingo..
Thank-you for this.
He said you could earn a guaranteed profit by buying CDS and burning down the economy. I think we can ignore his "thoughts" about CDS.
Sure. He later changed that to burn down MBS which is at least plausible. I’ve changed things I’ve written before too.
So buy a CDS on some MBS. How do you make that set of MBS more likely to go into default?
Short sell the insurer (e.g. MBIA)
Last Week on CNBC they were talking about the “auctions” of Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae “CDS.s” or credit deriviatives, that was being set up to dispose of them. We should get in writing that banks the government helps must do the same, and since that company has those auctions already in place, it could do the banks derivatives...??? Only 3-4 banks hold the most of those CDS (credit default swaps)...but more than 10 X that number do hold them.
They fear that if they do not ‘do something’ to slow down the runs on moneymarkets, annuities or other savings, this will bomb big time. There are National Security Issues here.
So “Bob” is really Goldman Sachs, not AIG?
Bob is AIG, but the bailout was really for Alice (Goldman Sachs) because they had the most to lose from the breakup or bankruptcy of AIG. The bailout was a bridge loan forced by the government in place of private offers.
LOL. Now THAT I understood.
thanks
CDS-credit default swaps are known as a credit “derivative”, and a type of “specialized insurance” used by debt holders to Hedge or insure against a default...HE$$ yes it’s a bet.
A potentially market-rattling bankruptcy filing by American International Group (AIG Quote - Cramer on AIG - Stock Picks) forced federal officials to reverse course and pursue a costly bailout of the insurance giant late Tuesday.AIG will receive an $85 billion bridge loan from the Federal Reserve aimed at keeping the giant insurer out of bankruptcy and preventing the acceleration of a world credit crisis.
To say "Bob" was forced to take the loan from the Fed, you need to look at the big picture. The only reason that AIG stock price could have gotten so far below book value is the threat of Fed intervention. As has been shown since last January with Bear, the shareholders always lose when the Fed takes over which is unfortunate because it robs companies like AIG of needed and deserved capital.
Please add me to your ping list. Thanks.
Good thread.
If we do the $700 Billion bailout, doesn’t the game start up again?
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