Too Big, Too Heavy

The mission of the US Air Force is to fly and to fight. Everyone in the Air Force’s job falls into one of three categories: to do the flying and fighting, to command those who do, or to support them. Part of supporting the warriors is to buy the best aircraft to accomplish the mission at lowest risk. Which is why the Air Force’s decision to buy urgently-needed tanker aircraft from the Northrop Grumman – EADS consortium must be reversed.

That decision -- announced on February 29 -- could not be judged quickly or without consulting with experts on both sides of the controversy. Air mobility experts, two former chiefs of staff of the Air Force and other experienced warfighters gave me very different opinions.

My reluctant conclusion is that the Air Force’s decision is profoundly wrong. I base it on two facts: first, the warfighters need a tanker that isn’t so big and heavy that it is unable to deploy on many of the world’s airfields; and second, the Air Force is taking an unreasonably high risk on the NG– EADS aircraft.

Congressional whiners and populist pundits are suffering a case of the vapors over the decision to award the contract (for an estimated $40 billion) to NG-EADS because American jobs will be exported to France. To be sure, US jobs and tax dollars will go to the subsidized French Airbus company -- a subsidiary of EADS -- whose A-330 will be modified into the tankers. But it was Congress that imposed a procurement system under which the Air Force was required to have competition for the sole US company capable of building the tanker -- Boeing -- and it is Congress that enabled foreign companies to compete.

Tankers aren’t glamorous. They are big, heavy and drab. But without them, America would not be a superpower. There are not that many places in the world in which American combat aircraft can land to refuel. Without tankers showing up in the right places at the right times, fighters can’t fight, bombers can’t bomb and transport aircraft can’t deliver troops, supplies, or disaster relief to far corners of the world in a matter of hours.

Former Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. John Jumper (who has consulted for Northrop Grumman on other programs) told me that he believed the tanker procurement was “squeaky clean” and that the warfighters would get what they need from the NG-EADS aircraft because it met all the requirements set by the Air Force.

Air mobility experts point out that we don’t run out of bulk cargo and passenger-carrying capacity. The Civil Reserve Air Fleet -- civilian airliners and cargo aircraft that can be called into service by the Air Force in a crisis -- provide tremendous capacity to carry people and cargo, but not jet fuel. But our warfighting ability is limited by the number of tankers and how and where they can be deployed.

Deployability is critical because tankers are bad tenants. Most runways can’t handle their weight and their size limits the number that can be stationed on any airfield. The bigger and heavier the tankers are, the fewer airfields can accommodate them.

The Boeing tanker, a version of the 767 jetliner, has a maximum takeoff weight of 395,000 pounds. It’s 159 feet long and has a wingspan of 156 feet. The NG-EADS Airbus 330 tanker’s max weight is 507,000 pounds. It is 192 feet long and has a 197-foot wingspan. My best scientific wild guess is that the NG-EADS aircraft will be unable to operate out of at least 20% of the airfields that could accommodate the right-sized Boeing tanker.

How the Air Force allowed this to happen is nothing short of bizarre. The warfighters are supposed to control the “requirements” -- the criteria the aircraft must meet -- and the procurement pukes are supposed to apply those criteria to choose which aircraft will be bought. But somehow, in mid-stream, the criteria were changed without the warfighters’ knowing about it. Critical criteria including maximum takeoff weight and clearance between wingtips while parked were changed to skew the competition to favor the larger Airbus.

Gen. Ronald Fogelman -- former Air Force chief of staff (and before that, commander of what is now Air Mobility Command which operates the tankers) is a Boeing consultant. He disputed that idea: “Anybody who thinks that somehow they’re going to dual-use these airplanes in a crisis and get benefit from both tanker and cargo-carrying capacity just doesn’t understand the way these things get used.”

Fogelman’s point is well-taken. For every hour a tanker is diverted to other purposes, every other aircraft that depends on the tankers has one less hour to fly.

One senior retired officer who requested anonymity told me that when the changes were revealed he called several officers high in the chain of command and they all reacted by asking “what are you talking about?” Now they know.

The other huge problem is the risk inherent in the winner’s inexperience and plan to build the aircraft. Boeing tankers have been delivering fuel in flight for over 50 years. NG-EADS has delivered fuel to an aircraft in flight through a “boom”, the crane-like device that is extended from the back of a tanker and through which fuel is delivered, precisely once. And NG-EADS promises to assemble the aircraft in a new plant in Alabama that isn’t built, using a new workforce that hasn’t ever built a tanker.

Seventeen years ago, I sat in my Pentagon office wondering what went wrong and how to fix it. A top-secret Navy attack aircraft program (which we know now was the A-12) had turned into a disaster. I hadn’t been cleared into the program, so despite my fancy security clearances and title I couldn’t even find out what had happened far less try to fix it. My boss had done a bad job of judging how the program was doing and had told the Secretary of Defense (a gent named Cheney) that all was well when it wasn’t. The big boss had passed that opinion on to Congress with embarrassing results.

My puzzlement ended when a familiar large head leaned into my office. Its owner smiled and asked, “Jed, you got a minute?” This friend, whom I count among my mentors, was a retired Air Force four-star general and had been commander of Air Force Systems Command. AFSC ran all aircraft procurement for USAF, so he knew a thing or two about building airplanes.

The explanation he gave was horribly simple. My boss had been shown an empty factory floor by the CEO of General Dynamics (now a part of Northrop Grumman), on which chalk rectangles marked the spots where specialized machinery would be placed to produce the A-12. And the CEO told my boss that they’d be turning out aircraft in 18 months or less.

Which sounded perfectly reasonable to my boss, whose previous career had been in the automobile industry. He was used to retooling factories and retraining workers every year to build new cars. He didn’t know you can’t do that for complex aircraft. It takes 18-24 months just to get the special tooling and test equipment (known in the aerospace biz as “STTE”) you need, and only then can you train your workforce to use it. My boss fell for the CEO’s yarn and the A-12 program produced a lawsuit but no aircraft.

NG-EADS promises to deliver about fifty tankers in the next five years. The component sections will be built in European plants and shipped to Mobile, Alabama to be assembled. But they haven’t broken ground for the Mobile factory yet. Whatever empty lot is chosen can’t be turned into the KC-45 plant for at least two years. Then -- if you make the false assumption that you know exactly what STTE you need now, and order it today -- you still have to install it, hire and train your workforce and organize to assemble and test-fly the aircraft.

If they can deliver fifty aircraft from Mobile in five years I’ll parachute from the 50th at 20,000 feet wearing my tuxedo. The risk inherent in this scheme is enormous, and it means that the NG-EADS aircraft is a huge mission risk measured in time. They will be years late in producing the aircraft, the costs will increase greatly, and tankers won’t be where we need them when we do.

The Government Accountability Office will rule on the Boeing protest against this contract in the next several months. But the GAO -- as I know from three decades of trying cases like this before it -- cannot rule on anything more than the legalities of what the Air Force did. Its authority does not extend to judging the effect on our warfighting capability.

Before GAO acts, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates must. He should call in all the combatant commanders and all of the Air Mobility Command former bosses he can find who aren’t working for one of the competitors. Get to the bottom of why the warfighters were apparently ignored. And fix this before billions of dollars and precious years are spent on what may reduce the Air Force’s ability to fly and to fight.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Babbin is the editor of Human Events. He served as a deputy undersecretary of defense in President George H.W. Bush's administration. He is the author of "In the Words of our Enemies"(Regnery,2007) and (with Edward Timperlake) of "Showdown: Why China Wants War with the United States" (Regnery, 2006) and "Inside the Asylum: Why the UN and Old Europe are Worse than You Think" (Regnery, 2004). E-mail him at jbabbin@eaglepub.com.

The scores are almost identical. So where did the “4 out of 5” and “it wasn’t close” come from?

What is compared on page 16 are
“Mission Capability/Proposal Risk”
“Past Performance”
“Cost/Price (MPLCC)”
“IFARA Fleet Effectiveness Value”

The first two are nearly identical like the third.
GOA recalculated:
$108.041 billion for Boeing's
$108.133 billion for Northrop Grumman’s offer
Less than 0.1 %.

But next factor was
“IFARA Fleet Effectiveness Value”

1.79 for KC-767AT
1.90 for KC-45

One KC-45 would replace 1.90 KC-135 and one KC-767AT just 1.79 Stratotankers.
Looks not much but with 263 KC-45 you can replace the whole fleet of 500 KC-135. You'll need 279 KC-767AT to do the same.

According to this calculations after the first batch of 179 KC-45 you just need 84 more aircrafts of the same type to replace the complete KC-135 fleet.

According to the IFARA Factor Evaluation GOA says:

Our review of the record discloses that the SSAC and SSA did consider the agency’s evaluated insights and observations in their evaluation of the firms’ proposals under this factor, and therefore find no basis to object to the agency’s evaluation.

Both aircrafts are nearly identical in terms of production risk or costs (0.1 %). But one aircraft is about 6 % more efficient in its main task aerial refueling.

Or with the words of Gen. Lichte:

I can sum it up in one word: more.

More passengers, more cargo, more fuel to offload, more patients that we can carry, more availability, more flexibility and more dependability.

Oh good the spider chart again. Someone made a good point, show the chart with the round circle being the requirement not the KC30.

Since the GAO ruled that extra credit should not have been given for exceeding the requirement this chart is misleading.

The IFARA number also required a lot of tweaking. Rules had to be changed to make it so the KC30 could even complete some of the missions.

But the most damning part of the GAO report is that there is a strong case that NG/EADS did not even meet all of the threshold requirements and therefore was not even eligible for the award.

I will agree that the KC30 can carry more cargo. But why didn't they agree to meet the depot requirement. Also why didn't they do the homework to show that they could refuel all the fixed wing aircraft.

So other than reposting the NG PR what do you have?

Since the GAO ruled that extra credit should not have been given for exceeding the requirement this chart is misleading.

Several lines on the spider's net point to something else - effectiveness or efficiency.

Did you ever thought about why no extra credit was given?
You would buy a car that's 0.1 % cheaper but offers less space just because it fulfills your minimum requirements - 4 wheels, 5 seats, engine and a steering wheel?

The IFARA number also required a lot of tweaking. Rules had to be changed to make it so the KC30 could even complete some of the missions.

GAO denied exactly that claim by Boeing.

But the most damning part of the GAO report is that there is a strong case that NG/EADS did not even meet all of the threshold requirements and therefore was not even eligible for the award.

Did you know that Boeing also failed in field of unrefueled range.

I think the depot issue is more about aircrafts like A310 or 767 at the end of production. Last year 68 A330 were delivered and 198 more were ordered. Why NG didn't issue something to comply with this requirement is NG’s fault.

So other than reposting the NG PR what do you have?

The GAO decision which sustains NG PR.

Did you ever thought about why no extra credit was given?

It doesn't really matter why. The RFP said no extra credit. The AF gave extra credit. That is why this is getting tossed.

Did you know that the 767 range would be further if they hadn't included more survivability features?

Did you read in the GAO report that although the 330 can carry more pallets it can't carry significantly more cargo on the main deck. This also shows the weakness in the RFP. They should have specified a cargo density. They have a standard pallet. I am sure there is also a standard weight for those pallets (for planning purposes). In the freight biz that is critical information.

Either the AF doesn't know how to write an RFP or it doesn’t know how to evaluate one. Either way they are about to get a whole lot more help in doing so.

It doesn't really matter why. The RFP said no extra credit. The AF gave extra credit. That is why this is getting tossed.

Next RFP: “Air Force will give extra credit for exceeding ...”

Did you know that the 767 range would be further if they hadn't included more survivability features?

Then Boeing shouldn't have used concrete as protecting material.

Did you read in the GAO report that although the 330 can carry more pallets it can't carry significantly more cargo on the main deck.

The SSAC noted that the KC-30 could carry more 463L pallets⁽²⁵⁾ than Boeing,⁽²⁶⁾ and that Northrop Grumman offered the capability to carry 463L pallets on both the main cargo deck and a lower cargo compartment, while Boeing only offered the single cargo deck.

[...]

(26) The SSAC noted, however, that the KC-30’s total weight carriage capability on the main cargo deck was not substantially greater than that of the KC-767. AR, Tab 55, PAR, at 17.

They should have specified a cargo density. They have a standard pallet. I am sure there is also a standard weight for those pallets (for planning purposes).

463L master pallet
Each pallet is 88 inches (224 cm) wide, 108 inches (274 cm) long, and 2-1/4 inches (5.7 cm) high. The usable space is 84” (213 cm) by 104” (264 cm). It can hold up to 10,000 lb (4,500 kg) of cargo at 8 g. Empty, each pallet weighs 290 lb (130 kg), or 355 lb (160 kg) with two side nets and a top net. (Source Wikipedia)

So with about 12 463L pallets at max weight a KC-45 is full (52 t). You can load 8 in the lower cargo compartment and scatter the other 4 the main deck. That's just a guess.

Weight of a CFM56 engine is about 2.5 t, F110 2.0 t and PW4000-94 4.3 t. I doubt one of the KCs can handle one of these engines on the main deck.

KC-767AT can carry more than 40,000 lbs fuel in the lower cargo compartment. Maximum gross weight for one LD-2 container is 2,700 lb and 767-200 can carry 22 LD-2 (59,400 lb). A330-200 can carry 26 LD-3 with a maximum gross weight of 3,500 lb for each LD-3. Both container systems have nearly the same pressure of 0.96 lb/in^2 on cargo floor. Max. pressure of a 463L is about 1.05 lb/in^2. With the same pressure as a civil container a 463L pallet could weight up to 9,100 lb on civil aircrafts. That's fare more than weight of CFM56.

I want close with the words of Mr. Kepplinger:

Boeing also challenges the Air Force’s evaluation judgment in the airlift area that Northrop Grumman’s proposed aircraft offered superior cargo, passenger, and aeromedical evacuation capability than did Boeing’s aircraft. From our review of the record, including the hearing testimony, we see no basis to conclude that the Air Force’s evaluation that Northrop Grumman’s aircraft was more advantageous in the airlift area is unreasonable.

Or just ignore survivability altogether (like NG did) and somehow get the AF to not count it against you.

No, but it wasn't so much about passive or active protection measures. The main difference the Air Force found was about some software features.

Did you see the previous (may 2007) GAO report that said the AF did not adequately justify the need for cargo?

Yes, passenger capability was also questioned.
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07566t.pdf
and
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07367r.pdf

DOD further stated that its Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Air Force concluded that the analysis was sufficient justification for the capability and the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated the requirement.

Then just take the better tanker, KC-45.

And now that the KC30 is the more expensive option there is analysis required to justify the additional expense.

One option costs more. That is not identical with more expensive. You most see the relation between costs and received performance.

According to the GAO approved numbers for Fleet Effectiveness (KC-45 1.9 / KC-767 1.79) with a fleet of 169 KC-45 you can do the job of 179 KC-767. So you can retire 20 KC-135 earlier, relieve 10 C-17 or lease them to FedEx.

Oh and while they are at it maybe they should run the numbers on the MIL CON now that they actually have the specs of the bid (not before like they did last time).

Like the “need for seat storage”? This is a dead end calculation. Air Force won't buy for each plane seats. That would be 34,000 seats just for KC-767 fleet (40,000 for KC-45)! Air Force will buy same amount of seats independent of aircraft. But first Air Force need to know how much seats are needed (GAO).

It costs more.

There are laws on the book about what justification needs to be done to go with the more expensive option. This wasn't done because the AF made it so it looked like the 767 was the more costly option.

You can make the argument about value for the extra cost, but you have to do it with numbers and analysis.

“More, more, more” sounds nice but the law requires more than just monosyllabic catch phrases.

From the GAO report:

Here, we agree that the SSET’s evaluation identified and documented the SRD requirements under which the firms’ evaluated strengths and weaknesses were assessed. Nevertheless, the record does not establish that the SSAC and SSA, in considering those strengths and weaknesses, applied the relative weights identified in the RFP for the various SRD requirements (under which the KPPs were most important). Moreover, the record does not show any consideration by the SSAC or SSA of the fact that Boeing’s proposal was evaluated as satisfying significantly more SRD requirements than Northrop Grumman’s.

and a little further down:

Although the record thus evidences that most of Boeing’s evaluated “major discriminators” were assessed under KPP requirements, and conversely most of Northrop Grumman’s evaluated “major discriminators” were assessed under less important non-KPP/KSA requirements,45 we have found no document in the contemporaneous evaluation record that shows that the SSAC or SSA gave any meaningful consideration to the weights that were to be assigned to the various KPP, KSA, and other requirements. That is, the SSAC’s briefing slides to the SSA and its PAR do no more than identify the SRD requirements for which the evaluated discriminators were assessed, but do not evidence any consideration of the descending order of importance assigned to these various SRD requirements.
In its briefing to the SSA, the SSAC merely reports each of the firms’ “advantages” without any analysis of whether or not Boeing’s “advantages” (which as indicated above are mostly derived from KPP objectives) were entitled to greater weight than Northrop Grumman’s advantages (which are mostly derived from less important non-KPP/KSA requirements).

This is like losing the Super Bowl, but only after the refs decide that a touchdown is worth 4 points and a field goal 5. (and they don't tell you this until time runs out).

The RFP laid out a scoring system. The evaluators chose to ignore it. Or they failed to document that it was applied.

If nothing more this should stop the mind numbing repeating of “fair and transparent”. Obviously this process was neither.

you could show him it written in blood and he will still argue that EADS is the better plane even tho it is a TURD.

I think MHalblaub is so full of his know it all B.S waving his white FRENCH surrender flag! he has no clue, he just likes to think he has the knowledge of those us who have flown and worked on airplanes Boeing has built for the USAF and do far more and lasted longer than they where intended to do.

He has no clue what it takes for a airplane to do a tanker mission, let alone ground crew preflights. Operationally the KC-767 is a far greater aircraft than EADS could ever think of making.

you could show him it written in blood and he will still argue that EADS is the better plane even tho it is a TURD.

He has no clue what it takes for a airplane to do a tanker mission, let alone ground crew preflights. Operationally the KC-767 is a far greater aircraft than EADS could ever think of making.

Alas I think you are right. In fact I get the feeling that NG hired a few people to post comments on forums. I am sure they thought this would be a cutting edge PR technique.

But when you see there really isn't any reasoning with them it does et old.

I notice none of them really seem to address any of the concerns raised. They just keep repeating the same NG/EADS talking points.

I do believe (protectionist or not) that the US should decide what best suits the needs of our military and WHERE to purchase those items. To lose this kind of capability is not in our national interest.

(for some of you Francophiles please explain the rationale for spending billions to build a copycat version of GPS, which you get to use for free. Or justify the $30B you spent to develop the A400 when you could have bought C-130s)

well put..

boogles the mind to think they are sold on that turd ( scarebus) its not even a northrop bird, over 50% of the profits will not be spent here it goes to FRANCE. stupid. And it CANNOT repeat CANNOT do the job that the KC-767 can and that is replace the KC-135. sure the EADS can haul more cargo or people but that is not what a tanker is for.

Wait and see how many countries find out that the planes built by EADS don’t add up to what they were suppose to be. Like there A-400 bet it will never be as reliable or flexable as the C-130. Glad the Army/AIr FOrce went with the C-27J over the EADS entry which did not add up to what the RFP called for either.

Or justify the $30B you spent to develop the A400 when you could have bought C-130s.

$30B? Is the exchange rate already that bad?

Several countries wanted more than C-130 offered. Like to airlift their APC. C-130 can't lift vehicle like German Puma, French VBCI or AMX 30, Spanish ASCOD AFV or British Warrior. C-17 is far to big for most countries which dislike to have more than one tactical airlifter. Several countries will replace C-130 or C-160 with A400M.

spending billions to build a copycat version of GPS, which you get to use for free.

It's then up to the EU to decide when to shut down or operate their positioning system.

Posted by a rationalist with distant French ancestors.

“EADS Airbus 330 tanker’s max weight is 507,000 pounds”

KC-10 Extender:
General Characteristics
Primary Function: Aerial tanker and transport
Contractor: The Boeing Company
Power Plant: Three General Electric CF6-50C2 turbofans
Thrust: 52,500 pounds (23,625 kilograms), each engine
Length: 181 feet, 7 inches (54.4 meters)
Height: 58 feet, 1 inch (17.4 meters)
Wingspan: 165 feet, 4.5 inches (50 meters)
Speed: 619 mph (Mach 0.825)
Ceiling: 42,000 feet (12,727 meters)
Maximum Takeoff Weight: 590,000 pounds (265,500 kilograms)
Range: 4,400 miles (3,800 nautical miles) with cargo; 11,500 miles (10,000 nautical miles) without cargo
Maximum Cargo Payload: 170,000 pounds (76,560 kilograms)
Pallet Positions: 27
Maximum Fuel Load: 356,000 pounds (160,200 kilograms)
Crew: Four (pilot, co-pilot, flight engineer and boom operator) Certain missions may require additional crew members. In aeromedical evacuation missions, a basic crew of five (two flight nurses and three medical technicians) is added. Medical crew may be altered as required

So the Northrop Grumman offering is too big?

I don’t think NG needed to hire anyone to post, nor Boeing. But if the US does decide to choose the NG offering and that it thinks its the best choice, will you be willing to live with that? I think not! Remember all EADS is providing is a basic airframe. All other systems related to the tanker conversion will be provided by companies in the US. So where is the lost capability? Boeing will still be building airframes, maybe not 767s but they’ll still be building aircraft.

I believe they built their own GPS because the were afraid of getting locked out in the time of war and the US was not providing/allowing access to the most precise capability of the system.

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