The 25 ethnically and religiously diverse Iraqi interim council members, who produced the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL) as a new constitution basis, understood this position. Its’ 39 articles were unique in the Arab world for conceiving republican, federal, democratic and pluralistic government guaranteeing rights for speech, religion, private property, etc. for all including Christians, Jews and former Ba’athists. However, in 2004 the U.S. marginalized this extraordinary indigenous effort, and the people involved, when approving a new interim government, and favoring the supposed quick fix of a U.N. and Algeria brokered scheme compatible with traditional Arab authoritarian rule.
Counterinsurgency successes allow the re-emergence of moderate constituencies that can force and/or facilitate agreement on the difficult issues facing the government. Unfortunately, few tolerate understanding these individuals are just now leaving behind a world dominated by fears of murder and torture directed against immediate and extended families.
Comparable, though less daunting issues, our Congress faces would be social security and immigration. They have managed zero progress on either issue for at least the last twenty years through both Republican and Democrat Administrations and Congresses. How reprehensible, arrogant and perverse to demand instantaneous statesmanship miracles from novice legislators barely extricating themselves from criminal constituencies applying murderous bestiality as the primary method for political persuasion.
Encouraging is the fact Iraq shares with WW II era Japan and Germany over a millennium of rocky governmental and philosophical ground. All traversed the same road through tribal and chiefdom wars (We called them duchies, imperial states, clans, provinces, fiefs, etc) to authoritarian domination. Muslim religion, as most often interpreted by their scholars (?), is no less amenable to representative government, than dour, brooding myths of Germanic tribes, teachings of Nietzsche, Marx and Engels, Japanese god/kingship comparable to ancient Pharaohs, or principles of Kokutai deriving interwoven national essence and personal identity from Emperor, citizen, ancestral spirits, government and Shinto religion.
State Department reports many African, Oriental and Asian countries becoming allies against Wahhabi jihadism. Yet they remember pathetic responses to fifteen terrorist actions by four successive Presidents. Highlights of servile behavior include Carter’s failure to defend Iranian embassy sovereignty. Under Reagan, Marines were forbidden to load weapons when guarding barracks, and we ran after Hezbollah killed 241 in Beirut. Under Bush #1, Arabs around Basra revolted with U.S. encouragement, and then were abandoned to Hussein’s retribution. Under Clinton, we fled Somalia after 18 Rangers were killed, and allowed Hussein to eject U.N. inspectors. Minimum penance demonstrating credibility obliges persistence for Iraq representative government. Credibility requires thwarting al Qaeda determination for Babylon to become the rallying point for the Caliphate.
Sustaining initiatives of African, Oriental and Asian countries brings GWOT victory by frustrating plans, breaking alliances and fracturing organizations of Wahhabi jihadists into ever less effective units. Without cities, countries or armies bin Laden and successor sociopath prophets live out unnaturally shortened lives as pariahs. Sun Tzu would consider mobilizing allies to compound campaign victories, and minimize bloodshed an extraordinary achievement for this “Long War”.
The tribes would be the equivalent of localities. The Sunnis, Shias and Kurds would be the equivalent of states.
Let the tribes select their leaders in whatever manner they are accustomed to. Let the tribes select the sect leaders. So Shia tribes select Shia leaders etc. Then let the three main sects govern making sure that no party is big enough to shove results down the others throats without the consent of at least one of the other two sects. Or some kind of supermajority requirement.
isn’t it strange that the “Arabs around Basra” revolted with American encouragement in ‘91, but hadn’t during the Iran-Iraq war of the 80’s?
After we took over, the Sunnis up there made an alliance with Al Qaeda because they needed outside muscle to continue being beastly to the Kurds, who got beastly right back and started some rather successful ethnic cleansing of their relatively new, and thoroughly unpleasant, Sunni Arab neighbors.
Who started losing big-time recently so they changed sides and started helping us against Al Qaeda up there, rather than helping Al Qaeda against us.
But the Kurds were not impressed and continued with their policy of encouraging the Sunni Arabs to move elsewhere, and killing the ones who wouldn't.
So the Sunni Arabs in Kurdish areas hit on the idea of making a deal with (gasp! shock! horror!) their hated and feared enemies, the Shia Arabs.
Who wanted to know what was in it for them.
So the Sunni Arabs in the north said, "Oil, you dummies, oil! That means money! If the Kurds kick us out, they get all the oil and, if they then declare independence or get automony, you guys won't get any!"
The Shia allowed as how this was a winning argument. Money talks and bs walks.
The bargain seems to be that, if the Shia keep the Kurds from getting rid of the Sunni Arabs in the northern oil areas, the Sunnis there and elsewhere will support a Shia demand for most of the oil income, on behalf of all Iraqis, provided they share with the Sunnis.
That sounds positively Congressional.
bump for later