Replies

Note: To read the entire text, please click on the link below. Thank you.

ICC-CCS.ORG - THE WEEKLY PIRACY REPORT - REPORT SNIPPET - QUOTE:

http://www.icc-ccs.org/prc/piracyreport.php

Weekly Piracy Report
1-7 January 2008

The following is a summary of the daily reports broadcast by the IMB’s Piracy Reporting Centre to ships in Atlantic, Indian and Pacific Ocean Regions on the SafetyNET service of Inmarsat-C from 1 to 7 January 2008.

ALERT

Chittagong anchorage, Bangladesh
The number of attacks has reduced since 2006. However, the area is still listed as a high risk area and mariners are advised to be cautious especially while approaching the anchorage and while at anchor at Chittagong

Nigeria
Violent attacks carried out by pirates on board vessels at anchor and vessel carrying out STS operations. Mariners are advised to exercise extreme caution in these waters.

Suspicious crafts

Recently reported incidents

04.01.2008: 01740 UTC: 06:16.2N – 003:22.7E, 7.5 NM off shore, Lagos anchorage, Nigeria.
Four armed robbers in a small rubber boat attempted to board a bulk carrier at anchor using grappling hook. Duty crew raised alarm and crew mustered. Robbers escaped. Nothing stolen. Master tried to report to port control but no response.

31.12.2007: 0100 UTC: 06:16.1N-003:18.3E: Lagos anchorage, Nigeria.
Two robbers armed with knives boarded a product tanker from the port quarter, while the duty watch keeper was on the stbd side. The robbers held the watch keeper at knifepoint and threatened him. The robbers stole his personal belongings. The second watch keeper noticed the robbers and informed the duty officer. Alarm raised and crew alerted. Robbers jumped overboard and escaped in a small wooden boat.

31.12.2007: 0340 UTC: Berth no. 20, Apapa, Lagos, Nigeria.
Two armed robbers boarded a berthed, bulk carrier, during cargo operations using a long stick with a hook. Two more robbers remained in the speedboat. Duty watch keeper spotted them and raised alarm. Armed police arrived on scene and tried to stop the robbers but the robbers resisted. Police opened fire and one robber was injured. Robbers jumped overboard and escaped. No injuries to crew and nothing stolen.

04.01.2008: 0920 LT 20:51.8N – 107:07.4E, Vinh Ha Long inner anchorage, Haiphong, Vietnam.
Seven pirates, armed with knives, in a wooden boat came alongside a container ship during anchoring operations. They stole ship’s stores and attacked three crewmembers who tried to stop them. A Vietnamese official watch keeper was onboard but did not take any action to stop the robbers. No injuries to crew. Incident reported to agent. Agent advised not to contact the police. No action taken.

Note: The following text is a quote:

http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp759.htm

January 9, 2008
HP-759

Treasury Designates Individuals, Entity Fueling Iraqi Insurgency

The U.S. Department of the Treasury today designated four individuals and one entity under Executive Order 13438 for threatening the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq. The individuals and entity designated today commit, direct, support, or pose a significant risk of committing acts of violence against Iraqi citizens, Iraqi government officials, and Coalition Forces.

“Iran and Syria are fueling violence and destruction in Iraq. Iran trains, funds, and provides weapons to violent Shia extremist groups, while Syria provides safe-haven to Sunni insurgents and financiers,” said Stuart Levey, Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence. “Today’s action brings to light the lethal actions of these individuals, and we call on the international community to stand with us in isolating them from the global economy.”

By committing, directing, and supporting violent attacks in Iraq, these extremists threaten peace and stability and undermine efforts to promote economic reconstruction in Iraq.

Today’s action follows President Bush’s issuance of E.O. 13438 on July 17, 2007, which targets insurgent and militia groups and their support. Designations under E.O. 13438 are administered by Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control and prohibit all transactions between the designees and any U.S. person and freeze any assets the designees may have under U.S. jurisdiction.

Identifying Information

AHMED FORUZANDEH
AKAs: Ahmad Foruzandeh
Ahmad Fruzandah
Ahmad Fayruzi
Jafari
Ahmad Foroozandeh
Abu Shahab
Abu Ahmad Ishab
Title: Brigadier General, Commanding Officer of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force (IRGC-QF) Ramazan Corps
Former Title: Deputy Commander of the Ramazan Headquarters and Chief of Staff of the Iraq Crisis Staff
POB: Kermanshah, Iran
DOB: Circa 1958-1963
Alt. DOB: 1957
Alt. DOB: Circa 1955
Education: Husayni Political University
Location: Qods Force Central Headquarters in the former U.S. Embassy Compound in Tehran, Iran

Iran-based Ahmed Foruzandeh, a Brigadier General in the IRGC-QF, leads terrorist operations against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces, and directs assassinations of Iraqi figures. The Qods Force, designated under E.O. 13224 for providing material support to terrorists, is the regime’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists and Islamic militants to advance Iranian national interests. The Qods Force provides training, weapons, and financial support to surrogate groups and terrorist organizations including: Lebanese Hizballah; Palestinian terrorists; Iraqi Shia militant groups; the Taliban and Islamic militants in Afghanistan, the Balkans and elsewhere. The Qods Force plays a central – yet often hidden – role in security interests, including Iraq and Afghanistan. Qods Force officers often use various cover mechanisms – including diplomatic, non-governmental organization, humanitarian, and media – for conducting operational activity, belying their military affiliation.

As of mid-February 2007, Foruzandeh ordered his Iranian intelligence officers to continue targeting Shia and Sunnis to further sectarian violence within Iraq. Foruzandeh is also responsible for planning training courses in Iran for Iraqi militias, including Sayyid al-Shuhada and Iraqi Hizballah, to increase their ability to combat Coalition Forces. The training includes courses in guerilla warfare, light arms, marksmanship, planting improvised explosive devices (IEDs), and firing anti-aircraft missiles.

Foruzandeh and his subordinates provide financial and material support for acts of violence against Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces. In early-April 2007, Foruzandeh provided $25,000 USD to help fund military operations against Coalition Forces in Salah Ad Din Province, Iraq. Foruzandeh provided the funds to two men claiming to be members of a Sunni terrorist organization in Iraq, promising the men additional funds if they would deliver videos of attacks against Coalition Forces. Foruzandeh also offered to deliver weapons to the border, if the two men could transport the weapons into Iraq in order to fight Coalition Forces. Previously, in August 2004, Foruzandeh drove explosives and associated materials into Iraq from Iran for use in suicide bombings.

In addition to providing financial and material support for attacks against Coalition Forces, Foruzandeh supplied a certain Shia militia group with a target for execution. On July 25, 2005, Foruzandeh held a meeting with representatives of Iraqi Hizballah and other Shia militia groups, calling upon them to continue liquidating all enemies of the Islamic revolution, including security and intelligence personnel, tribal chiefs, and religious clerics.

ABU MUSTAFA AL-SHEIBANI
AKAs: Hameid Thajeil Wareij Al-Attabi
Hamid Al-Shaybani
Abu Mustafa Al-Shebani
Abu Mustafa Al-Shaybani
Mustafa Al-Sheibani
Hamid Thajil
Hamid Thajeel Al-Sheibani
DOB: Circa 1960
Alt. DOB: 1959
POB: Nasiriyah, Iraq
Citizenship: Iranian
All Citizenship: Iraqi
Location: Tehran, Iran

Iran-based Abu Mustafa Al-Sheibani leads a network of Shia extremists that commit and provide logistical and material support for acts of violence that threaten the peace and stability of Iraq and the Government of Iraq. Al-Sheibani’s Iran-sponsored network was created to affect the Iraqi political process in Iran’s favor. The network’s first objective is to fight U.S. forces, attacking convoys and killing soldiers. Its second objective is to eliminate Iraqi politicians opposed to Iran’s influence. Elements of the IRGC were also sending funds and weapons to Al-Sheibani’s network.

Al-Sheibani’s network – consisting of several hundred members – conducted IED attacks against Americans in the Baghdad region. As of March 2007, Al-Sheibani, known to transport Katyusha rockets to be used for attacks against Coalition Forces, launched rockets against Americans and made videos of the attacks to get money from Iran. As of April 2007, a member of Al-Sheibani’s network supervised the transport of money and explosives from Iran for eventual arrival in Baghdad. In early-May 2007, Al-Sheibani’s network assisted members of a Shia militia group by transporting them to Iran for training and providing them with weapons for their activities in Iraq.

Additionally, Al-Sheibani commands several pro-Iranian insurgent groups in southern Iraq that work to destabilize Iraq and sabotage Coalition efforts. These groups use a variety of weapons, to include mortars, Katyusha rockets, and anti-tank landmines. Ordered by IRGC headquarters to create disorder, the task of these groups is to attack bases of Coalition Forces in southern Iraq, particularly British forces.

In an effort to cause instability in Iraq, Al-Sheibani and his network targeted Iraqi government officials. Al-Sheibani conducted attacks against the Iraqi Police Chief of Najaf, Iraq, and the Iraqi Deputy Governor in Jajaf, Iraq. Al-Sheibani’s network also killed Muhammad al-Friji, a colonel in the Iraqi Ministry of Interior.

ISMA’IL HAFIZ AL LAMI (ABU DURA)
AKAs: Abu Dura
Abu Diri
Abu Dar’a
Abu Haydar
Ismail Hafeth Izajawi
Ismail al-Lami
Isma’il Hafith Abid `Ali al-Lami
Ismai’il Hafuz al-Zargawi
DOB: Circa 1957
POB: Baghdad, Iraq
Citizenship: Iraq
Location 1: Iran
Location 2: Sadr City, Baghdad, Iraq

As of 2007, Iran-based Shia extremist Abu Dura and his group were actively targeting Iraqi government officials, Sunni community leaders, and anyone who cooperated with Coalition Forces. In a brazen daylight attack, Abu Dura and his group kidnapped employees from the Ministry of Higher Education in November 2006. Sunni hostages were then singled out, tortured, and killed by men under Abu Dura’s control. Abu Dura was also responsible for the July 2006, kidnapping of Taysir Najih Awad al-Mashadani, a Sunni member of the Iraqi Parliament. He also planned to kidnap Sunni Iraqi politician Adnan al-Dulaymi and planned a mortar attack against the residence of Iraqi Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi.

Abu Dura also directs acts of violence against Iraqi civilians. Abu Dura uses members of a Baghdad-based Shia militia to gather information on potential targets. Abu Dura then uses this information to plan and coordinate potential kidnapping and assassination operations. In July 2006, men under Abu Dura’s control routinely executed Iraqi citizens in Sadr City, Baghdad.

In addition to directing acts of violence against Iraqi government officials and citizens, Abu Dura supported acts of violence against U.S. and Coalition Forces. In July 2006, men under Abu Dura’s control attacked a U.S. forces patrol in Sadr City, Baghdad. The purpose of the attack was to kidnap U.S. soldiers and use them as a tool to make U.S. forces leave Iraq. After fleeing to Iran to avoid capture by Coalition Forces, Abu Dura continued to direct attacks in Iraq against Coalition Forces and Sunnis in Iraq during early-2007. Abu Dura maintained contact with proxies in Iraq who carried out those attacks.

MISH’AN RAKIN THAMIN AL-JABURI
AKAs Mushan al-Jaburi
Meshaan al-Juburi
Mishan Jibouri
Mishan al-Jabouri
Mashaan Aljabouri
Mashaan Jabouri
Mash’an el-Jburi
Mish’an al-Juburi
Mush’an al-Jiburi
Mashan Juburi
Mishan al-Jabburi
Meshan Thamin al Jabouri
Mishan Riqardh Damin al Jabouri
Mishaan al-Jubouri
Mashaan Rakadh Dhamin Al Jabbury
Misham Al Jaburi
Mish’an Rakkad Damin al-Jabburi
Nationality: Iraq
Citizenship: Syrian
DOB: 1 August 1957
POB: Ninwa, Iraq
Passport number: 01374026
Location 1: Latakia, Syria
Location 2: Damascus, Syria

Syria-based Mish’an Al-Jaburi provides financial, material, and technical support for acts of violence that threaten the peace and stability of Iraq. In February 2006, Al-Jaburi was expelled from the New Iraqi Parliament and fled Iraq to Syria for embezzling government funds and supporting Iraq-based insurgents. Al-Jaburi also owns Syria-based Al-Zawra, a television station that considers itself to be part of the fight against the U.S. In one instance, Al-Jaburi agreed to broadcast open-coded messages through patriotic songs to the Sunni terrorist group Islamic Army of Iraq. Additionally, Al-Jaburi utilized his nephew, Hasib Ismail Dandan, to provide storage sites for weapons, funds, and footage transiting in and out of Iraq.

Despite being publicly critical of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI), Al-Jaburi is reported to have provided financial support and services to AQI. Al-Jaburi worked with an AQI jihadist umbrella organization, the Mujahadin Shura Council, to fund Sunni extremist operations. Additionally, Al-Jaburi’s television station broadcast recruitment videos for AQI’s Abu Bakr Al-Sadiq Al Salafi Battalion.

AL-ZAWRA TELEVISION STATION
AKAs Alzawraa TV
Al-Zawraa TV
El-Zawra satellite station
Zorah Channel
Al Zoura TV station
Al-Zawara satellite television station
Al Zawrah Television
Zawrah TV station
Al Zaoura network
Location: Syria

Syria-based Al-Zawra television station is owned and controlled by Mish’an Al-Jaburi. Publicly stating that he owns Al-Zawra and that “no one” outside his family controlled its content, Al-Jaburi privately agreed to broadcast open-coded messages through patriotic songs to the Sunni terrorist group the Islamic Army of Iraq. Al-Zawra, which has received financing from Al-Qa’ida, is also used as a venue to broadcast graphic videos of attacks against U.S. forces. Additionally, Al-Zawra broadcast recruitment videos for AQI’s Abu Bakr Al-Sadiq Al-Salafi Battalion. In November 2006, Al-Zawra’s Iraq office was closed by the Government of Iraq for airing programs inciting violence.

In addition to the reasons for which Al-Zawra is being designated, it is a pro-insurgency station that broadcasts graphic videos of insurgent attacks against U.S. forces, advocates violence against Shia, and calls upon Iraqis to unite and take up arms against Coalition Forces.

-30-