[GATOR NAVY]

Failing INSURV is bad, bad juju and heads usually roll.

[B-Chan]

I predict massive Field Days all around, commencing at 0430 and continuing indefinitely.

Glad I'm not there to join in the fun.

B-chan
Former MM3
USS ENTERPRISE (CVN-65)

GONAVY

[clee1]

How in HELL does something like this happen?

[csvset]

PMS isn't being done correctly would be my first guess. I'd guess that the COC is weak as well.

Here's a link to their home page.

USS STOUT DDG 55

[NTHockey]

What, the Navy ran out of paint? Oh, the world is coming to an end! We are all doomed.

[Chode]

when your offense is down, that's one thing. but when your defense is down too...

[ryan71]

“Three months after the ship returned from a deployment...and widespread corrosion”

My CO would have had every swinging dick E-5 and below broken into tiger teams and manning the needle guns for those 3 months.

We earned the name “Banana Boat” not just because of our name, USS Deyo, but because of our love of yellow zinc chromate.

[varon]

The sophisticated Aegis weapons systems, designed to protect ships from hostile missile attacks, was hobbled by faulty radar.

The other flaws spotted included missing safety gear, a broken close-in weapons system, widespread lube leaks and corrosion.

The ship had returned from a successful deployment to the Horn of Africa in December, and the strike group had no complaints about the ship's performance, he said.

By successful, they must mean it bobbed on the water without sinking. Thank God it wasn’t called upon to perform its designated functions. With the Aegis weapons system hobbled, a broken close-in weapons system, what did they expect to do if they encountered the enemy, have all hands shout BOO and hope it would scare them away?

[investigateworld]

bttt

[Straight Vermonter]

Career...over.

[Robe]

Simple formula for ship operations, been used for decades

+

+

+

=

[blam]

USS Stout (DDG-55)

[rabidralph]

But wait, we have 16 hours of sensitivity training we need to get through and we have to deliver some trees for Arbor Day planting.

[PerConPat]

Forbes said the members were told the Navy does not believe that problems on these ships were result of weaknesses in their leadership. "There was no indication that it was the commanders' fault," he said.

Unless the CO had documented the serious deficiencies and submitted written reports to superiors, I don't see how the command can escape serious criticism and consequences.

The briefer indicated that many of the problems could not have been detected "unless they had this kind of high-intensity inspection," he said. .

I can't see how a "high-intensity" inspection could ever disclose numerous, ongoing, existing deficiencies that would have escaped the previous notice of a well trained and alert crew.

Navy leaders also told the panel the issues did not result from a lack of funding.

Typical upper echelon CYA speak.

The crew had identified many of the problems before the InSurv, Quinn said. Some repairs may have been delayed - and put the ship in a poor position for a comprehensive review - because the crew knew they were headed to the shipyard, he said.

This comment, at least, leads me to believe that the crew was not totally asleep. However, problems- be they material or personnel- that degrade ships' operational capabilities must never ignored by crews or the chain of command. Something associated with this affair is emitting foul odors.

[TXnMA]

USN & USAF are not our only Services with infrastructure deficiencies. Check out this video of a Fort Bragg barracks

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=46vYZFU1Dew

sent to me by a senior NCO in the 82nd ABN.

~~~~~~~~~~~

I lived in a WWII barracks for a while in the USAF -- but, believe me, we were required to keep that place spotless and well-maintained. This Army barracks would have Child Protective Services dragging every adult in it off to jail -- if they found children living there!

And the worst part is that the ABN troops who are billeted there just returned from spending 15 months at a primitive FOB in Afghanistan...

Something (in addition to ships, planes, and barracks) is definitely rotten in our DOD...

[beauxdogs]

Just a few thoughts for consideration.

INSURV tends to embellish the significance of what it finds to enhance its authority. What is most significant is (a) the number of “starred” (i.e., restrictive) deficiencies, (b) the number of items the ship didn’t identify beforehand (technical proficiency), and how many of (a) were contained in (b). It’s one thing to have problems you recognize but can’t correct because of time, manpower, parts, or operating tempo. It’s something entirely different not to be able even to recognize problems. The facts that the crew documented many of the problems before INSURV and there is no indication of command negligence are favorable.

The INSURVs for STOUT and CHOSIN took place after deployment and before overhaul. These ships may have lost key people due to turnover after deployment and before INSURV. The type commander may even have intended to use the INSURV report as leverage to acquire more overhaul funds(it’s happened but it’s a gutsy ploy). It’s not good if the overhaul is truly short-funded.

It may not be entirely fair to lay the success or failure of a command inspection at the feet of the Goat Locker. It doesn’t take a 4 hashmark CPO to identify bleeding rust or FOD on engine intake screens. Department heads and division officers have to know what’s going on in their spaces, too.

I come from an era where the entire ship’s company took the superstructure and hull of a DLG down to bare metal with chipping hammers, scrapers, and needle guns during ROH before redeployment to Vietnam. But that was long, long ago in what is beginning to look like an America far, far away.

There may be more to this INSURV report than we realize. On the face of it, though, it certainly looks challenging.