This is NOT a DNS flaw.
This is a flaw in BIND, a particular piece of software that does DNS.
While the majority of DNS servers use BIND, it is not the only one.
I stopped using BIND many years ago due to it's poor track record of security and compliance with RFCs.
I switched to DJBDNS and have had zero problems with DNS since then.
BIND is not the only flavor of DNS that is affected. Microsoft DNS was also vulnerable, as are others. Kaminsky does not say that it is a problem solely with BIND, but with various implementations of the DNS protocol.
Here's an interview with Dan Kaminsky at Black Hat 2008 where he explains it pretty well.
I know, and agree...
But hey... when a software programmer doesn't do bounds-checking on a stack-allocated buffer, they don't describe the flaw as a "failure to check bounds", they call it a "buffer overflow", even though it wasn't the buffer's fault.
This is a DNS protocol flaw and spans BIND 8/9, MSDNS, Nominum. It doesn't affect DJBDNS, PowerDNS, and MaraDNS.
Now if someone things the following: Our DNS servers dont accept queries from the outside world. They must be safe!
-Can someone ask them to do an nslookup www.doxpara.com, will they return 157.22.245.20?
-If so, dont be so sure
I security track record remark I found interesting as it brought back a recent “Banging spoon on highchair” incident of Linus’. Did you catch that a few weeks ago where he called *BSD devs “m*asterbating monkeys”? Some much the educated high-brow discussion of “when’s a security flaw a bug/code flaw” and “aren't all code flaws security holes?”, vice-versa, ad nausea
Don't want to get start a whole DBJDNS v. BIND thing, but I'm with you on your ISC comment. You see ISC+not-for-profit mentioned in the same breath far too often. Configuring BIND is *not* for the faint of heart. Boy, can I attest to that.