Posted on 08/08/2008 9:26:41 AM PDT by GodGunsGuts
And yet, Saint Augustine did share the view that you seem to have, at least, that Scripture has nothing at all to say about matters of science:
[snip]"[12] It would be easy enough to show that Augustine does rely on Scripture for knowledge about the natural world, knowledge which we might describe as “scientific.”7 But that would only suggest that Augustine does not espouse the strong form of the principle of limitation (Pera’s “principle of independence”), as McMullin rightly suggests. Augustine does not distinguish natural and revealed knowledge by arguing that they deal with subjects which never overlap. He would have no time for Gould’s NOMA principle! However, what we need to ask is whether Augustine holds to even the weak form of the principle of limitation, espoused by McMullin, according to which Scripture should not be used to settle “technical issues of natural science.” To test this idea, we need to find a passage which deals with something corresponding to a “technical issue of natural science,” so that we may examine Augustine’s attitude to the authority of Scripture in such a case. The only clear example I can find in De Genesi ad litteram is in another passage from book two, where Augustine tackles the question of whether the sun, moon and stars are of equal brightness. As he writes,
certain persons are also wont to ask whether the luminaries of heaven, that is, the sun, moon, and stars, are in themselves equally bright, on the supposition that the unequal distances from earth may cause them to appear with greater or lesser brilliance to our eyes. Those who hold this opinion have no hesitation in saying that the brightness of the moon is less than that of the sun, by which, they say, it is illumined. Concerning the stars, they go so far as to maintain that many are the size of the sun, or even larger than it, but that they appear small because of their greater distance (1982: 2.16.33).Does this question correspond, in Augustine’s eyes, to what McMullin describes as “technical issues of natural science”? It seems from the following paragraph (1982: 2.16.34) that it does. Augustine’s argument there is that, while such speculation is all very well for unbelievers, it is “neither necessary nor fitting” for believers to waste their valuable time in what he describes as “subtle enquiries” (subtilius aliquid quaerere, literally, “to enquire in a rather subtle manner” [1972: 204]).8 If these matters are for Augustine matters of “rather subtle enquiry,” then they would seem to correspond to the “technical matters” to which McMullin makes reference.
[13] How, then, does Augustine respond to this question? His initial response might seem to be in accordance with McMullin’s principle of limitation, that is to say, the principle that “texts of Scripture should not be taken to have a bearing on technical issues of natural science.” In Augustine’s words, “for us it would seem sufficient to recognize that, whatever may be the true account of all this, God is the Creator of the heavenly bodies.” In other words, the true account
7 See, for instance, his treatment of “the waters above the heavens” mentioned in Genesis 1 (1982: 2.5.9; cf. McMullin 1998: 298). In a recent monograph I accepted McMullin’s use of the phrase “principle of limitation” in reference to Augustine’s work (Dawes: 16). What I here want to argue is that, while such language is certainly applicable to Galileo, it is not strictly applicable to Augustine.
8 In this context the comparative adverb subtilius seems to have effectively lost its comparative sense.
may be left to the natural philosopher to decide; all the Christian need do is to acknowledge God as Creator. Yet the words which follow suggest that Augustine’s view is not so simple. For he immediately adds: “And yet we must hold to the pronouncement of St. Paul, There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another of the stars; for star differs from star in glory [1 Cor 15:41].” In other words, whatever position one accepts, Augustine insists it must be compatible with 1 Corinthians. If he truly held to a principle of limitation, he would not have regarded 1 Corinthians 15:41 as having a bearing on this matter at all.
[14] It follows that McMullin’s attribution to Augustine of a “principle of limitation” cannot explain what our author is doing here. But on my proposed reformulation of Augustine’s position -that of the principle of differing purpose - his argument becomes clear. The purpose of 1 Corinthians 15 is not to teach the physical details of the universe, but to speak about human bodies at the resurrection of the dead, a fact which Augustine recognizes in the same passage (“Paul speaks thus because of the likeness of the stars to risen bodies of men”). Compared to the doctrine of the resurrection, such subtle speculations about the structure of the universe are rather a waste of valuable time (cf. 1982: 2.16.34). Yet - and this is the key point - when, in fulfilling this more serious purpose, the Scriptures make reference to aspects of the physical world, what they say must be taken with the utmost seriousness.9 Pace McMullin, such biblical texts do “have a bearing on technical issues of natural science,” even if they were not written for that purpose. As it turns out, Augustine suggests that 1 Corinthians 15:41 could be interpreted in such a way that it does not preclude the scientific opinion he is discussing. One could, for instance, argue that, while the heavenly bodies are all of the same brightness in themselves, St. Paul’s remark refers to their differing degrees of brightness when seen by us. But at the end of the day, Augustine suggests that believers should accept the plain meaning of Genesis 1:16, even in this rather technical matter.10 As he writes, “we do better when we believe that those two luminaries [the sun and the moon] are greater than the others, since Holy Scripture says of them, And God made the two great lights” (1982: 2.16.34). [emphasis mine]
[15] While I am distancing myself from Ernan McMullin’s attribution to Augustine of a “principle of limitation,” my conclusion is very close to one he himself arrived at in an earlier study. In that study McMullin speaks of the tension between two ideas, both found in Augustine’s work (1981: 21). The first is that idea that Scripture is not intended to teach matters that are “of no relevance to salvation.” The second is Augustine’s assertion (found elsewhere in the same commentary) that where the conclusions of reason are not securely founded, the literal sense of Scripture is to be preferred. The question this raises is clear: “If cosmology is not relevant to salvation, why should it be supposed that cosmological details in the Scriptures are to be taken as literal truth-claims?” McMullin’s response to this question seems to me to be entirely correct:
Augustine’s answer would undoubtedly be that they are covered by the warrant that the literal sense of Scripture possesses, and that one cannot require relevance to the salvation message of every passage for which this is to hold. The details of__________________________
9 Augustine’s position here is actually very close to the de dicto view of biblical authority held by Cardinal Bellarmine at the time of Galileo’s trial (Blackwell 1991: 32, 105; see note 5 above).
10 In other words, Augustine’s final appeal here is to what McMullin calls “the principle of the priority of Scripture” (1998: 295), according to which the literal meaning of the Scripture should prevail over natural knowledge, provided that the latter is not demonstrably proven.
Israel’s history with which the Old Testament abounds lack such relevance, yet
they must (he would insist) be taken as historically accurate (1981: 21).
If this is correct, as I believe it is, then it is misleading to suggest that Augustine holds to a “principle of limitation,” as though he were intending to place limits on Biblical authority. Such a concern belongs to a later age; it is foreign to the religious world of Augustine. As far as Galileo is concerned, he was surely correct to cite Augustine in support of his first point: that the purpose for which Scripture was written was not that of teaching astronomy. However, in taking this argument further and suggesting that biblical authority should not be invoked in astronomical matters, Galileo was departing from the tradition which Augustine represents."
Source:
Journal of Religion & Society Volume 4 (2002) ISSN 1522-5658
Could There Be Another Galileo Case?
Galileo, Augustine and Vatican II
Gregory W. Dawes, University of Otago, New Zealand
Cordially,
Cordially,
You didn't read my post. It is a quote from Saint Augustine.
He says he wishes he would have learned Hebrew.
I excuse the typo.
Please see my post #117.
We may be in agreement.
Actually you wrote: “Except that Luther couldn’t read Hebrew and admitted as much.”
Followed by the quote below, which looked like it was designed to back up the idea that Luther couldn’t read Hebrew. Are you now saying that the following quote came from Augustine???
“The Hebrew language is the best language of all, with the richest vocabulary... If I were younger I would want to learn this language, because no one can really understand the Scriptures without it. For although the New Testament is written in Greek, it is full of hebraisms and Hebrew expressions. It has therefore been aptly said that the Hebrews drink from the spring, the Greeks from the stream that flows from it, and the Latins from a downstream puddle.”
LOL!
I’m going for more coffee. You’ll have to carry on without me until I figure out what I’m typing.
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